The waters of the Maori: Maori law and state law by Durie, Edward Taihākurei et al.
1 
 
NGĀ WAI O TE MĀORI  
Ngā Tikanga me Ngā Ture Roia 
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HE WHAKAMĀRAMA  
 
Purpose  
1. This paper is for filing in the Waitangi Tribunal in relation to a claim that 
existing laws do not adequately accommodate the Māori proprietary interest 
in natural, water resources. The claim was initiated by the New Zealand 
Māori Council in association with ten tribal groups.  It was later accompanied 
by 166 other Māori groups, whom the Tribunal joined as interested parties.  
 
2. The inquiry has progressed through stage one, where the Tribunal found that 
a Māori proprietary interest in natural water resources had been proven.  The 
Supreme Court endorsed that finding.  A long recess followed while the 
Crown developed its proposals to reform water laws.  
 
3. In the current stage 2, the Tribunal is considering the adequacy of the 
Crown’s present and proposed laws.  It is anticipated that in the middle of the 
current year, geothermal water will be addressed as stage 3 and in stage 4,  
the inquiry may focus on how the Māori interest may be provided for in law.  
 
4. The Māori Council considered that technical evidence on custom law would 
be filed in the final stage after the tribal groups had given their customary 
evidence. However, on 16 November, an interested party sought leave to file 
expert and technical evidence on custom law by 20 January 2017. The 
Tribunal accepted that custom law evidence should be filed by that date. This 
paper responds to that directive. 
 
Explanation of terms 
5. This paper uses ‘Tikanga Māori’ for custom law.  Māori spoke of that which 
is ‘tika’ or ‘right’ and thus used ‘tikanga’ in the nominalized form - the 
desirable standards by which correctness, justice or rightness is maintained.1  
The addition of “Māori” is modern, for previously, there was no other 
tikanga.    
                                                 
1 For the origin, meaning and use of the term ‘tikanga’ see Richard Benton, Alex Frame, Paul Meredith Te 
Mātāpunenga. A Compendium of References to the Concepts and Institutions of Māori Customary Law Victoria 
University Press 2013 p 429.  Note that ‘tikanga’ was used for ‘rights’ in the Treaty of Waitangi and in the ‘fourth 
article’ referred to by Colenso, ‘ritenga’ is used for ‘custom’.   Bishop Manuhuia Bennett regarded tikanga as 
‘doing things right, doing things the right way, and doing things for the right reasons.’ See Matapunenga at 431. 
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6. ‘Ritenga’, has also been translated as ‘custom’, but it is not used here as it is 
more regularly used for customary practices and ritual and is now associated 
with the Christian Book of Common Prayer.   
 
7. ‘Ture Roia’ is an 19th century transliteration which is used for ‘state law’. 
‘Ture’ was introduced for the Biblical torah, or Hebrew Law and became 
used also for ‘state law’, especially when used with ‘roia’, a transliteration of 
‘law’.     
 
Explanation of Content 
8. Part A seeks to describe Tikanga Māori in relation to water and water bodies.  
It considers the law’s spiritual foundation, how the spiritual foundation 
shaped the customary use of water and water bodies and how water bodies 
were possessed by hapū as though they were property, even although they 
were not so described as property by Maori (but simply as land and water).  
 
9. This is not proposed as a definitive analysis of the tikanga on water. The 
purpose is to identify those key points that are likely to assist in developing 
a state law that is more cognisant of Māori interests.  The failure of those 
brought up under English law, to appreciate the essential aspects of the native 
tenure, is the primary reason why Māori freehold land is now beset by 
problems of multiple and absentee ownership. The same failure is evident in 
our own time, in the Government control of the recent shaping of Post 
Settlement Governance Entities.  This Part therefore follows the 1994 
monograph, Custom Law by Chief Judge Durie, as he then was, which 
compiled the essential elements of Tikanga Māori generally to assist 
practitioners in the Waitangi Tribunal and Māori Land Court.     
 
10. Part B considers the cultural conflict between certain key concepts of 
Tikanga and Te Ture Roia which impact on the use and management of water 
bodies.  It considers the principles by which state law has endeavoured to 
accommodate the conflict in the past, and which informs on how the same 
may be accommodated today. 
 
11. The conclusions for Part A and B are located at paragraph 142. 
 
12. Part C considers the state’s limited recognition of the Tikanga on water today 
and how this contrasts with the larger recognition of Tikanga in the past.  This 
part considers a much larger recognition is due in terms of the legal doctrines 
and precedents of the common law states, especially New Zealand, England, 
Canada, United States and Australia, and in terms of the universally accepted 
norms of the United Nations.  It compares the Māori view that the hapū held 
both political control and the exclusive use-rights, or ownership, of water 
bodies, with the Crown view (apart from exceptional cases) that the Crown 
has the political control and that the Māori interest is limited to caring for 
waterways.  This does not provide for a property interest but only a cultural 
one and because, it seems, that in the Crown’s view, Māori had no conception 
of ownership and property.  
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13. Accordingly, this part looks to the precedents of the common law which 
require that the laws of the indigenous people are also respected, and which 
signal that, as a result, certain assumptions of the state Law, may be 
inapplicable outside of England. The part examines how the native law is 
given effect in state law through the doctrine of aboriginal title and by statutes 
giving effect to negotiated Treaty settlements.  It also considers the adequacy 
of certain settlements, proposed law changes and current statutes, like the 
Resource Management Act (“RMA”).  A failure to provide adequately for 
Tikanga Māori is considered to relate to assumptions that Māori did not have 
mana in relation to water, with its twin components of political authority and 
exclusive possession, but had only kaitiakitanga, or an interest in 
management. This part also highlights the significant role of the Waitangi 
Tribunal in findings of fact on Tikanga Māori for transmission to the general 
courts.  
 
14. This part finally examines the significant drivers for statutory change, the 
Waitangi Tribunal, in its interpretation of the Treaty of Waitangi and its 
findings on the relevant facts, and the norm setting work of the United 
Nations, as it relates to both states and the state-like appearance of 
international business. 
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PART A: HE TIKANGA MŌ TE WAI 
Tikanga and the spiritual relationship to water 
Understanding Tikanga 
19. The Waitangi Tribunal has noted before that lakes, rivers and springs are 
taonga (treasured possessions) which are highly significant to Māori well-
being and ways of life.2  But as the Environment Court has considered, to 
understand that significance and how it affects Māori conduct, one must step 
deeply inside Māori thinking.  One must see the world through Māori eyes, 
and assess Māori values within a Māori worldview.3 A culture cannot be 
understood in terms of the worldview of another.4  
 
20. Canon Māori Marsden described the world view of a culture as the central 
systemisation of conceptions of reality to which the members of that culture 
assent and from which stems their value system.  The worldview, he 
considered, lies at the very heart of the culture, touching, interacting with and 
strongly influencing every aspect of the culture.5  It is by understanding the 
world-view of a culture that we can come to understand its values and 
ultimately, mātauranga Māori (Māori knowledge systems) and Tikanga 
Māori (Māori law).   
 
21. But is Tikanga Māori, law or lore?  Anthropologists now generally accept 
that where there is a society of people there is law.6  Dame Joan Metge for 
example recognises that law prevails whether through the law making and 
law enforcing institutions of complex state societies, or through the informal 
                                                 
2 Waitangi Tribunal, He Maungarongo – Report on Central North Island Claims, Stage One, (Waitangi Tribunal 
Report 2008.  Volume 4) p.1281.  
3 Ngati Hokopu ki Hokowhitu v Whakatane District Council (2002) 9 ELRNZ 111 (NZEnvC). Refer also the 1921 
decision of the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council, Amodu Tijani v Secretary, Southern Nigeria, (1921), 2 
AC 399. 
4 Understanding a culture in its own terms is difficult when simply writing in English will convey meanings that 
do not exactly fit with the native comprehension and when the understanding of difference is sought through 
comparative studies. In Exploring Māori Values 1992 Dunmore Press, John Patterson attempts, as an 
investigative philosopher, to come to grips with personal, embedded limitations that inform any look into one 
world-view from the perspective of another. However, a seminal text on the topic is James Clifford and George 
E. Marcus (eds) Writing Culture The Poetics and Politics of Ethnography 1986 University of California Press.  
Refer also to the important discourse on Kaupapa Māori methodology, led by Professor Linda Tuhiwai Smith, 
which emerged, inter alia, as an affirmation of Indigenous (Maori) ways of knowing and worldviews and 
making space for post-colonial transformation. See Smith, L, Decolonizing Methodologies: Research and 
Indigenous Peoples (Zed Books, London, University of Otago Press, 1999); Battiste, M, Reclaiming Indigenous 
Voice and Vision (UBC Press, Vancouver, 2000) and Friere, P, Pedagogy of the Oppressed, (Penguin, London, 
1996) 
5 Royal, C.T, The Woven Universe: Selected Writings of Rev. Māori Marsden (Estate of Rev. Māori Marsden, 
2003) at 56. See also Royal, C, The Purpose of Education: Perspectives Arising from Mātauranga Māori: A 
Discussion Paper (Report Prepared for the Ministry of Education, Version 4, January 2007) p 38. 
6 N Rouland Legal Anthropology (The Athlone Press, London, 1994) and see the discussion by R, Boast “Māori 
Customary Law and Land Tenure” in R Boast, A Erueti, D McPhail and N Smith Māori Land Law 
(Butterworths, Wellington, 1999) at 2. See also Wickliffe, C, Maranui, K & Meredith, P, ‘Access to Customary 
Law’ (Visible Justice: Evolving Access to Law, Wellington, 12 September 1999) at 1-2. 
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and multi-purpose structures of small scale societies, as with the small hapū 
which constituted the Māori community.7  Early colonial officials also had 
no difficulty in accepting that Māori customs and usages had the character 
and authority of law.8 
 
22. Although this paper concerns tikanga in relation to water and water bodies, 
there are a number of values that apply to all tikanga.  These are introduced 
now.  Tikanga was based on a worldview in which all things descended 
from the Gods, and were passed down through the generations to the 
present by meticulously memorised whakapapa (genealogies) which 
establish the relationship of all people and all things.9  
 
23. From this worldview come the cardinal tikanga values of wairuatanga 
(spirituality including placating the departmental Gods), whanaungatanga 
(maintaining kin relationships with humans and the natural world, including 
through protocols of respect), koha (gift exchange), mana (authority 
including the authority which groups derive from land and waterways), tapu 
(the recognition of an inherent sanctity or a sanctity established for a purpose 
– to maintain a standard for example), noa (liberating a person or situation 
from tapu restrictions, usually through karakia and water), utu (maintaining 
reciprocal relationships and balance with nature and persons), mauri 
(recognition of the life-force of persons or objects), hau (respect for the vital 
essence of a person, place or object), rangatiratanga (appreciation of the 
attributes of leadership), manaakitanga (enhancing the mana of others 
especially through sharing, caring, generosity and hospitality to the fullest 
extent that honour requires); and kaitiakitanga (stewardship). Tikanga and 
ritenga also include adherence to a proper form and process in karakia, 
waiata, genealogical recitations, oratory and debate.10 
 
                                                 
7 Metge, J, ‘Commentary on Judge Durie’s Custom Law’ (Unpublished Custom Law Guidelines Project Paper, 
1997) at 5. 
8 See for example the instructions of James Stephen to Governor Hobson 9 December 1840, GBPP, 1841, No. 
311, at 24 cited in McLintock, A.H Crown Colony Government in New Zealand (Government Printer, 
Wellington, 1958) at 393-394. Also, in 1832, after a stay in New Zealand, R.W Hay reported to the Colonial 
Office in London: The property of the soil is well defined, their jurisprudence extensive, and its penalties are 
submitted to without opposition, even from the stronger party”.  ‘Notices of New Zealand’ from Original 
Documents in the Colonial Office, communicated by R.W. Hay, Esq., reported in The Journal of the Royal 
Geographical Society (Vol. 2, 1832). 
9 A concise and focused account of the creation of the world, the appearance of the Gods, and the descent to a 
range of lifeforms and inanimate objects, from the viewpoint of an ethnologist, is provided by Te Rangi Hiroa in 
The Coming of the Māori Whitcoulls 1949 Reprint 1977 (drawing on such previous ethnographers as Elsdon 
Best, Raymond Firth, HD Skinner, S Percy Smith and  John White).  However, two distinctive approaches 
which seek to capture in modern context the Māori sense of imagery in recitation see (a) the papers under The 
Achievement of Authentic Being in The Woven Universe, Selected Writings of Rev Māori Marsden edited by Te 
Ahukaramū Charles Royal (2003), Jones, Pei Te Hurinui, ‘Māori Genealogies’, in The Journal of the Polynesian 
Society (Volume 67, No. 2, 1958) p 162. and Jones, Pei Te Hurinui  He Tuhi Mārei-kura (2013) Aka & 
Associates Ltd.   
10 Pierre Tohe “Maori Jurisprudence: The Neglect of Tapu” (1996 – 1999) 8 Auckland University Law Review 
884. Tohe argues that a sense of divine responsibility, encapsulated in tapu, underlies the Maori legal system 
and enforces compliance with community norms. See also Mead, H, ‘The Nature of Tikanga’ (Paper presented 
to Mai i te Ata Hāpara Conference, Te Wānanga o Raukawa, Otaki, 11-13 August 2000) at 3-4. 
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24. Accordingly, the value system on which Tikanga Māori is based, is 
aspirational, setting desirable standards to be achieved.11  Thus, where our 
state law sets bottom lines, or minimum standards of conduct below which a 
penalty may be imposed, Tikanga Māori sets top-lines, describing 
outstanding performance where virtue is its own reward. With that 
background this paper now turns to the concepts that underlie Tikanga Māori 
in relation to water and water bodies.  
 
Tikanga 
25. Tikanga Māori reflects a metaphysical cosmology which is pervasive in 
determining how Māori relate to landforms and all forms of life.12 That 
includes how they relate to each other.  Their conception of the origin of all 
things on earth determines their ritenga (ritual), tikanga (law or customary 
values) and their perceptions of what is tika (right) or hē (wrong).  Their law 
is aspirational, setting standards of best conduct based on ancestral exploits, 
with prescription mainly reserved for ritenga including the propitiation of 
hara (spiritual offences).13 Compliance is largely self-enforced, driven by 
whakamā (shame) or mataku (fear of spiritual retribution).  Muru 
(community stripping of the goods of a whānau) was also practised, as utu 
(redress or restoration of balance) for some aituā (misfortune) like the 
careless loss of life or property or some breach of social laws.  Muru was 
usually undertaken with the full acquiescence of the whānau kua hē (the 
family or community in the wrong).14  
 
26. Fundamental to Tikanga Māori is a conception of how Māori should relate to 
land, water, all lifeforms and each other.  It is a conception based on: 
 Whakapapa or the physical descent of everything; and 
 Wairuatanga or the spiritual connection of everything. 
 
It is a law which recognises a legal responsibility to care for the world in 
which we live, and to constrain its exploitation.15  
 
Whakapapa 
27. Whakapapa may be introduced with the pepehā “ko tātou ngā kanohi me ngā 
waha korero o rātou mā, kua ngaro ki te pō” (we are but the seeing eyes and 
speaking mouths of those who have passed on).16 Traditional Māori 
knowledge is encoded in a mental construct called whakapapa.  The word 
derives from papa, which is anything broad and flat such as a flat rock, board 
or slab, and from whaka, a causative prefix that enables something to occur. 
                                                 
11 This is explored from a philosopher’s viewpoint by John Patterson in Exploring Māori Values 1992 Dunmore 
Press Ltd. See also Mead, H, Tikanga Maori: Living by Maori Values (Huia, Wellington, 2003) at 25-32.  
12  Korero by Te Rangikaheke on āwhina, among other topics, as cited in Grey, G, Polynesian Mythology 
(Whitcombe & Tombs, Wellington, 1956) at 15. 
13 Patterson, J, Exploring Maori Values (Dunmore Press, 1992). 
14 See the topic ‘Muru’ in Benton, R, Frame, A, Meredith, P, Te Mātāpunenga. A Compendium of References to 
the Concepts and Institutions of Māori Customary Law (Victoria University Press 2013) at 254. 
15 For a more extensive, general summary see Margaret Orbell (1985) The Natural World of the Māori William 
Collins Publishers, Auckland pp 215-217  
16 Ministry of Justice, Hinatore ki te Ao Māori: A Glimpse into the Māori World (Ministry of Justice, Wellington, 
2001) ‘Māori Social Structures.’ 
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Whakapapa means to place layer upon layer.17 A leading example of this 
concept is the orderly recitation and naming of genealogies according to 
successive generations and specific lineages. This form of whakapapa 
envisages a building upon the past, layer by layer, towards the present and 
into the future.  
 
28. John Rangihau identified whakapapa as the most fundamental aspect of how 
Māori come to know the world and their place in it.18 It tells how people 
connect to the Gods, land, waterways, mountains and people and helps define 
their rights and responsibilities.   
 
29. Hence, in Māori cosmology, all things are related by descent.  It is not just 
all Māori who are connected in genealogical tables. All things descend from 
departmental atua (ancestral deities) at various generational levels, all 
ultimately descending from Io Matuakore and through Io, Ranginui (the sky) 
and Papatūānuku (the earth).19 Accordingly, the atua are tūpuna (ancestors), 
whose wairua (spirits), like those of all tūpuna, continue to have influence.  
The people, and the resources they use for food, clothing or shelter, are not 
the victims of the atua, but their progeny.  The atua serve to protect, but they 
also serve to punish takahē/takahanga (transgressions).   
 
30. This shapes the way that Māori relate to the environment and to each other.  
In taking fish for food or trees for timber, for example, they are encroaching 
on the domain of particular atua.  They must show respect, not exploiting 
mindlessly, but taking only that which is necessary and beneficial to others.  
So, greed is frowned on.  The first fish caught is given away.20 The catch is 
offered first to the elderly.  In taking from the bounty of Tangaroa, one thinks 
not of oneself but of the needs of others.  
 
31. Similarly, in entering te wao nui (the forest domains) of Tāne, no great tree 
is felled without seeking permission by karakia,21 and the thought is not for 
                                                 
17 Williams, H, A Dictionary of the Māori Language. (Reprint of 7th ed. A R Shearer, Government Printer, 
Wellington, 1975, 7th ed first published in 1971) p 259. 
18 Rangihau, J, ‘Being Māori’ in King, M (Ed), Te Ao Hurihuri: The World Moves On (3rd Ed, Longman Paul 
Press, Auckland, 1981) pp 165-175. 
19 On the place of Io, and the possibility of post-Christian reconstructions, see Te Rangihoroa The Coming of the 
Māori 1949 Whitcoulls Limited, 526, 531-536.  For an ethnography on the Creation, the departmental Gods and 
the origins of mankind see pp 431 – 472. For modern summaries see Law Commission, Maori Custom and 
Values in New Zealand law (Study Paper 9, Wellington, 2001) at 32; New Zealand Ministry of Justice He 
Hinatore ki te Ao Māori: A Glimpse Into the Māori World (New Zealand Government, Wellington, 2001); 
Department of Conservation, ‘Report and Recommendations of the Board of Inquiry into the New Zealand 
Coastal Policy’ (14 Feb 1994) cited in Nolan, D, (ed.) Environmental and Resource Management Law (4th Ed, 
LexisNexis, Wellington, New Zealand, 2011) at para 14.2. 
20 At least in the authors’ experience and as recorded by the Waitangi Tribunal Motunui-Waitara Report 1983 
section 4.5 but Glen P Te Awaawa Firmin writes in Kei Hea Ngā Mānu in Ahunga Tikanga 2012 at 85 that 
amongst Te Ātihaunui ā Paparangi “the first fish caught was always thrown back” and in other districts “they 
hang it in a tree and leave it there”.  See also Mead, H, Tikanga Maori: Living by Maori Values (Huia, 
Wellington, 2003) at 25-32. See also Patterson, J, Exploring Maori Values (Dunmore Press, 1992) at 195. Refer 
also to ‘Manaakitanga’ in Benton, R, Frame, A, Meredith, P, Te Mātāpunenga. A Compendium of References to 
the Concepts and Institutions of Māori Customary Law (Victoria University Press 2013) at 205-209. 
21 And so the story of Rata who was unable to complete the construction of his waka until he had completed the 
appropriate ritual for the felling of a tree.  See Alpers Māori Myths and Tribal Legends 1964 Longman Paul 
127. 
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personal benefit, but to build a great house, or waka or the like, for everyone.  
It was also common that in the papakainga (villages), the whare (house) of 
the rangatira (leaders) was no grander than that of others.  The grand house, 
the whare rūnanga, was the house of everybody and the place for the visitors.   
 
32. One need not go beyond the proceedings on a marae today to appreciate that 
there are elaborate respect protocols too when hapū (bands or tribes) greet 
one another, or when hapū come together as an iwi (confederation).  Social 
gatherings do not begin with mix and mingle. The process is again, a spiritual 
one which involves the recognition and respecting of difference, the 
acknowledgement of the spiritual world of the ancestors, the 
acknowledgement of tangata whenua and manuhiri each according to their 
karanga (call), the acknowledgment of commonality through whakapapa 
(genealogies), and individual acknowledgments by hongi.22    
 
33. The first law for Māori is probably therefore, a law of relationships, about 
how Māori relate to their environment and to one another.23 Whether one is 
talking with visitors on a marae, or is fishing, hunting, building, weaving or 
foraging, protocols of respect are paid to keep peace in the spiritual and 
earthly realms.  The protocols are replete with whaikōrero (orations), pepeha 
(sayings), whakatauakī (proverbs), whakapapa (genealogies), karakia 
(incantations), and waiata koroua (traditional chants).  Central to this is the 
recitation of whakapapa, which traverse both spiritual and physical realms.  
The land and waterways are shared between those who have passed on to te 
arai (the spirit world), the living and those yet to be born.  Ancestors, whether 
remote or recent, occupy a spiritual world that is as real to Māori as the 
physical world.  Accordingly, forebears are not spoken of but are spoken to, 
and creation stories are not myths but beliefs, beliefs which are the 
foundation of Māori law.24  
 
Wai me te wairuatanga 
Since all things come from the spiritual realm, all things are tapu, that is, they 
exist under the protection of an atua. Consequently, there are restrictions on 
the use of places and things and on what people may do.  In addition, there 
are particular restrictions on places, things, or people that perform functions 
of spiritual significance.  For example, the tapu on an urupa (burial site) or 
tuahu (shrine) limits activities in the vicinity, or a pouwhenua (post marker) 
may prevent certain persons from entering on particular territory or waters, 
for fear of spiritual (and physical) retaliation. Women in childbirth, warriors, 
carvers, tohunga, corpses or persons in close contact with corpses are also 
under particular tapu restrictions.25  
                                                 
22 Mead, H, Tikanga Maori: Living by Maori Values (Huia, Wellington, 2003) at 117-132. 
23 See Waitangi Tribunal Muriwhenua Land Report 1997  at 21-23 and especially the evidence cited of Dame 
Anne Salmond – “… Māori were operating in a world governed by whakapapa … Ancestors intervened in 
everyday affairs, mana was understood as proceeding from the ancestor-gods and tapu was the sign of their 
presence in the human world.  Life was kept in balance by the principle of utu (reciprocal exchanges) which 
operated in relations between individuals, groups and ancestors.”  
24 Ibid, at 133-150. 
25 Ibid, at 35-64. See also Firth, R, The Economics of the New Zealand Maori (Government Printer, London, 
1929) at 235; Waddy, P, ‘Early Law and Customs of the Maoris’ (LLM Thesis, Sydney, 1927) at 21; and 
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34. Water, when sprinkled on the body, serves as a medium to protect people 
when undertaking special functions like those mentioned, or when embarking 
on an expedition.  It also serves to assist those suffering ill health through 
spiritual imbalance or contamination. In addition, water may be used to 
remove various tapu restrictions, as when people sprinkle themselves with 
water on leaving a cemetery, or when people return from battle to resume a 
life of peace.   
 
35. Freshwater then, is closely associated with the wairua, having come directly 
from the atua.26  It is termed waiora (lifegiving water).   Te Rangikaheke 
records wai (water) as coming from the separation of Ranginui and 
Papatūānuku, firstly from their tears during the period of separation, and then 
from the rains used as a weapon by Tāwhirimātea, atua of winds and storms, 
during his battles with his brothers.27  Wai may be wai māori (normal or fresh 
water) wai tai (seawater) or wai ariki (thermal water) but wai on its own refers 
to freshwater (except that it is also used for roimata (tears)).  As a medium 
wai is linked to wairua (spirit), waiora (also used for soundness of body and 
mind) and wairangi (a temporary, unbalanced state of mind).  
 
36. Wai is regularly used for spiritual strengthening in rituals.  Punawai or 
springwater is especially preferred for its purity.  Flowing water is used for 
example, in the tohi rite, to endow a child with desired mental and physical 
attributes.  The still water of a pool, known as a waiwhakaika, is used for 
rites to assist the retention of knowledge.  
 
37. Māori distinguish persons or things according to whether they are in a high 
state of tapu and therefore restricted, or in a state of noa, relieved from 
extraordinary restrictions.  Water is an important medium to remove certain 
tapu restrictions so that persons may function normally, freed from the risks 
of tapu, or may utilise certain resources the use of which would otherwise be 
prohibited or restricted.  
 
Accordingly, things will be treated differently according to the degree of tapu 
attaching to them.  
 
Ngā whakapūtanga o te wai  
38. As discussed above, wai, as a naturally occurring substance, has its own 
wairua or spirit in Māori thinking.  A water body, on the other hand, has also 
its own mauri (life-force) and hau (vitality) which gives it a distinct 
personality or mana (authority).28 This applies to all water bodies, the puna 
                                                 
Barlow, C, Tikanga Whakaaro: Key Concepts in Maori Culture, (Oxford University Press, Auckland, 1994) at 
128-129. 
26 Mead, H, Tikanga Maori: Living by Maori Values (Huia, Wellington, 2003) at at 66 but note that Mead 
considers water itself is not tapu, but is a medium for removing tapu. See Te Mātāpunenga .. entry Wairua.    
27 Cited by Hohepa, P and Habib, G, ‘Maori Terminology and Water’ (Unpublished Support Report, Claims 
Wai 2357: Sale of Power Generating SOEs, Wai 2358: National Freshwater & Geothermal Resources, no date) 
at paragraph 2. For a Ngāti Pahauwera perspective of the same, see Waitangi Tribunal, The Mohaka River 
Report (Wai 119, Brooker and Friend Ltd, Wellington, 1992).   
28 For a fuller appreciation of these terms see Te Mātāpunenga … entries for Mauri, Hau and Mana. The 
bracketed words ‘life-force’, ‘vitality’ and ‘authority’ provide an introduction only.  No English word is an 
exact equivalence. Some would probably dispute the term ‘life-force’ arguing that mauri is not life but that on 
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wai (springs), repo (wetlands), awa (rivers), manga (tributaries), roto (lakes), 
waitomo (underground water bodies) wainuku (ground water), ngutuawa 
(estuaries) and muriwai (lagoons). 
 
39. The strength or health of the water body may be measured by the abundance 
of wildlife and taniwha which inhabit it.  In custom, the water fowl and 
taniwha are presented as kaitiaki (guardians) who protect both the waterbody 
and the associated hapū.29  Manu (birds) are well known to Māori as warning 
people of danger, as for example when they cut across the pathway of an ope 
(travelling party) or farewell the dead, as when they attend at a tangi or at the 
whare of a person who has passed away. Observations in nature were critical 
to survival and the manu were closely read.  
 
40. However, when the manu and other kaitiaki abandon a water body, they 
portend of disaster. Their absence or reduction in numbers is a serious omen 
for the hapū.  Accordingly, the removal of a tree on which birds depend is a 
serious offence.  The same applies to the removal of bed-rocks on which fish 
depend. For example, if a rock is removed to take the koura underneath, the 
rock must be replaced in the location and position in which it was found so 
that the mauri is not compromised.30  
 
 
41. The taniwha (also called tūpua) exercise a powerful influence on the hapū as 
they are also hapū protectors and ensure safe journeys.  Like the birds, the 
health of the water fowl and taniwha indicates the strength or health of the 
associated hapū.  The underground waters without wildlife may be inhabited 
by taniwha that emerge at different places, as with the taniwha called 
Pekehaua for whom the spring at Awahou on lake Rotorua, is named.   
 
Te whanaungatanga ki te wai 
42. In customary accounts, each cold-water body is a manifestation of the 
ancestral atua and is imbued with the essentials for life - mauri, mana and 
hau.  The water-body is thus an ancestor itself and so in the case of a river, is 
revered as an awa tūpuna or awa tūpua (river of the ancestor or ancestral 
taniwha). As a consequence ancestral figures in turn remind the people who 
live along the water-way, of their relationship to the past and to one another.  
 
                                                 
which life depends.  It has been said that trees grow, land is fertile, birds are numerous, fish abound and men are 
skillful and prosperous, only while the mauri remains inviolate – Benton, R, Frame, A, Meredith, P, Te 
Mātāpunenga. A Compendium of References to the Concepts and Institutions of Māori Customary Law 
(Victoria University Press 2013) at  p 241.    
29 Today it is usual to refer to the people themselves as the kaitiaki (kaitieki in some dialects).  This is 
understandable since hapū cared meticulously for their water bodies. Nonetheless in former times the credit was 
usually given to other creatures. Each family frequently had their own species of kaitieki. For example, the ruru 
(morepork) was a common family minder. See the discussion of ‘kaitiaki’ in  Waitangi Tribunal, Ko Aotearoa 
Tenei: A Report into Claims Concerning New Zealand Law and Policy Affecting Maori Culture and Identity (Wai 
262 Claim, Waitangi Tribunal, Wellington, 2006) at 93, 111-112. 
30 The Waitangi Tribunal reported on much further evidence of customary practices on food collection, 
including the replacement of stones, in Motunui-Waitara Report 1983 at section 4.5 and in several subsequent 
reports.   
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43. Dr Patu Hohepa elaborated further in stage 1 of the water claim in describing 
the relationship between his iwi and their waters as follows: 
 
Wai is the ultimate protector of the life force of Ngapuhi. The settler ancestor 
Nukutawhiti cast his sacred amokura (feathers of the tawake or frigate bird) headdress 
into the waters of the raging Hokianga and that and his incantations allowed 
Ngatokimatawhaorua(the waka of Kupe) to safely enter the harbour. “Ko te Mauri o 
Ngāpuhi he mea huna ki te wai” – the life force of Ngāpuhi is hidden in the water - has 
been reiterated by many Ngāpuhi elders.31  
 
Ngā hāparu o ngā wai  
44. To hāparu is to dirty the essence of life. Hā is the breath of life, and part of 
the hau.  Paru means dirty or muddy. Hāparu is a desecration, debasement or 
defilement of the breath of life.  Hāparu originally referred to the intentional 
destruction of a sacred place or significant resource for revenge against 
another or to provoke a battle. To defile a river as a matter of course may 
never have happened because it was so abhorrent to Māori. Today however, 
hāparu has become the norm. 
 
45. Tikanga Māori did not permit the discharge of waste of any kind to water. 
Bodily waste, food scraps, fish scales and gut, or even pipi shells, were 
discharged only to land.32  The contamination of water was not just a hē or 
wrong, but a hara or spiritual offence which would bring serious misfortune 
to the offenders and their hapū.  When Māori built homes in western form 
they commonly built both washhouses and toilets a distance from the house 
to prevent the contamination of the house. Still today, on many marae, the 
ablution blocks are invariably discrete buildings.33  
 
46. Water may become hāparu or contaminated in various ways. It becomes 
impure or unsanitary when its natural flow is disturbed or modified by 
unnatural means, or when separate watercourses are fused so that the mauri 
of the waters mix by unnatural means. Boiled water used for cooking is seen 
to be wai mate (dead water).  It should not be discharged to living water that 
supplies food. Similarly, a river or lake loses its power or force and may 
become dead when there is a discharge of effluent into an awa.34 In such a 
case, the mauri has diminished and can only be restored through 
Papatūānuku.  Discharging sewerage and other waste material into 
waterways is highly offensive to Māori, no matter how well treated.35 
 
                                                 
31 Hohepa, P and Habib, G, ‘Maori Terminology and Water’ (Unpublished Support Report, Claims Wai 2357: 
Sale of Power Generating SOEs, Wai 2358: National Freshwater & Geothermal Resources, no date) at 25. 
32 The Waitangi Tribunal reported on the customary aversion to the discharge of waste to water in Motunui-
Waitara Report (see above) at section 4.5. 
33 Mead, H, Tikanga Maori: Living by Maori Values (Huia, Wellington, 2003) at 65-95. See also Salmond, A 
Hui: A Study of Māori Ceremonial Gatherings  (Penguin Group, 2009); and Walker, R ‘Marae: A Place to 
Stand’ in King, M (ed) Te Ao Hurihuri: Aspects of Maoritanga (Reed Publishers, Auckland, 1992) at 174. 
34 Ministry of Justice, Hinatore ki te Ao Māori: A Glimpse into the Māori World (Ministry of Justice, Wellington, 
2001) ‘Traditional Māori Concepts: Whenua.’ 
35 Hayes, S, ‘Defining Kaitiakitanga and the Resource Management Act 1991’ in Auckland University Law Review 
(Vol 8, 1998) 893 at 897. Hayes was referring to the Court decision of Rural Management Ltd v Banks Peninsula  
District Council [1994] NZRMA 412. 
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47. Water used for washing the body or clothing should not be mixed with water 
used for drinking or preparing food.  This finds expression today in the 
abhorrence about using the kitchen sink where food is prepared, for washing 
clothes or the body.  In tradition, there were separate streams for washing 
clothes or bodies and for food preparation and drinking.  Where that was not 
possible clothes and persons were washed a discrete distance from the water 
body.   
 
48. Today, hāparu has become common, as with the pollution of a river or lake 
or the draining of a wetland. As the Tribunal heard in the opening week of 
stage 2, in the 1960s Ngāti Kauwhata hapū placed a rāhui (prohibition on 
use) on the Oroua river, because of the hāparu.36     
 
Tikanga and the use of water 
Mō te aha, ngā wai? 
49. The water bodies supplied all that might be expected of water bodies for 
human survival. They supplied drinking water and a great range of fish 
(approximately 40 indigenous freshwater species), water fowl and edible 
plants.  Water bodies provided the materials for clothing, especially from 
swamp harakeke, feathers from water birds, and decorative dyes.  They 
provided the material for shelter, especially from raupō and the timber of the 
water-based, kahikatea.  The water bodies provided rongoā (medicines) and 
the water for physical and spiritual cleansing and rites. They provided the 
means for transport.  
 
50. This section does not document the vast variety of fish, water fowl and plants 
that once existed or the wide range of materials for clothing, shelter, 
implements, weapons, waka and medicines.  Suffice it to say that an 
abundance of those things have been recorded.   
 
51. Rather, this section considers how the reliance of Māori on water bodies 
compared with the greater British reliance on land based resources, 
influenced Māori culture, values and law, and accounts for the greater 
attention which Māori once gave to their proprietary interests in water.  
  
52. To appreciate the primacy of the water bodies, one has to imagine Aotearoa 
as it once was.  Before European contact, Aotearoa was as much a land of 
water as it was of dry land. The dry land was mainly the hill country, the 
ranges and mountains. In between the higher lands were vast areas of repo 
(wetlands) linked by rivers and streams providing extensive aquatic 
highways. Hohepa and Habib37 record thousands of waterways across the 
country today: 3,820 lakes with a surface area of more than one hectare; many 
thousands of recognisable rivers collectively extending over 200,000 
                                                 
36 Evidence of Dennis Emery in opening the second stage of the water claim at Waiwhetu marae in October 
2016. 
37 Cited by Drs Patu Hohepa and George Habib Hohepa, P and Habib, G, ‘Maori Terminology and Water’ 
(Unpublished Support Report, Claims Wai 2357: Sale of Power Generating SOEs, Wai 2358: National 
Freshwater & Geothermal Resources, no date) at paragraph 92.  
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kilometres; tens of thousands of small streams; more than 200 sizeable 
groundwater aquifers; thousands of mainly small freshwater springs; and 
about 89,000 ha of freshwater wetlands.  They estimate however, that in 
1840, the wetlands were over 7 or 8 times more extensive so that tens of 
thousands of hectares are considered to have been drained.  The Maori 
ancestors saw the wetlands as major resource areas, rivalling the sea resource 
in several, coastal districts.  
 
53. To appreciate the primacy of the water bodies one has also to consider the 
main sources of food.  Apart from the kurī (dog) and kiore (rat) there were 
no animals and few crops.  This is quite unlike the vast array of animals and 
crops in Britain, and so the perspective of water as a resource is quite 
different.  In the Aotearoa rivers, lakes and wetlands there was an abundance 
of food, with kahawai, tāmure, kanae, makawhiti, pātiki and various shellfish 
at the river mouth, and then īnanga, ūpokororo, kōkopu, kakawai, piharau, 
koura, kākahi, a huge abundance of tuna (Māori having over 100 names for 
the various species in different stages of development), and a variety of water 
fowl, including the ducks, especially the whio.  The ducks were caught in 
their thousands, notably in Waikato, the Bay of Plenty and Marlborough.  
When they were moulting in the summer they were fat and unable to fly, and 
were easily driven into inlets and on to the shore.  
 
54. Accordingly, the largest structures for catching any form of wildlife were in 
water.  The pā tuna and utu piharau (eel and lamprey weirs) were built across 
large rivers in their hundreds supporting large numbers of hinaki (pots or 
nets) at the end of wooden frames and fences.  
 
                     
 
55. Similarly, just as the British enclosed land in private ownership to expand 
agricultural development by individual families, so also the Māori 
“enclosed” the water for individual, extended families, mainly by pa tuna and 
by rocks and markers. James Cowan wrote: 
 
At 1840 each hapu occupied and defended the boundaries of a territory 
on which it was dependent for its survival and nourishment, its 
continuity and identity. In the central plateau lakes ‘the fisheries were 
jealously guarded... the boundaries of the various hapu were carefully 
defined by the leading marks.  Every yard of these lakes had its owners... 
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sometimes a rahui or close-season mark, or post indicative that such a 
place was tapu, was set up.38  
 
56. The same applied generally, with specified use rights applying along rivers, 
lakes, coastal reefs and pools, for the benefit of particular groups. It should 
be noted however that land and water resources may be shared by more than 
one tribal group.39 Each tribes’ rights and responsibilities to land and natural 
resources could be quite different. For example, one tribe may have had the 
rights to harvest birds in an area at a particular time of the year, while another 
tribe may have had the fishing rights for the area, and a third tribe may have 
had the rights to grow crops.40 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                  Pa Tuna Eel Weirs, Whanganui River, 1924 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                 Traditional Pa Tuna Eel Weirs, Whanganui River, circa. 191041 
                                                 
38 Cowan, J. 1930: The Maori: Yesterday and Today. Whitcombes & Tombs, Wellington pp 182 
39 For example, the Waitangi Tribunal reported on the evidence of the division of the reefs of Waitara amongst 6 
hapū in Motunui-Waitara Report 1983 at section 4.5 and in the Muriwhenua Fishing Report 1988 on the use of 
the same reefs by different hapū at different seasons. The latter report includes extensive detail on Māori fishing 
experience and beliefs at sections 2.2 to 3.4.  
40 Firth 1929) at 43; Ballara, A, 1998) at 194-195, 197. 
41 Alexander Turnbull Library, Manuscripts and Pictorial Collection, Ref 1/2-140011-F 
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57. As with land, a particular area may be reserved for a special purpose (whenua 
tāpui) and boundaries may be defined to enclose a place for a particular 
person or whānau (whenua i rohea), but it is only the use that is given, and 
while the use may be passed down to descendants, it is nonetheless given at 
will, and may be taken back if the user fails to maintain customary 
responsibilities, caring for the same and contributing to the common good.   
 
58. Indeed, the waters were frequently awash with private or whānau usages.  
The basis for the right was usually that one’s father and his father had fished 
at some place but complexity of the use rights framework is illustrated by the 
fact that different persons might fish in the same spot for different species at 
different times of the year, the whole hapū may need to engage together when 
particular fish are running without regard to ‘private’ locations and as 
mentioned, more than one hapū might share in particular resources. 42 
 
 
Te ara wai me te horapa hāere o ngā hapū  
59. A further major point of difference between Britain and Aotearoa was that in 
Britain the major means of transport and physical communication was by 
road – on land.  For Māori, it was by water.   
 
60. The Māori had no beasts of burden, no horses or oxen, and consequently no 
carts, carriages or carriage ways. A huarahi, in those days was not a roadway.  
A hua was a linear cut in a carving and a hua-rahi or large, linear cut, was a 
track in the ground.  The forests were dense and foreboding and the coastal 
flats were divided by foothills. Transport and communications were 
primarily by water on the lowlands, and if by foot, the paths, to the most 
practical extent, followed water courses.   
 
61. In similar vein, as hapū grew they divided, laterally, and tended to divide and 
spread along the water-way edges. Māori were not forest dwellers.  They 
lived along the open ground of the waterways or on cleared hilltops near to 
the water.  As a result, the spreading papakāinga alongside the rivers and 
lakes, became a genealogical lineage on land.  The papakāinga record the 
history of descent from the first Māori settlers as they journeyed inland. As 
was graphically illustrated in the Whanganui River Claim to the Waitangi 
Tribunal, the Whanganui River represents a lineage of descent relationships, 
figuratively called te taura whiri o Hinengākau, or the plaited rope of 
Hinengākau.   The river itself is divided into upper, central and lower parts, 
named for three siblings from whom all trace descent, so that the river 
presents as a unifying force in which all descend from the parents of those 
                                                 
42 Thus Major Rapata Wahawaha asserted that “Ancestral authority prevails over one’s iwi or hapū. The 
authority is solely over one’s own land if the parent has bestowed that authority on their child…” Captain 
Gilbert Mair, who led Te Arawa troops against Te Kooti in the 1870’s, described how Ngāti Whakaue bestowed 
the fishing ground Te Ruru on him personally. See ‘Evidence of Captain Gilbert Mair,’ (National Archives, 
Wellington, Crown Law Office, File CLO 174, Part I) at 184 and 177A respectively. 
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three. And so again, the river is a single, living entity and an important 
symbol of spiritual and cultural prowess. 
 
There were aspects of the same in the evidence of the Tapuika people of the Kaituna 
river, in stage 2 of the water claim, when protesting the division of the river into 
different administrative sections for local body purposes.43 
 
62. The waterways were the highways of the day, and these highways were in 
the possession of the hapū, more emphatically than the forests on the land.  
 
Nā te wai, ngā kaupapa 
63. From the spiritual dimension that Māori have with the natural order comes 
also particular policies on how water is used. This paper has already 
considered the spiritual relationship with water and water bodies.  The same 
spiritual relationship engenders the values that are the basis of Tikanga 
Māori, as introduced at the beginning of this Part. It is thus expected that the 
resources of the watery domains will be treated with respect, without any sign 
of greed or excessive exploitation, and with the good of the people and future 
generations, at heart.  Equally associated with the spiritual regime is the 
concern to maintain the purity of the water, as earlier discussed, so that there 
is no discharge of waste to water, but only to the land, and separate streams 
are maintained for drinking, for washing clothes or bodies and for the 
preparation of food.  
 
Nā te kaupapa, te tikanga me te pono 
64. Associated with the spiritual awareness and well-being, or wairuatanga, that 
comes with water, is the display of respect for the inhabitants of the natural 
world, and the virtue of displaying respect when dealing with one another.   
 
65. When dealing with one another, the key conceptual regulator of conduct is 
the ideal or value of manaakitanga.  Manaakitanga, as earlier explained, 
refers to the reciprocal enhancement of the mana of each other when people 
engage.  It is most commonly associated with the generous hosting of visitors 
or with the respect protocols when Māori formally engage with one another 
in discussion.  Nonetheless, it is a concept which informs best standards in 
Māori conduct generally.  It requires that one should seek to enhance the 
mana of others through words and by demonstrative acts showing love, 
generosity and care. In this context mana refers to both individual status and 
human dignity generally.  Mana is something that all people have, although 
some have more mana than others, as is evident in the demeanour of the 
senior rangatira, whose word is law. So, everyone must be acknowledged, 
and those of significant mana most especially so.  
 
66. In oratory, a most common way of respecting others and building stronger 
relationships is through the use of whakapapa to kindle ancient bonds of 
consanguinity.  This connects to the related value of whakawhanaungatanga 
which involves the nurturing and building of filial relationships.   
                                                 
43 See the same in Waitangi Tribunal, Report of the Waitangi Tribunal on the Kaituna River Claim (Wai 4, 
Waitangi Tribunal, Wellington, 1984) at 27-32. 
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67. Under the heading of Manaakitanga, Te Mātāpunenga cites as follows from 
The Lore of the Whare Wananga “By honouring (manaaki) people the mana 
endures (ma te manaaki i te tangata e tu ai te mana). Under the heading of 
Whanaungatanga, Te Mātāpunenga recites the farewell from Te Rama of 
Tuwharetoa (Taupo) to Tamahau Mahupuku of Wairarapa: 
 
 He poroporoaki ki a koutou e noho mai ra i Wairarapa, ia Ngaati Tuwharetoa e noho 
atu nei i konei, … he whanaunga tuturu koutou no Ngaati Tuwharetoa i runga i o tatou 
whakapapa. 
  
 This is a farewell to you who reside at Wairarapa from Ngati Tuwharetoa, you are 
indeed relatives of Tuwharetoa based on our genealogies.      
 
68. The virtue of whakawhanautanga thus applies not only to building 
relationships amongst the several hapū of common descent, but to 
relationships far and wide. 
 
69. This paper has already considered the lineage of descent relationships traced 
by the Whanganui River. The same applies to other rivers, as referred to 
below, and each gives expression to the traditional value of 
whakawhanaungatanga.    
 
Tikanga and the traditional control of water 
Outline of this section 
70. Initially, this section considers the groups or persons holding customary 
rights and interests in water bodies, and how they are known by the water 
bodies with which they associate.   
 
71. Ultimately, this section considers the scope of the customary interest. In 
Tikanga Māori, is the interest limited to using water for fishing, gathering 
and transport or is it limited to setting standards for the water’s use as a 
kaitiaki? Or, is the position that in Tikanga Māori, the hapū have an 
autonomous authority and power to manage and control the use of their 
territorial waters by their members and if need be, to the exclusion of others?  
 
Te whenua me te iwi  
72. The land and their associated waters were initially occupied by clusters of 
whānau taking possession of different parts.  These were the hapū, which 
might typically comprise a few hundred persons. The hapū constituted the 
everyday community. They also operated autonomously. They have been 
assessed as the primary, political and land-holding unit of Māori society.44  
 
73. As the hapū grew they divided, and in dividing they spread across the district, 
or typically, along the rivers or around the lakes. Consequentially, the hapū 
of a district most usually shared a common ancestry.  Collectively the people 
                                                 
44 Ballara, A, Iwi: The Dynamics of Maori Tribal Organisation from c. 1769 to c. 1945 (Victoria University 
Press, Wellington, 1998) at 279-325. 
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of common ancestry were known simply as the people, or in te reo Māori, 
the iwi.  
 
74. Since all Māori are related by whakapapa, post-contact Māori also spoke 
increasingly of the iwi Māori, meaning Māori as a people.  
 
Ngā tohu a te whenua  
75. For Māori iwi, hapū and whānau, their water bodies, including in this 
instance the open seas and the hot-water rivers and springs, are integral, 
defining parts of their personal and tribal identity, security and prosperity.  
 
76. The water bodies are usually addressed as living organisms and as the 
forebears connected to the local hapū.  The hapū in turn describe themselves 
and their place in the universe by reference to their river or lake.  
Accordingly, when Māori inquire “who are you” they may say “ko wai koe?” 
or “who is your water” (although in polite idiom they would ask where a 
person is from, which again is intended to refer to a lake, mountain or river).45 
So it is, that Māori define themselves and their place in the universe in terms 
of their pre-eminent landforms, especially the mountains and waterbodies 
closest to their papakainga. They introduce themselves by reference to their 
awa or moana (waterway) as an important part of their mihi (greeting) 
alongside their maunga (mountain), iwi (tribal group), hapū (tribe) and 
tūpuna (forebears). Hence, waterways are intrinsically linked to one’s 
whakapapa and tribal identity.  
 
77. Numerous whakatauakī (proverbs) and pepeha (tribal sayings) identify the 
connectedness and metaphysical relationships of the people and their 
mountains, rivers or lakes. Two examples are: 
Ko Waikato te Awa 
Ko Taupiri te maunga 
Ko Potatau te tangata 
Waikato taniwha rau 
He piko he taniwha 
He piko he taniwha 
 
Waikato is the River 
Taupiri is the mountain, 
Potatau is the leader. 
Waikato of a hundred taniwha 
On every bend is a taniwha 
 
Ko Tongariro te maunga 
Ko Taupo te moana, 
Ko Tūwharetoa te iwi 
Ko Te Heuheu te tangata 
 
Tongariro is the mountain 
                                                 
45 “Ko wai koe” to older Māori could be offensive, like saying ‘who do you think you are’ or ‘do you think your 
river/lake is the only one’. No hea koe – where are you from – is the safer expression. 
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Taupo the waters 
Tūwharetoa the people and 
Te Heuheu the leader. 
 
 
78. The distinctive features of the land and waters of the several hapū of 
common descent, became the symbols of the hapū as a whole, and the sense 
of power inherent in those natural features, generated the perceived power 
of the people.  The Mohaka River Report provides another classic example 
of how a river is symbolic of the identity and authority of a people, the 
Ngāti Pahauwera in that instance.46  
 
79. Other tohu or signs of tribal possession were in the multitudinous names for 
different parts of the land and waters.  Some were named on discovery, for 
the person or body parts of a significant forebear to support a claim to 
possession on that basis (take taunaha). It should then be noted that Māori 
did not usually change the names of places, following a conquest, so that 
the history remains written in the land.  For example, Wellington harbour is 
named Te Whanganui a Tara or the great harbour of Tarataraaika after an 
original possessor whose descendants now live in Horowhenua-Manawatu 
and Wairarapa. Their forebears were driven out by Taranaki and Ngāti Toa 
hapū. However, the name of the harbour remains. Taranaki and Ngāti Toa 
will claim a proprietary interest by conquest and occupation, while 
recognising the non-proprietary, associational interest of Ngāti Tara (the 
descendants of Tarataraaika).  
 
80. Another form of naming, called tapa whenua, recorded subsequent persons 
and events. These evidence on-going occupation following discovery or 
conquest and so confirm the right to possess (discovery or conquest 
conferring no rights unless followed by occupation). As a result, the 
landscape is a historical treasure trove of names ranging from major battles 
affecting the right to a large district, to the spot for a hinaki (eel trap) on a 
river. The claim to land by naming was a settled part of Tikanga.47  
 
81. The rāhui was another means of declaring ownership of certain lands or 
waters.  Usually demonstrated by a carved or decorated pou (post) is was at 
once a warning against use by others and a declaration of ownership.48 
There were several types but reference need only be made to what Meade 
calls the ‘conservation’ rāhui, and the ‘trespass’ rāhui. The former was to 
retire a resource until it had recovered from over-use or from pollution, as 
where a person had been killed or had drowned in the water.  A breach of 
that rāhui was not necessarily fatal.  The possessory rāhui was imposed 
when it appeared that the land of a hapū was under some threat of invasion 
or intrusion by an unwelcome person or persons.  It was a sign on a track or 
waterway that anyone who proceeded beyond that point would be 
                                                 
46 Waitangi Tribunal, The Mohaka River Report (Wai 119, Brooker and Friend Ltd, Wellington, 1992) at 1, 7, 8, 
15, 21, 36-38 and 60. 
47 Take taunaha is explored in detail by Hohepa and Habib in …. 
48 A great deal has been written about rahui but see for example Mead, H, Tikanga Māori: Living by Māori Values 
(Huia, Wellington, 2003) at 197.  
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proceeding on the land of the hapū and was liable to divine punishment or 
to be promptly killed if not a member of the hapū or an invitee. The aukati, 
or a line which no-one could cross without authority, served the same 
purpose.  The government agent Falloon was killed for crossing an aukati 
across the mouth of the Whakatane River.  It led to the Ngati Awa land 
confiscations.  
 
82. The trespass rāhui and aukati were highly political and likely to lead to a 
battle and so were imposed only by the leading rangatira after an intensive, 
public debate.  The conservation rāhui might be imposed by a tohunga and 
removed when the objective was seen to have been achieved.       
 
Nōku te wai. 
83. Māori distinguished between goods (taputapu, rawa), which were possessed 
as property, and real estate (whenua) which was not.49Authority consistent 
with their perception that lands and waters were used by divine permission, 
they did not talk of land and waters as property in absolute ownership but 
simply referred to them as ancestral beings with the mana (authority) to use 
being vested in a rangatira as the hapū representative (mana being a personal 
endowment rather than an institutional capacity).   
 
84. Given the philosophy of divine permission, Māori had no word to fit 
precisely with the English verb ‘to own’ insofar as ‘to own’ includes a right 
to transfer that which is held absolutely, in addition to a right to exclude 
others.  However, the lack of an equivalent word for ownership was not 
because that which the hapū possessed was less than ownership but because 
in Tikanga Māori it was, on balance, more.  The expression which Māori 
regularly used to describe the relationship between a hapū and its water was 
that ‘so and so has the mana of the water’.50   Mana in such context means 
the absolute and exclusive power and authority over something.  
Accordingly, mana covers not only the private right to own, but also the 
public right to control.  
 
85. Nonetheless, Māori today are often considered to possess something less than 
ownership because Māori considered the whenua (which includes wai) was 
something that could not be owned. Philosophically, that was correct, but the 
claim of a hapū to possess (whai, whiwhi) a water resource, to the exclusion 
of other hapū, and independently of other hapū, amounts to an assertion of 
ownership.   
 
                                                 
49 Taputapu or implements, weapons and ornaments were seen to be invested with the hau of the maker, the hau 
being transferred to the original possessor and carried within the object to succeeding generations. Benton, R, 
Frame, A, Meredith, P, Te Mātāpunenga. A Compendium of References to the Concepts and Institutions of 
Māori Customary Law (Victoria University Press 2013) at 76-84, 402-403 and 424-425. 
50 See Ngata, H, English-Maori Dictionary (Learning Media, Wellington, 1993) at 319. Rangatiratanga is also 
used for ‘ownership’. But see also Te Mātāpunenga reference on Rangatiratanga in Benton, R, Frame, A, 
Meredith, P, Te Mātāpunenga. A Compendium of References to the Concepts and Institutions of Māori 
Customary Law (Victoria University Press 2013) at 331-334. ‘Rangatiratanga’ appears to have been coined for 
the purposes of the Treaty of Waitangi.     
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86. A further common assumption is that Māori have less than ownership 
because they were merely kaitiaki or stewards of the resource. However, so 
long as Māori claimed exclusive use on some proper take (ground), the 
restriction which Māori placed on themselves in the exercise of that use did 
not create something less than ownership but was evidence of responsible 
ownership.  Whatever the motivating belief behind the policy, kaitiakitanga 
is an incident of ownership, not an alternative to ownership.  
 
87. Alternatively, Māori may be considered to have less than ownership because 
they do not believe that the land (and waters) can be traded or sold.  However, 
a requirement or expectation that a property be capable of sale is not inherent 
in the concept of property ownership but is merely a capitalist perception of 
what property ought to be. In any event, the reality is that even for customary 
Māori, the water could in fact be sold, as for drinking, as the early sailors 
found in the Hokianga Harbour when they sought to provision their ships 
with water from local streams.51    
 
88. Nor does it matter that Māori had different views from the settlers about what 
could be held as private property. For example, the rangatira, Apihai Te 
Kawau, informed the Governor at Orakei in 1879 “It was only the land that I 
gave over to the pakehas.  The sea I never gave, and therefore the sea belongs 
to me.  Some of my goods are there. I consider the pipis and fish are my 
goods.”52 Hori Tauroa added: " I was not aware of the Government taking all 
my large pipi-banks and shoals in the Manukau (Manukau harbour). Those 
large banks have all gone to the Government. I was not told why these were 
taken. I wish to know now whether they belong to the Queen or remain my 
property".53  The question here is not which is the correct view of property 
but what the Māori view was. It appears that for Māori, fish (and presumably 
other wild creatures), are property for so long as they are in the hapū territory. 
They are in the same position as water, in that respect.  
 
89. The Māori view that a water resource and a land resource were 
conceptually the same, and were capable of being owned as hunting 
grounds, is supported by several 19th and 20th century observers. Thus, the 
1921 Native Land Claims Commission reported with reference to Napier 
Inner Harbour that in Native custom Maori rights were not confined to the 
mainland, but extended as well to the sea where “deep-sea fishing grounds 
were recognized by boundaries fixed by the Maoris in their own way; they 
were well known, and woe betide any alien who attempted to trespass upon 
them”. In 1918 Captain Gilbert Mair described the same in relation to the 
sea at Maketu, saying “… they had marks on the land which were only 
disclosed to the favoured few, and even those miles out off Maketu were 
                                                 
51 British Resident, James Busby, refers to this in 1835 in a dispatch to the Colonial Secretary: “A payment has 
been pretty regularly exacted in this harbour for permission to water and I have heard of a demand for harbour 
dues having been made by one of the chiefs of the Hokianga River.” Despatch from British Resident,’ (ATL, 
qMS-0344, No. 65/2)   
 
52 Cited in Waitangi Tribunal, Report of the Waitangi Tribunal on the Manukau Claim (Wai 8, 2nd ed. 
Wellington, 1989) at 113. 
53 Ibid 
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the property of tribes and not common grounds.54  The Claims Commission 
added that the inshore fishery had more restricted rights where “particular 
spots would be recognized as the sole privilege of a single family, just as 
eel-weirs in fresh-water rivers”.55 
 
90. Writing in 1930, James Cowan, a noted author on Māori life, considered 
that in 1840 in the central plateau lakes ‘the fisheries were jealously 
guarded … the boundaries of the various hapū were carefully defined by the 
leading marks. Every yard of these lakes had its owners … sometimes a 
rahui or close-season mark or post indicative that such a place was tapu was 
set up”.56 In 1918 Captain Gilbert Mair advised the Native Land Court that 
“no land in New Zealand has been more absolutely, more completely and 
more thoroughly under Maori owners’ customs and rights than these two 
lakes, nor do I know of any piece of land in New Zealand in all my 
experiences that has been used or that can show more marks of ownership, 
individual or tribal than those lakes, and the surrounding lands.57 
 
91. Te Rangi Hiroa (Sir Peter Buck) wrote “It will be seen that the tumu 
(stakes) in the lake were used like surveyors' pegs in modern times: they 
marked off the parts of the lake that belonged to the various families and 
subtribes ... it was far more valuable to the old-time Maori than any equal 
area of land.”58 
 
92. Te Rangikaheke, an advisor to Governor Grey, emphasised how no 
distinction was made between land and water resources.  Elsdon Best 
recorded him as saying: “The tumu on which Hinemoa rested in Rotorua 
Lake was a post (or stake) erected in a shoal part of the lake. It was named 
Hinewhata and was erected as a token of mana of Umukaria. Ka whiwhi te 
tino rangatiratanga i te one, whiwhi ana ki uta, whiwhi ana ki te moana. … 
When a chief of high rank gains possession of land he possesses it on shore 
and in the lake, hence it is said that some of his lands are ashore and some 
in the water.”59 
 
93. The numerous Māori claims to lakes, in petitions and Court proceedings, 
need not be recorded here.  It is sufficient to say here that in Tikanga Māori, 
the lakes (and rivers) as a resource, with water included, could be owned by 
one or more hapū. In addition, particular use rights were reserved for 
whānau and while they were held at the will of the hapū, they could be 
transmitted by ohāki (a statement in contemplation of death) or by descent.  
Some Judges of the Native Land Court accepted the Māori ownership of 
                                                 
54 ‘Evidence of Captain Gilbert Mair,’ (National Archives, Wellington, Crown Law Office, File CLO 174, Part I) 
at 270. 
55 ‘Whanganui-o-Rotu' in ‘Report of the Native Land Claims Commission’, AJHR, (1921, Vol.2, G-5) at 13.  
56 Cowan, J, The Maori Yesterday and Today (Whitcombe & Tombs, Wellington, 1930) at 182. 
57 ‘Evidence of Captain Gilbert Mair,’ (National Archives, Wellington, Crown Law Office, File CLO 174, Part I) 
at 184.  
58 Te Rangi Hiroa, P, "Maori Food-supplies of Lake Rotorua,’ in Transactions of the New Zealand Institute, (Vol 
III, 1921) at 433-451. 
59 Letter to Solicitor-General Salmond, (5 October 1918, National Archives, Wellington, File CLO 174, Part 2). 
Translation of Maori in original text. 
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lakes, as in the 1929 decision of Judge Acheson in relation to Lake 
Omapere.60  
 
94. The intense division of water resources applied also to the rivers, with their 
impressive pā tuna, their carved markers to anchor eel-pots, nets or lines 
and to reserve fishing spots, and their several rahui posts to reserve 
particular areas.  The Waitangi Tribunal has determined that hapū also 
owned along the rivers, with numerous use rights, in its reports on the 
Kaituna River (1984), Mohaka River (1992), Ikawhenua Rivers (1998) and 
Whanganui River (1999). This was so evident to early officials that 
although rivers are only indirectly referred to in the Treaty of Waitangi in 
the context of fisheries or taonga (prized possessions), in 1842, George 
Clark, Chief Protector of Aborigines, felt able to assure rangatira that their 
rivers were also protected to them. He wrote, in the Government newspaper 
Te Karero o Niu Tireni: 
E hoa ma, kua wareware pea koutou ki te pukapuka i tuhituhia ki 
Waitangi, i roto i taua pukapuka ka waiho nga kauri katoa, nga awa 
katoa. Ma te tangata Maori hei aha noa atu kia a ia … 
 
Friends, perhaps you would have forgotten that document which was 
written at Waitangi. In that document, all of the kauri, the rivers and 
everything else are left for the Maori to deal with as he wishes.61 
 
95. In accordance with that view, the Government has consistently treated with 
Māori as though they had ownership of their lands and not merely some 
right of user. Accordingly, while the first Chief Judge of the Native Land 
Court considered that ‘ownership’ did not fit with the Māori idea of a land 
holding, the legislation under which he worked required him to treat the 
Māori land holding as no less than ownership.62   
 
96. The Court, having been directed to determine the title to Māori Land in 
accordance the Native custom, concluded that the Native custom had a clear 
view on the right to land, by one group as against another, finding that there 
were four kinds of right arising from Māori tradition: take taumou 
(discovery) and the related take taunaha (claiming by naming), take ahi kā 
(occupation), take tuku (gift) and in certain instances, take raupatu 
(conquest).63 Although most judges of the Native Land Court considered 
the Court could deal only with dry land, because their statute so required, 
there was no reason why the customary principles for determining the title 
to the land could not have applied also to water.  And that is in fact what 
was done by those judges who considered that the Court could in fact deal 
with the ownership of certain lakes, including lakes Omapere, Rotokawau, 
Rotongaio and Rotoaira.  The owners were determined in the same way as 
they were for the land.  
                                                 
60 Bay of Islands Native Land Court MB 11, (1 August 1929). 
61 Te Karere o Niu Tireni, (Vol. 1, No. 7, 1842). 
62 Fenton, F,  ‘Papers Relating to Sitting of Compensation Court at New Plymouth State of the Proceedings of 
the Compensation Court at the Sittings at New Plymouth, from the first day of June, to the twelfth day of July, 
1866.’ In AJHR (1866, A-13, No. 1) at 3 
63 For example, conquest was not a source of title if it was not followed up by occupation.  
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97. Māori themselves took “whenua” to include the water bodies, unless a 
distinction was required.  For example, it was written in Te Waka Māori o 
Niu Tireni of 24 February 1874: “Haere mai ki Rotorua, te whenua o Ngāti 
Whakaue, moana kau”, or ‘welcome to Rotorua, the land of Ngāti 
Whakaue, which is principally water’.64  For the hapū, the roto, awa and 
repo, being a major source of food and materials and frequently the 
transport route, were taonga (prized possessions), just as much if not more 
so than the ngahere (forests), maunga (mountains) and mānia (plains) were 
taonga of the territorial whenua (takiwā). 
  
98. It appears therefore, that the Crown’s decision that a Court should 
determine the title to Māori land according to Māori custom, but should not 
determine the title to lakes and rivers, has nothing to do with Māori custom, 
but was a decision of the Crown made for other reasons. 
 
99. It was also, presumably, a conscious decision since the previous practice of 
several of the Crown purchase agents was to assume that Māori owned the 
lakes and rivers in accordance with their customs, and so specific provision 
was made to include these water bodies in Land Sale deeds. The agents 
appear to have known that Māori had a distinctive view of property law for 
in several deeds for the conveyance of land they provided for each of land, 
water, stones and trees as separate properties.65 After all, as every Māori 
knew, the land, waters, stones and trees are on different descent lines. 
Māori continue to contend that their right to river gravel or pounamu for 
example, has not been extinguished in various land sales where these were 
not specifically enumerated.  
 
Mō te tini, te wai 
100. Some points of clarification remain. It appears to be tika that the land and 
waters are held under the mana of a leading rangatira on behalf of the hapū, 
for, as postulated earlier, mana is a personal endowment rather than an 
institutional capacity. For that reason, some modern terms like mana whenua 
and mana moana are inapt when they are used to suggest that the mana is in 
the land or sea itself or in the people of the hapū as a whole.  It needs to be 
borne in mind that only the person of highest mana in the community should 
ultimately confer the right to use resources, for each use is an intrusion on 
the domain of a significant ancestor.  It is also only in the context that a 
mountain or river is a living being that these too can be seen to have mana.  
 
101. Conversely, the rangatira is not an absolute ruler. It was the mana of a 
rangatira to claim that “all the land belongs to me”.  It was also the mana of 
                                                 
64 Te Matapunenga above, p 541 
65 For example, this extract is from a Wairarapa Deed of Sale: “Now we have assuredly bade farewell to and 
forever transferred these portions of our ancestors’ lands, descended from them to us – that is, we have transferred 
them under the shining sun of the present day, with its lagoons, lakes, rivers, waters, trees, grasses, stones, and all 
and everything above the ground and under the ground, and all and everything connected with the land…”. See 
Report by Commissioner Mackay, ‘Claims of Natives to Wairarapa Lakes and Adjacent Lands’ in Appendices to 
the House of Representatives (1891, Sess II) G4, at 3. 
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the rangatira to claim “I have nothing, for all that I have is for the people”. 66 
The people, undoubtedly, would agree and, as has often been observed, a 
rangatira who flouted the opinion of the people, was unlikely to remain one.67  
 
102. It is in the context of the real politic that no issue is taken with the significant 
conclusion of Angela Ballara that the hapū are the entities exercising regular 
corporate functions, while respecting, as Ballara does, the rise of iwi 
formations from the 19th  century.68   
 
103. The assertion that hapū held the natural resources according to some system 
of law is confirmed by early officials and visitors. To the opinion already 
cited of RW Hay in 1832 can be added the conclusion of Lord John Russell 
in 1840 that Māori had established by their own customs a division and 
appropriation of the soil with usages having the character and authority of 
law.69 It is the Treaty itself that provides the conclusion that the governing 
institution was the hapū, as hapū alone are cited as the tribe. 70 
 
104. Finally, while an attempt has been made to isolate the tikanga relating to 
water with some precision, in several respects the tikanga is actually fluid.  
The problem seems to be that while in western tradition the lawyer seeks  the 
ground norm for a particular topic, the Māori delight in a smorgasbord of 
norms or broad based and aspirational values, in which the skill is in finding 
the norm best suited to the occasion. In similar vein, boundaries can be 
extremely precise at the micro level of a māra (garden plot), and equally 
imprecise at the macro level of a political boundary between hapū. Some 
things ought to remain vague if the alternative is to invite a major battle.   
 
105. The main conclusions for this Part are at the end of Part B. 
 
                                                 
66 The recognition that the rangatira held the land for the people is evident in this assertion by Rawiri Te Puaha 
of Ngāti Raukawa and Ngāti Toa to Governor Grey in 1852 concerning land at Takapuwahia -  Kaore he 
Tangata kua riro mai i taku mana, e hoa e hara i tena Tangata i hoatu te whenua ki a koe na matou na te iwi 
katoa i hoatu kia koe ma te iwi katoa e hapai taku hoatutanga whenua kia koe…(No man has my mana. Friend,  
that man did not give the land to you, it was us, all the tribe who gave it to you, and it is for the whole tribe to 
sanction my handing over land to you.). ‘Rawiri, Te Puaha to Governor Grey,’ (14 July 1852, Shortland Papers, 
GNZ MA 646, Special Collections, Auckland Public Library) at 64-65. 
67 For example, Joseph Williams as cited in Māori Custom and Values in New Zealand Law Study Paper 9 2001 
at 34, that rangatira who failed to confirm the consensus of the people were likely to be abandoned in favour of 
a contender more willing to lead to where the people wish to go.  
68 Ballara, A Iwi: the Dynamics of Māori Tribal Organisation from c 1769 to c 1945 (Victoria University Press, 
Wellington, 1998) at 279-325. 
69 Lord John Russell to Governor Hobson, 9 December 1840 in GBPP (Vol. 3, 1841 (311) at 149. 
70 There is a reference to iwi in the 1835 Declaration of Independence but iwi in that context may mean simply 
the people rather than a tribe or could refer to the tribes as a whole.  
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PART B: TIKANGA AND OTHER LEGAL SYSTEMS 
 
This part considers Tikanga in the context of other country laws.  
The Distinctive Concepts of Tikanga Māori 
    
The concept of community law and communal ownership 
106. The first most distinctive context for Tikanga Māori, as compared with the 
environment in which the English law grew, is probably that for Māori, the 
land was owned communally.  The second was probably that the community 
(the hapū) was autonomous, able to operate effectively without the 
supervision of an overarching authority. However, there were also elements 
of private or individual ownership, amongst Maori.  It was tika, or correct, 
that those persons or families who, for at least a generation, had used a 
particular resource for a specific purpose generally or for a given season or 
time, should continue doing so. However, these private interests had not the 
security of English tenure.  They were held privately or exclusively only for 
so long as that continued to be tika in the eyes of the community.  They could 
be displaced for some good cause like the need for concerted effort in hosting 
a hakari (public feast).  Ultimately, that which was in the best interests of the 
hapū as a whole prevailed.  
 
The concept of a water body 
107. Rivers and lakes are not water on land as in England, but are resources with 
their own distinctive character, distinct from the forests and plains on land. 
They are single, living entities in which different hapū would have separate 
interests in distinct parts.  
 
108. Accordingly, it is not just a spring that is owned, but the water flowing down 
from the spring to the point where it leaves the hapū area of influence.1 The 
river or lakebed is not valued as a reservoir or canal for water but the bed and 
water are valued as a single, natural entity. Water then would be an integral 
part of the resource while remaining within the takiwā (the hapū area of 
influence). 
 
109. As the Waitangi Tribunal has noted in relation to the Whanganui River, a 
water body is to be seen as a whole and integrated system in which rivers, 
tributaries, wetlands, and lakes may all be connected. The surrounding cliffs 
or river flats will likewise be part of the system insofar as they determine the 
river’s ahua (character and form).  It is not like the English law where a 
distinction may be made between the river or lake bed, and the water on it.2  
  
                                                 
1 See for example the evidence for Poroti Springs, water claim stage 2, first week, Waiwhetu marae. 
2 Waitangi Tribunal, The Whanganui River Report (Wai 167, Legislation Direct, Wellington, 1999 at 39.  See 
also Waitangi Tribunal, Te Ika Whenua Rivers Report (Wai 212, GP Publications, Wellington, 1998); Waitangi 
Tribunal, The Mohaka River Report (Wai 119, Brooker and Friend Ltd, Wellington, 1992) and the Waitangi 
Tribunal, Report of the Waitangi Tribunal on the Kaituna River Claim (Wai 4, Waitangi Tribunal, Wellington, 
1984).  
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The concept of a divine inheritance  
110. The conception of land and water as a divine inheritance was not unique to 
Māori but prevailed throughout the Pacific, including both Melanesia and 
Polynesia.  Kenneth Brown, a former Solomon Island magistrate, cites Dr Sir 
Gideon Zoloveke of Melanesia as saying:  
Land thus was the most valuable thing and could not be lightly parted with.  This is based 
on the belief that the departed ancestors superintended the earthly affairs of their living 
descendants, protecting them from disasters and ensuring their welfare, but demanding 
in return strict compliance with time-honoured ethical prescriptions.  Reverence for 
ancestral spirits was a cardinal point of traditional faith and such reverence dictated the 
preservation of land which the living shared with the dead.3  
 
111. Brown quotes also Bonnemaison as follows: 
In Vanuatu custom land is not only the site of production but it is the mainstay of a vision 
of the world.  Land is at the heart of the operation of the cultural system.  It represents 
life, materially and spiritually.  A man is tied to his territory by affinity and 
consanguinity. The clan is its land just as the clan is its ancestors.  The clan’s land, its 
ancestors and its men are a single indissoluble reality – a fact which must be borne in 
mind when it is said that Melanesian land is inalienable.4    
 
112. Times may have changed, at least in the Environment Court, but the difficulty 
for Māori in conveying these concepts to European lawmakers was 
frustratingly apparent in the mid-1970s when the New Zealand Māori 
Council sought to explain the Māori relationship to land to a parliamentary 
select committee which was considering amendments to the Town and 
Country Planning Act 1952.  Eventually, at the Committee’s request, the 
Council suggested a clause to give effect to their concern.  It became s3(1)(g) 
of the Act. The section required planners to have regard to the Māori 
relationship with their ancestral land.  The trouble was that planners and the 
Planning Tribunal, not unreasonably, had no idea at that time, of what was 
intended. The Planning Tribunal concluded that ancestral land must be an 
urupa (tribal cemetery) and that ancestral land could not include land that had 
ceased to be Māori land.5  
 
113. In Māori thinking, rights and responsibilities to land, waterways and other 
natural resources are not dependent upon ownership at English law or even 
on continual occupation. Ancestral associations are a fire which always 
burns. Even if the land and waterways have been alienated, the sacred 
connection remains.  However, the link is conceptual, rather than proprietary.  
In 1992, a claimant put the position to the Waitangi Tribunal in these terms: 
 
The link between the person and the land by virtue of their history can never be erased. 
… ngā tapuae o ngā tūpuna [footsteps of our ancestors] .. remain on the land forever. 
The fires never go out.6 
 
                                                 
3 Kenneth Brown, ‘The Language of Land: Look Before You Leap’ in Journal of South Pacific Law (Volume 4, 
2000). 
4 Bonnemaison, J, ‘Social and Cultural Aspects of Land Tenure’ in Larmour, P, (Ed), Land Tenure in Vanuatu 
(Institute of Pacific Studies, Suva, 1984) at 1-2. 
5 Knuckey v Taranaki County Council (1980) 6 NZTPA 609. 
6 Evidence of Alex Nathan (Wai 38, Doc D27) cited in the Waitangi Tribunal, The Te Roroa Report (Wai 38, GP 
Publications, Wellington 1992) at 49. 
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114. Sometimes, Māori have omitted the supernatural altogether. In a redraft of 
what became the RMA, Māori members of the Ministry for the Environment 
introduced Māori as the kaitiaki or caretakers of the land and waterways, 
omitting that the kaitiaki were more usually certain birds, taniwha and other 
creatures invested with the spirits of ancestors or closely related to remote 
ancestors by whakapapa.7  While it is the people who are now posited as the 
monitors and caretakers, traditionally it was the close observation of the 
kaitiaki creatures that informed Māori of whether all is well in the world or 
whether some action is needed. The Tribunal has heard evidence of the result, 
as when Ngāti Kauwhata elders placed a rahui on the Oroua River after it 
was deserted by the native birds.8  
 
115. Unfortunately, the recognition of kaitiaki has been taken as an alternative to 
ownership, when it is in fact an incident of ownership.    
 
The concept of mana  
116. Mana, which confers a larger capacity than kaitiakitanga, appears not to be 
provided for in the modern management of water and yet it is the basic 
concept in giving expression to Māori rights.  Mana covers both ownership 
(the right to use and possess against all others), and the over-riding political 
authority to control the use and management. In custom, the hapū had the 
mana over their territorial lands and waters.  
 
117. Based upon Next Steps for Freshwater, it is the State which has that which 
Māori call mana – the power to possess and to control – leaving to Māori, a 
cultural interest in the maintenance of natural, water regimes.  The State 
provides a benefit for the commercial exploiters of water, does not provide a 
benefit for the customary owners, but recognises the customary responsibility 
of the hapū, as kaitiaki, to maintain clean waterways.  Māori may do so 
through co-management agreements with local authorities. The structure 
provides a free ride for commercial exploiters and for the hapū and local 
Māori and Pākehā communities, the cost of cleaning up the tracks.9  
 
118. In this context, Māori may observe that their forebears did not cede their 
mana in the Treaty of Waitangi. In the Declaration of Independence of 1835  
the “tino rangatira” (great chiefs) were recognised as having “ko te 
Kingitanga, ko te mana” (all sovereign power and authority) within their 
territories, and thus, all sovereign power and authority over their respective 
forests and fisheries, lakes and rivers. This Kīngitanga and mana were not 
ceded to the Crown in the Treaty of Waitangi.  Instead the tino rangatira gave 
                                                 
7 The complexity of the whakapapa is evident in a letter to a Māori newspaper, the translation of which includes 
“The headland at Uruti belongs to the Ngäi-Teao people… plus the house sites of Ngäi-Teao and their eel lakes 
and Wairongo as well which was passed down to me from my ancestors. I still live on that headland now… The 
tipua [taniwha] which live on the outskirts of Uruti are guardians [kai tiaki] that descend from crayfish, they are 
called Turuawahine, they are female and are ancestors of Ngäi-Teao. I am their descendant”. Harawira, A, Te 
Puke ki Hikurangi, (Vol. 5, No. 15, 30 January 1903) at 3. 
8 See evidence of Dennis Emery, stage 2, first week, at Waiwhetu. 
9 This is not intended to disparage Te Whakahonotanga a Rohe.  The authors appreciate the efforts of Iwi 
Leaders to extend the benefits of the settlements affecting the Whanganui and Waikato rivers to the hapū of 
other waterways.    
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to the Crown the power to make laws, but so as not to infringe upon their tino 
rangatiratanga.10  
 
The concept of responsibility 
119. Embedded in Tikanga Māori is a concept which transcends the right to use. 
It is the responsibility to so use as to maintain to the fullest practicable extent, 
pure, freshwater regimes. It is a concept which requires a balancing of the 
benefits of ownership with the responsibilities of ownership. It is a 
responsibility which is owed to one’s forebears and one’s descendants. The 
concept, based upon the natural world as a divine inheritance, questions our 
current understanding of what constitutes sustainable development and 
points to the need for greater constraint in the interests of the survival of the 
natural world and human survival.  
 
State Recognition of Custom Law  
The principles of State recognition 
120. This part considers that three principles for the recognition of Tikanga were 
established on the colonisation of New Zealand.  They were:  
(a) that a colonising state will, within bounds, respect the colony’s native 
law;  
(b) that the property rights of the native people will be determined in 
accordance with the native law; and  
(c) that any elements of divinity in the native law need not be an 
impediment to its recognition. 
 
121. The extent to which these principles were followed once the colonists 
achieved numerical supremacy is questionable.  However, the more recent 
avenues for recognising tikanga will be considered in Part C with a view to 
informing the Tribunal on the ultimate question of how Māori proprietary 
interests in water may be provided for today, having regard to current legal 
doctrines and international norms.  
 
The principle of respecting the Native Law 
The Treaty of Waitangi 
122. Māori custom is recognised in the Treaty of Waitangi.  It is indirectly 
recognised in Article 2 of the Māori text in these terms: 
 
Ko te Kuini o Ingarani ka wakarite ka wakaae ki nga Rangatira ki nga 
hapu-ki nga tangata katoa o Nu Tirani te tino rangatiratanga o o 
ratou wenua o ratou kainga me o ratou taonga katoa …. [emphasis 
added] 
 
123. McHugh suggests that the Article 2 promise of ‘te tino rangatiratanga’ implies 
the continued viability of customary law where Māori were concerned.11 He 
                                                 
10 (Wai 1040, November 2014) at 528-529 which finds that the chiefs who signed the Treaty did not cede 
sovereignty to the British Crown but agreed “to share power and authority with Britain.” 
11 McHugh, P The Māori Magna Carta (Oxford University Press, Auckland, 1991) at 287. 
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added: ‘The chiefs thought simply that they were to retain their customary 
authority over and amongst their own people.’12 On the 5th February during 
the debates preceding the Treaty’s signing, for example, the Nga Puhi 
rangatira, Tamati Waka Nene, was recorded as stating: 
O Governor … You must preserve our customs, and never permit our 
lands to be wrested from us … Stay thou here, dwell in our midst.13 
 
Waka Nene’s view was decisive in persuading those present to sign the 
Treaty.  
 
124. Where the English text refers to the protection of Māori properties the Māori 
text, as cited here, refers to the protection of all those things treasured by the 
Māori people (“me o ratou taonga katoa”) and so gives effect to the wide 
view that Māori have of ‘property’. A taonga also includes intangibles like 
customs, language and song.14  
 
125. A direct reference to Māori custom is in the “fourth article” of the Treaty (as 
it has been called).  This was an amendment to the Treaty in the debate at 
Waitangi.  While it does not occupy much attention today, it very likely had 
considerable significance for Māori at the time. It was debated in the presence 
of Māori, in the manner of the oral tradition, an agreed position was read out, 
and it was debated by the missionaries who, over the previous 25 years, had 
competed with the tohunga as advisors on te taha wairua (life’s spiritual 
dimension). At the request of Bishop Jean Baptiste Pompallier, Reverend H. 
Williams with the assistance of W. Colenso drafted the article as follows: 
E mea ana te Kawana, ko ngā whakapono katoa, o Ingarani, o 
ngā Weteriana, o Roma, me te ritenga Māori hoki, e tiakina 
ngatahitia e ia.   
 
The Governor says that the several faiths [beliefs] of England, 
of the Wesleyans, of Rome, and also the Māori custom, shall 
be alike protected by him.15 
 
126. Alan Ward has described how official messages recognising Māori 
customary rights were then conveyed throughout the country.16 These 
included a circular from Governor Hobson and a message from him through 
Willoughby Shortland that “the Queen will not interfere with your native 
laws and customs.”17 
 
                                                 
12 Idem. 
13 Buick, L The Treaty of Waitangi (3rd ed, Avery Press, Auckland, 1936) at 143. 
14 Report Findings and Recommendations of the Waitangi Tribunal ...in Relation to Fishing Grounds in the 
Waitara District (Wai 6) 17 March 1983 (Te Atiawa Report) para. 10.2 (a). Report Findings of the Waitangi 
Tribunal. Relating to Te Reo Māori (WAI-11) 29 April 1986, para. 4.2.4; 4.2.8. 
15 W Colenso The Authentic and Genuine History of THE Signing of the Treaty of Waitangi Capper Press 
Christchurch Reprint 1971. “[beliefs]” is part of the original text.  
16 Ward, A, A Show of Justice: Racial Amalgamation in Nineteenth Century New Zealand (Reprinted with 
Corrections, Auckland University Press, 1995) at 45. 
17 The source of Shortland’s statement in Kaitaia is John Johnson’s journal, 23 April 1840, Auckland Public 
Library. 
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The English Laws Act and the Courts 
127. The English Laws Act 1858 then provided: “The laws of England as existing 
on the 14th day of January 1840, shall, so far as applicable to the 
circumstances of the said Colony of New Zealand, be deemed and taken to 
have been in force (from that day and thereafter)”.18 The limitation on the 
application of English law has been held to include the situation where the 
same would be inconsistent with Māori custom.19 For that reason the doctrine 
of the riparian ownership of river and lake beds may not be applicable.20  In 
addition, Māori custom has now been recognised as part of the New Zealand 
common law.21 
 
128. Even the Solicitor-General, Sir John Salmond, when appointed to argue the 
case for the Crown’s putative interest in Lake Rotorua, advised the Attorney-
General in 1914:  
 
The Prime Minister... has instructed me to appear before the Native Land 
Court to contest the claims of the Natives on the ground that the only 
rights possessed by the Natives over the larger lakes of this country are 
rights of fishery (which would not enable a freehold order to be issued) 
and not rights of ownership as are now claimed ... It is to be observed in 
the first place that the question relates not merely to Lake Rotorua but to 
all rivers, lakes, foreshores and tidal waters in the Dominion ... I think it 
exceedingly doubtful whether any such contention as that which I am 
now instructed to raise before the Native Land Court could be maintained 
... it may be anticipated that the Court will hold that by native custom the 
Natives own not merely the land but the water of this country and freehold 
titles will be issued accordingly [emphasis added].22 
 
129. In 1927 the Privy Council, then the highest legal authority for New Zealand, 
recognised that English legal doctrines might have no application in English 
colonies where they differed from native laws. The Privy Council warned 
against “… a tendency operating at times unconsciously, to render (Native 
title to land) in terms which are appropriate only to systems which have 
grown up in English law’. The Privy Council pointed out that “the notion of 
individual ownership is quite foreign to native ideas” and that “All the 
members of the community, village or family, have an equal right to the land, 
but in every case the Chief or headman of the community or village, or the 
head of the family has charge of the land, and in a loose mode of speech is 
sometimes called the owner.” 23  
 
                                                 
18 Section 1. See also s. 2, English Laws Act 1908. 
19 Baldick v Jackson (1910) 30 NZLR 343 (HC). 
20 Paki v Attorney-General [2014] NZSC 118, [2015] 1 NZLR 67 at para 67; and Paki v Attorney-General (No 
1) [2012] NZSC 50, [2012] 3 NZLR 277 at para 18. 
21 See Chief Justice Elias in Takamore v Clarke [2012] NZSC 116, [2013] 2 NZLR 733 at para 73 (citing to fn 
113);  
22 Salmond to Attorney-General, 1 August 1914, Opinions Relating to Lands Department 1913-15, cited in Alex 
Frame, Salmond: Southern Jurist, (Victoria University Press, Wellington, 1995) at 119. 
23 Amodu Tijani v Secretary Southern Rhodesia [1921] 2 AC 199, 403 
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The Principle for Determining the Native Title to Land 
130. There was no question but that the title to Māori Land should be determined 
according to Māori custom.  Agents were appointed for that purpose and land 
purchases were purportedly affected on the basis of their inquiries.  However, 
by 1865 when the Native Land Court was established, attitudes had changed.  
While entitlement would be determined on the Judge’s interpretation of 
Māori custom, the titles themselves would issue as freehold titles in 
individual ownership. And, with some limited exceptions as already 
mentioned, the principle that the native right to property would be determined 
in accordance with custom, was not extended to water bodies.  
 
The Principle of Religious Neutrality.  
131. The principle of religious neutrality in the fourth article of the Treaty applied 
also to Māori custom, so that no question could be raised on the basis of the 
divine origin of mana and of property.  This was hardly surprising. On a 
similar basis English law had recognised the divine origins of certain rights 
of the Kings and of the Monarch’s right to the radical title to all land.  
 
132. The principle was confirmed however by the Privy Council in 1925 in 
Pramatha Nath Mullick v Pradyumna Kumar Mullick24 when admitting an 
Indian idol as a suitor in respect of temple funds, clothing the idol with legal 
personality for that purpose.25 Many years’ later, the New Zealand 
Government would recognise by statute, the legal personality of the 
Whanganui River having regard to Tikanga Māori.  
 
133. The New Zealand Courts are now cognisant of Māori spiritual relationships.  
In 1987 in Huakina Development Trust v Waikato Valley Authority on the 
discharge of cow-shed effluent to the Waikato River, the High Court 
concluded that “customs and practices which include spiritual elements are 
cognisable in a court of law provided they are properly established, usually 
by evidence”.26   
Recognition in Comparable Jurisdictions 
134. A growing body of law recognises and supports an Indigenous Peoples right 
to the control, allocation and management of water within tribal territories.  
 
Canada 
135. Many aboriginal First Nations peoples continue to assert their sovereignty in 
accordance to their customs and traditions.27 Historic treaties contain express 
                                                 
24 Pramatha Nath Mullick (Appeal No.59 of 1924) v Pradyumma Kumar Mullick and another (Fort William 
(Bengal)) [1925] UKPC 33 (28 April 1925) (a copy of which is accessible through bailii 
Http://www.bailii.org/cgi-
bin/format.cgi?doc+/uk/cases/UKPC/1925/1925_33.html&quiry=(%Pradyumna+Kumar+Mullick%22 
25 See BA Wortley Jurisprudence Manchester University Press 1967 p75 and see PW Duff The Personality of 
an Idol The Cambridge Law Journal Vol 3 Issue 1 November 1927 pp 42 – 48. 
26 [1987] 2 NZLR 37, 59. 
27 Nowlan, Linda, ‘Customary Water Laws and Practices in Canada’ (Unpublished Report, Commissioned by 
FAO/IUCN, Research Project, 2004) at 6. See also J Borrows ‘Learning from the Land’ (Lecture at Victoria 
University Law School, 11 February 2016) where Professor Burrows discusses the unique relationship the Cree 
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provisions relating to water and a Treaty may protect water rights when that 
right is under threat. Claxton v Saanichton Marina Ltd28 provides an example 
where a proposed marina threatened the eel grass that sustained a traditional 
fishery. However, even in the absence of an express treaty right to water, a 
reserve-based sovereign right may be found to exist from the interpretation 
of the treaty that created the reserve.29  
 
Navajo 
136. In the United States of America, the sovereign right of the Navajo peoples 
over their water resources is reflected in the Navajo Nation Water Code 
(1984).  This provides that the Navajo Nation is ‘the owner of the full 
equitable title to all waters …’ of the reservation.30  The Navajo Nation Water 
Code further provides operational provisions associated with the granting of 
permits and enforcement functions.31 
 
137. The Navajo Nation stretches across four States with 298,000 citizens.32 The 
Navajo reservation is located within the treaty-guaranteed traditional 
territory of the Navajo, encompassed by their four sacred mountains.33 The 
Navajo Nation operates a three-branch government of legislators, executives 
and judiciary. Uniquely, it is a leader in the development of legal institutions 
and substantive law that is consistent with Navajo tradition and practices, 
resulting in traditional law siting alongside the legislative code and judicial 
decisions.34 
 
138. The Navajo traditional and sovereign right to water is clearly articulated 
within their Navajo Nation Water Code (1984). The Declaration of Purposes 
1101, contained in the General Provisions section notes: 
                                                 
peoples have with water and their creation stories. Online at: http://www.victoria.ac.nz/law/about/events/nz-
centre-for-public-law/learning-from-the-land-indigenous-legal-education-in-context. 
28 British Columbia Court of Appeal, Hinkson, Lambert and Locke JJ.A., March 30, 1989.  
29 See Winters v. United States 207 U.S. 564 (1908). The Supreme Court of the United States held that ‘a 
reserve right of a sufficient amount of water necessary to fulfill the purposes of the Indian reservation was 
implied in the creation of reservations of land.’ A reserve right to water is a right created by federal law, senior 
to all future users, and cannot be lost by non-use. See also the decision, US u Truckee-Carson Irrigation District 
where the Court found that ‘the Secretary of the Interior was not authorized to take Indian water rights for the 
benefit of reclamation projects’ and also the Court ruled that ‘when the United States represents Indians in 
litigation it is obligated to act as a trustee and not to compromise the Indian's interests owing to its conflicting 
responsibilities’.  Although not adopted per se, it does hold some logic that this doctrine should apply to the 
prairies in Canada. 
30 Navajo Nation Water Code, 1103, Nature of Ownership. Any legal title held by the United States to those 
waters is as trustee only for the Navajo peoples. This is consistent with the Winters doctrine where the US 
Supreme Court laid down a basic tenet of Indian law – that with ‘the establishment of an Indian reservation was 
an implied reservation of sufficient water to enable the Indians to live on these lands which were drastically 
reduced in size from the aboriginal lands they were ceding in treaties with the United States, and to which they 
were being forcibly relocated.’ Subsequently this right is not dependent on State law and Indian water rights are 
‘prior and permanent’ meaning that water rights are not lost by non-use. 
31 See generally Subchapter 6 of the Code and 1402. 
32 Kristen Carpenter and Angela Riley ‘Indigenous Peoples and the Jurisgenerative Moment in Human Rights’ 
California Law Review, Vol 102, 2014, at 222.  
33 Ibid. 
34 See Raymond Austin Navajo Courts and the Navajo Common Law: A Tradition of Tribal Self-Governance 
(University of Minnesota Press, Minneapolis, 2009). See also John Borrows Drawing Out the Law (University 
of Toronto Press, Toronto, 2010). 
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In order to provide for a permanent homeland for the Navajo People; to 
protect the health, the welfare and the economic security of the citizens of 
the Navajo Nation; to develop, manage, and preserve the water resources of 
the Navajo Nation; to secure a just and equitable distribution of the use of 
water within the Navajo Nation through a uniform and coherent system of 
regulation; and to provide for the exercise of the inherent sovereign powers 
of self-government by the Navajo Nation, the Navajo Nation hereby asserts 
its sovereign authority over all actions taken within the territorial jurisdiction 
of the Navajo Nation which affect the use of water within the Navajo Nation.  
 
In the Application of the Code section 1102 provides: 
 
Upon the effective date of this Code, it shall be unlawful for any person 
within the territorial jurisdiction of the Navajo Nation, as defined in 7 N.N.C. 
§254, to impound, divert, withdraw, otherwise make any use of, or take any 
action of whatever kind affecting the use of water within the territorial 
jurisdiction of the Navajo Nation unless the applicable provisions of this 
Code and regulations and determinations made hereunder have been 
complied with. No right to use water, from whatever sources, shall be 
recognized, except use rights obtained under and subject to this Code.  
 
139. In addition to the Water Code, in 2006, the Navajo legislative council 
established the Navajo Nations Human Rights Commission to address 
discriminatory actions against the citizens of the Navajo Nation. The Nations 
Human Rights Commission has successfully lobbied for the recognition of 
water and subsistence rights against powerfully aligned federal, tribal, and 
corporate interests.35  
 
Standing Rock 
140. The Sioux Nation has historically faced challenges from the State over 
adjudication of water rights, a challenge that cuts across their recognised 
sovereign rights to water.36 More recently the Dakato Access Pipeline, a 
subsidiary of Energy Transfer Partners, is planning to construct a pipeline 
that will infringe on Indigenous sacred sites of the Lakato peoples. Originally 
the route of the pipeline was through Bismarck and Mandan, North Dakota, 
which would have adversely affected these primarily non-Native Indian 
communities.37 After opposition the alternative pathway now crosses 
underneath the Missouri River, 800 metres from the Standing Rock Indian 
                                                 
35 See Mission/Vision, Navajo Nation Human Rights Commission, http://www.nnhrc.navajo-
nsn.gov/mission_vision.html  (last visited Nov. 7  2013) as cited in in Kristen Carpenter and Angela Riley, 
‘Indigenous Peoples and the Juris-generative Moment in Human Rights’ California Law Review, (Vol 102, 2014) 
at 176. 
36 For example in March 1980 the State of South Dakato filed a suit in the state court for control over all water 
rights in the Missouri River system affecting the water rights of seven South Dakato Sioux tribes. See South 
Dakato v Rippling Water Ranch, et al. , (No. CIV-80-3031-DJP, D.S.D, 1980).  
37 Both Bismarck and Mandan communities comprise around 90 per cent non-Indigenous peoples. 
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Reservation, subsequently placing this water source at risk from spillage and 
pollution.38 
 
141. The underlying issue for the Standing Rock community is a sovereign right 
to water, a right that has been challenged by the State. This right is further 
exacerbated by a determination by the World Health Organisation that 
perceives a right to water as a human right noting that “Access to safe 
drinking water by indigenous peoples is closely linked to their control over 
their ancestral lands, territories and resources. Lack of legal recognition or 
protection of these ancestral lands, territories or resources can, therefore, 
have far-reaching implications for their enjoyment of the right to water.” The 
issues articulated at Standing Rock have resulted in the largest collective 
action by Indigenous peoples across the world against the non-recognition of 
an Indigenous right to water. 
 
Conclusions on Parts A and B 
 
142. The following are the key conclusions from Parts A and B. 
 
143. Tikanga Māori offers an alternative view of what is sustainable development 
and postulates the need to constrain economic development and growth in 
the interests of human survival and the survival of the natural world.  
 
144. Māori possessed territory, or areas over which they had influence or mana, 
and the territory which they possessed was not just land but included the 
whole of the territorial resources of land, lakes, rivers, springs, swamps and 
inland seas.  
 
145. The fish, water-fowl and water plants of the water bodies were especially 
significant because of the lack of land-based animals and paucity of crops; 
and for lack of horses and other beasts of burden, and the consequential lack 
of carriages and carriage-ways, the water bodies were singularly important 
for transport, trade and social intercourse.  
 
146. Having regard to Tikanga Māori, the political assertion that nobody can own 
water is a trite response to a complex issue of cultural difference.  It merely 
invites the equally unhelpful rejoinder that, if that is the Pākehā law, then let 
it be the law for the Pākehā, but it is not the law for the Māori who, by their 
own law, owned the water and water bodies.  
 
147. Unlike English law, there was no concept of someone owning the bed of the 
river, lake or harbour but not the associated water. To Māori, the water was 
as much held or possessed as the associated bed, and it was held for so long 
as the water remained or flowed over the tribal territory. 
 
                                                 
38 In December, 2016 the permit to cross the pipeline under the lake was withheld granting a temporary reprieve 
to the Indigenous peoples. However, with the change in government the status remains uncertain. 
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148. The water bodies were held by or for the hapū, as the autonomous, political 
unit along with the related hapū along the water’s edge, with whom 
associations were made from time to time for defence, trade and social 
intercourse. The water bodies were symbolic of the identity and authority of 
the hapū and of the iwi of the combined hapū.  The evidence of occupation 
of the water’s edge was also evidence of their authority over the water bodies. 
 
149. Although there were private interests in the water, in the form of individual 
or whānau use rights, these were subordinate to the community of ownership 
represented by the hapū. 
 
150. In Tikanga Māori, Māori had the mana of their lands and waters that is, the 
absolute and exclusive power and authority thereover.  That covers not only 
the private right to own but also the public right to control. It includes, but is 
not limited to kaitiakitanga. Kaitiakitanga is an incident of ownership, not an 
alternative to it.  
 
151. There is domestic and international precedent for the following principles  
 
i. that a colonising state will, within bounds, respect the colony’s native 
law;  
ii. that the property rights of the native people will be determined in 
accordance with the native law; and  
iii. that any elements of divinity in the native law need not be an impediment 
to its recognition. 
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PART C: CUSTOM ON WATER AND ITS 
RELATIONSHIP TO WESTERN LEGAL CONCEPTS, 
THE TREATY AND HUMAN RIGHTS 
 
 
I  Introduction – property and political authority in natural 
resources 
 
152. This section discusses customary rights claims to natural resources with a focus 
on water bodies through the westerns concepts of political authority and 
proprietary rights (ownership). This is important because it pervades thinking 
about Indigenous rights in New Zealand – including the water claim considered 
by the Waitangi Tribunal in the Stage 1 Report on the National Freshwater and 
Geothermal Resources claim (“Stage 1 Report”).1 The approach in this section 
is to consider these issues in the context of recent international and comparative 
law debates about Indigenous rights and theoretical framework for thinking 
about rights in terms of a “right to culture”, “right to property” and “tino 
rangatiratanga” models. The proposition is that in New Zealand  Indigenous 
rights reforms are largely directed at recognition of a right to culture and right to 
property (in some instances), with little recognition of a right to tino 
rangatiratanga.2  
 
153. Māori generally argue for tino rangatiratanga over natural resources in both 
senses of political authority and proprietary rights in that they seek virtually all 
rights in relation to the resource.3 In other words, tino rangatiratanga subsumes 
proprietary rights.4 Tino rangatiratanga is at the heart of Te Tiriti o Waitangi and 
the growing principles of the Treaty of Waitangi jurisprudence”. 
 
154. Ownership is not the typical means by which Māori describe their right to water 
bodies but this is largely prompted by Government privatization of water rights.5 
                                                 
1 Waitangi Tribunal, The Stage 1 Report on the National Freshwater and Geothermal Resources Claim (Wai 2358, 
Legislation Direct, Lower Hutt, 2012) [Stage 1 Report]. 
2 On this debate, See Karen Engle The Elusive Promise of Indigenous Development: Rights, Culture, Strategy (Duke 
University Press, Durham, 2010). Karen Engle has critiqued Indigenous rights movements for giving up “strong 
self-determination claims” in favour of the right to culture category. See also Courtney Jung The Moral Force of 
Indigenous Politics (Cambridge University Press, New York, 2008); and Andrew Erueti “UN Declaration on the 
Rights of Indigenous Peoples: A Mixed-Model Interpretative Approach” (SJD thesis, University of Toronto, 2016). 
3 As noted in the Stage 1 Report, The claimants’ position is that article 2 of the Treaty of Waitangi guaranteed them 
the “full, exclusive and undisturbed possession” of their properties (in English) and te tino rangatiratanga (full 
authority) over their taonga (treasured possessions) (in te reo Māori). They presented conclusive evidence that Māori 
hapū and iwi had customary rights and authority over water bodies – as distinct from land – in 1840. 
4 The Tribunal held that "te tino rangatiratanga was more than ownership: it encompassed the autonomy of hapu to 
arrange and manage their own affairs in partnership with the Crown." Stage 1 at 100. 
5 As Richard Boast observes, “It is no accident that those natural resources which have been privatised by statute 
(fisheries, the radio spectrum) have attracted the greatest amount of litigation from Māori groups. If a resource is 
unowned, or is nationalised, there is at least some hope of securing interests in it; but it is quite otherwise once 
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However, it is the right to use, exclude and exploit the water body that is the 
heart of the matter.6 Property is sometimes referred to as a bundle of rights. As 
Paul McHugh notes, “the essence of property was not the physical thing itself 
but the rights in relation to the thing; rights which other members of the particular 
society were bound to observe.”7 In Yanner v Eaton, the High Court of Australia 
observed:8 
 
The word ‘property’ is often used to refer to something that belongs to another. But ... 
‘property’ does not refer to a thing; it is a description of a legal relationship with a thing. 
It refers to a degree of power that is recognised in law as power permissibly exercised 
over the thing. The concept of ‘property’ may be elusive. Usually it is treated as a 
‘bundle of rights’. 
 
155. According to Western notions of ownership, property in a natural resource gives 
a right to exclude, and use the natural resource as you wish including allowing 
others to exploit it and to gain some benefit from its use (for example, its use for 
electricity generation). But even owners are subject to the rights of the state, 
which may for example take property for public works subject to compensation 
and the use of natural resources in New Zealand is regulated by the modern 
resource management regime. As a result, in thinking about proprietary rights it 
is often useful to think of a set of relevant rights that relate to the natural resource 
in question and to consider how those rights are to be allocated to various 
interested parties. Presently the Crown reserves the right to regulate the use of 
water. The Crown receives benefits (indirectly by taxing profits made from use 
of water) from the use of the resource through the RMA consent system. Those 
who take water under the RMA acquire rights to the water captured and can 
benefit from its use.9 This idea of different types of rights held by different 
parties obviously has many parallels with Māori customary tenure.10  
 
156. The freshwater claimants sought “proprietary interests in particular water 
resources.” This is the primary argument made and it is clearly directed to the 
right to use and occupy water exclusively and to allow others to use the natural 
                                                 
privatised.”  See Richard Boast, "Māori Fisheries 1986-1998: A Reflection" (1999) 30(1) Victoria University of 
Wellington Law Review 111 at 134. Boast was speaking in the context of fisheries and efforts to privatize that 
industry, but the parallels to water are very close and one of the issues considered below is whether legal uncertainty 
as to the Crown’s rights to water will mean it is unable it to pursue a policy of privatisation. 
6 Generally, property includes the following rights: the right to use or enjoy the property, the right to exclude others, 
and the right to sell or give away. See, Milirrpum v Nabalco (1971) 17 FLR 141, 171 (Blackburn J). See also: Kevin 
Gray, “Property in Thin Air” (1991) 50 Cambridge Law Journal 252.   
7 PG McHugh, The Māori Magna Carta (Oxford University Press, Auckland, 1991) at 73.  This notion of a bundle 
of rights is the conception applied in thinking about the content of “native title” in Australia as opposed to a “right in 
land” approach, which pressupposes an underlying title to which are attached pendant rights, See Western Australia 
v Ward [2002] HCA 28, (2002) 191 ALR 1. For the development of the ‘bundle of rights’ approach, see Pamela 
O’Connor, ‘The Changing Paradigm of Property and the Framing of Regulation as a Taking” (2011) 36 Monash 
University Law Review 50 at 54–56. 
8 Yanner v Eaton [1999] HCA 53, (1999) 201 CLR 351 at 365-366. 
9 B Barton “Different kinds of argument for applying property law to resource consents” (2016 April) Resource 
Management Journal  7-10. 
10 See above Section A. 
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resource. Similar rights to excusive occupation of property arose in the Ngati 
Apa (2003) judicial decision, which opened up the possibility of Māori acquiring 
freehold titles in the foreshore and seabed.11 This meant that Māori could 
potentially exclude others from their freehold titles (this being a right associated 
with Māori freehold land under Te Ture Whenua Māori 1993) and even the sale 
of the land to others. The prospect of exclusive interests possessed by Māori in 
the foreshore and seabed, while not clear,12 was too much for the government of 
the day which effectively overrode the decision and replaced it with a statutory 
scheme for recognition of non-exclusive rights and that remains in place today.13 
 
157. So far, the Waitangi Tribunal has not had any difficulty in finding that the 
customary interests held by Māori in rivers are akin to proprietary rights.14 In the 
Stage 1 Report, the Waitangi Tribunal accepted the claimants’ contention that 
western-style legal ownership – while not a comfortable fit with Māori 
customary authority (mana, or the Treaty equivalent, tino rangatiratanga) over 
particular resources – is the closest English cultural equivalent.15 But it also 
recognized that tribes have political authority over their resources or tino 
rangatiratanga.16 According to the Waitangi Tribunal, the claimants were entitled 
to enhanced authority and control in how their taonga are used. The Stage 1 
Report found that claimants may be entitled to commercial redress for the use of 
rivers for electricity generation and that this might be in the form of both 
compensation for past losses17 and royalties for future use.18 It takes the same 
                                                 
11 See Ngati Apa v Attorney-General [2003] 3 NZLR 643 (CA) [Ngati Apa]. This was the Māori Land Court’s 
original mandate. That is to convert lands “owned by Natives under their customs or usages” into a Crown granted 
fee simple title. In other words, the Native Land Legislation saw Māori customary title as translating readily into a 
right of ownership.  
12 See Elias CJ’s judgment in Ngati Apa, above and 11, at [45], which notes that freehold was not necessarily the 
outcome of an inquiry because the Māori Land Court may now make a declaration of status of customary land 
without making a vesting order changing the status of customary land to Māori freehold land. At [45].  Justice Gault, 
at [121] noted that few customary interests in the foreshore and seabed would be capable of supporting a vesting 
order and an estate in fee simple. but contrast with Boast noting this “may well have been overstating the position”. 
Contrast Richard Boast, Foreshore and Seabed (Lexis Nexis, Wellington, 2005) at 97, noting that this “may well 
have been overstating the position.”   
13 Marine and Coastal Area (Takutai Moana) Act 2011 [Takutai Moana Act 2011], which repealed the Foreshore 
and Seabed Act 2004. Note that under the Takutai Moana Act 2011, s83 it is possible to acquire ownership of sub-
surface minerals excepting “Crown Minerals” under the Crown Minerals Act 1991. 
14 See, Waitangi Tribunal Stage 1 Report, above n 1; Waitangi Tribunal, The Ika Whenua Rivers Report (Wai 212, 
1998); Waitangi Tribunal, The Whanganui River Report (Wai 167, 1993); Waitangi Tribunal The Ngawha 
Geothermal Resource Report (Wai 304, 1993); Waitangi Tribunal, He Maunga Rongo: Report on Central North 
Island Claims , Stage 1 (Wai 1200, 2008). In relation to the Stage 1 Report, Jacinta Ruru describes it, as “the most 
legally significant Waitangi Tribunal report to date, ever.  It grapples with the toughest issues at the heart of our 
legal system – ownership of property, commercial rights to benefit from that property and inherent rights to 
development. See Jacinta Ruru, “Maori rights in water – the Waitangi Tribunal’s interim report” (Sep 2012) Maori 
Law Review. 
15 See Stage 1 Report n 1 at 137.   
16 Stage 1 Report above n 1 at 76. 
17 Stage 1 Report, above n 1, at [3.9.1]. 
18  Stage 1 Report, above n 1, at [3.8.3(1)]. 
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view in respect of geothermal resources.19 The Crown’s general negotiating 
stance is against the recognition of ownership interests or the provision of 
commercial redress in respect of existing generating capacity and its future use. 
But it is “open to discussing the possibility of Māori proprietary rights in water, 
short of full ownership”.20 By this the Crown seems to be saying that it will not 
entertain the right of Māori to use and occupy and exploit the natural resource. 
Instead, for the Crown tino rangatiratanga equates with protection and 
preservation, so that the natural resource may be cared for, used, and enjoyed by 
present and future generations of tangata whenua, and shared with tauiwi (non-
Māori) as appropriate.  
 
158. Thus, the dominant model for the Crown in the context of freshwater, is largely 
a “right to culture model.”21 By this we mean the protection of a traditional way 
of life, procedural rights to consultation and tribal self-management of property. 
For example in the Muriwhenua Fishing inquiry, the Crown submitted that 
rangatiratanga was “something less than ownership” and suggested that 
stewardship was more important in Māori society, and that in reality 
rangatiratanga meant “stewardship”.22 Ultimately ownership rights were 
acquired by Māori in commercial and traditional fisheries but only after Māori 
obtained significant legal leverage. In the context of water, the Crown clearly 
prefers stewardship without ownership, or a shared-management right such as 
those that the Crown has negotiated with Waikato-Tainui and Whanganui tribes 
in treaty settlements.23 The right to culture is a prominent part of New Zealand’s 
reforms and this follows from the emphasis on making reparations to the tribe.   
 
159. But Indigenous rights reforms are also based on a property model.  This seeks to 
restore to Māori a “resource base” of property rights and monetary 
compensation. Treaty settlements, for example, provide “commercial redress”.24 
And iwi have acquired commercial rights to natural resources on the basis that 
Māori possess de facto property rights in the resource.25  One can understand 
why the property category might be so prominent given the dominant role 
property has played in Indigenous-state relations in New Zealand. The Treaty 
itself in the English version of Article 2 speaks of Māori rights to “Lands and 
                                                 
19 Waitangi Tribunal, He Maunga Rongo: Report on Central North Island Claims (Wai 1200, 2008) at 1590 and 
Waitangi Tribunal, The Ika Whenua Rivers Report (Wai 212, 1998) at [10.4]. 
20 New Zealand Māori Council v Attorney-General [2013] NZSC 6, [2013] 3 NZLR 31 at [113]. 
21 See Karen Engle The Elusive Promise of Indigenous Development: Rights, Culture, Strategy (Duke University 
Press, Durham, 2010).   
22 Waitangi Tribunal Muriwhenua Fishing Claim Report (Wai 22, 1988) at 10.3.3 (b). See also Ngai Tahu Māori 
Trust Board v Attorney-General HC Wellington CP559/87, 2 November 1987 at X noting, successive governments 
were wrong in assuming that the Māori fishing right was merely “recreational or ceremonial”. 
23  Te Awa Tupua (Whanganui River Claims Settlement) Bill (129-2); Waikato-Tainui Raupatu Claims (Waikato 
River) Settlement Act 2010. 
24 Office of Treaty Settlements Ka Tika A Muri, Ka Tika a Mua: Healing the Past and Building a Future (March 
2015).   
25 See discussion below.  
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Estates Forests Fisheries”.26  Property was a strong motivating factor for the 
Treaty as the colonial office sought to regulate land sales. Often property is the 
only means by which tribes could assert rights against the state.27 Property thus 
is an ancient means of thinking about Indigenous rights in New Zealand. In the 
early years of settlement, common law decisions including R v Symonds (1847) 
drew a distinction between imperium and dominium.28 And this has been more 
clearly elucidated and confirmed in the aboriginal rights jurisprudence forged 
over the last four decades.29 Land was infused with both imperium, representing 
the Crown’s interest as the sovereign, and dominium being the pre-existing 
proprietary right retained by Indigenous peoples. Once the land was alienated or 
sold however (or confiscated), and it could only be acquired by the Crown under 
its pre-emptive right, imperium and dominium merged so that the Crown 
acquired the absolute beneficial interest in the land.30 In recent decades, the 
common law doctrine of aboriginal rights has revitalised such property-based 
claims by Indigenous peoples. Generally the Crown prefers the proprietary rights 
model – because it does not threaten or call into question current configurations 
of political power. But it is not only sought by Government. During the early 
1980s Māori leaders also sought a more robust economic-base for tribes.31 The 
Freshwater Water Tribunal claim is a recent example of this quest for greater 
economic self-sufficiency. But of course in relation to freshwater the Crown is 
rejecting the proprietary rights model.  
 
160. These property and right to culture models can lead to significant reforms – 
witness especially the economic fruits of the treaty settlements. The economic 
redress has had a profound impact on the Māori economy, estimated in 2016 to 
be worth $42 billion and growing by 1 billion each year.32 Ngai Tahu is the 
largest private land owner in the South Island.33 Ngai Tahu and Waikato-Tainui 
received $170 million in reparations in 1993 but the value of their assets is now 
over $1 billion.34 Māori are major stakeholders in the commerical fishing, 
forestry, and aquaculture industries. However, the Crown’s focus on property 
and the right to culture has resulted in a lacuna in terms of political authority. 
                                                 
26 See Treaty of Waitangi Act 1975, sch 1. 
27 See for example Native Land Act 1865; Lake Omapere Case (1929) 11 Bay of Islands MB 253. 
28 R v Symonds (1847) NZPCC 387 (SC). See also, Ngati Apa above n 11 at [21] “[I]n New Zealand, the Crown’s 
notional “radical” title, obtained with sovereignty, was held to be consistent with and burdened by native customary 
property.” See also Te Runanga o Muriwhenua v Attorney-General [1990] 2 NZLR 641 and Te Runanganui o Te Ika 
Whenua Inc Society v Attorney-General [1994] 2 NZLR 20.  
29 Paul McHugh Aboriginal Title: The Modern Jurisprudence of Tribal Land Rights (Oxford University Press, 
New York, 2011). 
30 See Mabo v. Queensland (No.2), (1992) 175 C.L.R. 1. 
31 Alan Ward, An Unsettled History (Bridget Williams, Wellington, 1999) at 29. 
32 Liz Te Amo, New Zealand Trade and Enterprise, “The Māori economy is Big Business”; at 
https://www.nzte.govt.nz/en/news-and-media/blogs-and-commentary/2015/7/29/the-m%C4%81ori-economy-is-big-
business/. 
33 Ngāi Tahu Claims Settlement Act 1998.  
34 See Waikato-Tainui Annual Report (2014) <www.tgh.co.nz/admin/documentlibrary/waikato-
tainui%20annual%20report%202014.pdf>. 
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Political authority in this context refers to the right to tino rangatiratanga, self-
government or self-determination. Tino rangatiratanga is grounded in many 
ideas but is closely related to concepts of prior sovereignty or historical 
sovereignty and the international law right to self-determination.35 According to 
these concepts, Indigenous peoples of Aotearoa New Zealand were independent 
peoples and possessed full authority over their lands and peoples and are 
therefore entitled to recognition of their right to self-determination.36 James 
Anaya refers to Indigenous peoples exercising internal self-governance powers 
and external relations with states.37 In New Zealand it is often said by political 
leaders that self-government would be impracticable either because sovereignty 
was ceded, or we do not have the landmass to accommodate North-American 
style “reservations”.38 But in the New Zealand context, the self-government 
concept tends to be more nuanced and relates to constitutional reform, and 
political authority and control over natural resources. In relation to treaty 
settlements for example there is no recognition of any form of political authority. 
Instead iwi have the right to “self-management” of their tribal property. This gap 
is also evident in relation to Māori interests in natural resources, including water 
as iwi seek a greater say in the regulation of water.39 Government has responded 
through treaty settlements relating to water such as the Whanganui agreement40 
and proposed reforms to the RMA.41 However, these grant procedural rights 
(effective participation in decision-making) for example and not stronger rights 
such as free, prior and informed consent. The law relating to International 
Indigenous rights is informative in this respect because it endorses not only 
property rights but also political authority in terms of a right to self-
determination, self-government and free, prior and informed consent (what we 
call the “self-determination framework”).42   
 
                                                 
35 For an account of these “conceptual categories”, see Benedict Kingsbury “Reconciling Five Competing 
Conceptual Structures of Indigenous Peoples’ Claims in International and Comparative Law” (2001) 34 NYUJIntl 
Law & Pol 189. 
36 As the Waitangi Tribunal notes in its Whaia te Mana Motuhake (Wai 2417, 2014) at 36:, “tino rangatiratanga has 
been interpreted as absolute authority and can include freedom to be distinct peoples; the territorial integrity of their 
land base; the right to freely determine their destinies; and the right to exercise autonomy and self-government.” In 
Waitangi Tribunal Ko Aotearoa Tenei: Te Taumata Tuarua (Wai 262, 2011) vol 1 at 80, the Tribunal noted that tino 
rangatiratanga conveys concepts of authority and control but added there is more to the concept including 
expectations about right behaviour, appropriate priorities and ethical decision-making that are deeply embedded in 
Māori culture.” Waitangi Tribunal, Ko Aotearoa Tenei: Te Taumata Tuarua, Vol 1, at 80.   
37 S James Anaya Indigenous Peoples in International Law (Oxford University Press, 2004). 
38 See for example Sir Douglas Graham, Minister of Treaty Negotiations in the early 1990s, equating tino 
rangatiratanga with iwi self-mangement in Douglas Graham Trick or treaty? (Institute of Policy Studies, Victoria 
University of Wellington, Wellington, 1997) at 20–21: “But unlike the First Nations people in the US who were left 
with their own sovereign rights to a large degree, at least initially, Māori ceded sovereignty in exchange for a 
concomitant guarantee of rights.”. 
39 For an exception, see Fisheries (Kaimoana Customary Fishing) Regulations 1998: provides tangata whenua with 
power to make bylaws about customary fishing including imposing rahui (prohibitions) on customary gathering. 
40 Te Awa Tupua (Whanganui River Claims Settlement) Bill. 
41 See Ministry for the Environment Next steps for fresh water: Consultation document (February 2016) at 29. 
42 United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, GA Res 61/295, UNGAOR, 61st Sess, Supp No 
49, UN Doc A/RES/61/295 (2007) [The Declaration]. 
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161. Successive Governments in New Zealand have rejected the notion of any form 
of political authority residing in iwi. This is partly due to the controversial nature 
of such claims. But it also stems from an originalist understanding of the bargain 
between the Crown and Māori in the Treaty of Waitangi that seeks to “read up” 
the Crown’s Article 1 right to sovereignty and “read down” the Article 2 
guarantee to Māori of tino rangatiratanga.43 The implication is that tribes may 
have possessed historical sovereignty but this was willingly given up and so there 
is no right now to seek self-determination or political authority. According to 
“Principles for Crown Action on the Treaty of Waitangi” issued by the fourth 
Labour Government in 1989, there was no question that tribes ceded sovereignty 
to the Crown and the Government has the right to govern and make laws (the 
principle of government).44 However this principle was subject to the 
“rangatiratanga principle” which was concerned with: “The preservation of a 
resource base, restoration of iwi self-management and the active protection of 
taonga, both material and cultural.”45  According to Geoffrey Palmer, then 
Minister of Justice, the Article 2 tino rangatiratanga obligation, with its focus on 
culture and property, is “the price the Crown paid for” sovereignty in Article 1.46 
And this reading has been crystalized by New Zealand’s unitary government and 
the now “outdated” notion of Parliamentary sovereignty.47  
 
162. For successive Governments this has been the orthodox means of reading the 
Treaty. But Government also supplements this restrictive originalist construction 
with the contemporary position that the Treaty is “always speaking” and the 
foundation of a “relationship” or “partnership” between Māori and 
Government.48 Indeed there is a long tradition of political negotiations between 
Māori and the state,49 and this continues in the context of modern Indigenous 
rights reforms. Almost all aspects of Indigenous rights reforms have been 
initiated and controlled by the Executive branch of Government which exercises 
                                                 
43 Here we use the “originalist” versus “living constitutionalism” models of interpretation where in the latter case 
instead of focusing on the intentions of those who create a constitution, a constitution is seen as an evolving, living 
entity that is capable of adapting to changing social circumstances and contemporary moral and political beliefs. 
See, Ran Hirschl Constitutional Theocracy (Harvard University Press, Cambridge (Mass), 2011).   
44 Department of Justice Principles for Crown Action on the Treaty of Waitangi (Department of Justice, 1989) 
[Principles for Crown Action]. See also Geoffrey Palmer “The Treaty of Waitangi - principles for Crown action 
(New Zealand)” (1989) 19 VUWLR 335.    
45 At 8. 
46 Palmer, above n 44, at 340. 
47 Andrew Butler and Geoffrey Palmer A Constitution for Aotearoa New Zealand (Victoria University Press, 
Wellington, 2016) at 111 (critiquing the “outdated” doctrine of parliamentary sovereignty). 
48 See Principles for Crown Action, above n 44. Many scholars also advocate this approach: see for example 
Matthew Palmer The Treaty of Waitangi in New Zealand's Law and Constitution (Victoria University Press, 
Wellington, 2008): “[instead of] looking more closely at the words or the original intent [of the Treaty]”, like the 
terms of a contract, we ought to see the treaty as expressing “the parameters of a relationship” and as such we must 
resolve any issues through dialogue within the context of the time. See also Kenneth Coates and PG McHugh Living 
Relationships: Kōkiri Ngātahi: the Treaty of Waitangi in the New Millennium (Victoria University Press, 
Wellington, 1998). 
49  Mark Hickford, Lords of the Land (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2011). 
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considerable control over Parliament.50 This remains the case even under an 
MMP electoral system. As Palmer and Butler note, while “the effects of MMP 
have weakened the Executive and increased the power of [Parliament] by 
making it more likely that the government will have to negotiate arrangements 
for confidence and supply with other parties in order to achieve a majority … 
the challenge to executive power offered by MMP has largely been seen off.”51 
According to Palmer and Butler this is largely due to the large size of Cabinet 
relative to Parliament and the influence wielded by the Prime Minister.52 There 
is, for example, no legislation governing treaty settlements, only policy 
established by the Executive. And while treaty settlements are ultimately given 
effect in legislation, there is a convention that Parliament will not re-open them 
when the settlements reach Parliament.53 Treaty settlements also exist beyond 
the scope of judicial review given their non-justiciable subject matter.54 The 
limited judicial decisions on the Treaty are largely due to statutory references to 
the Treaty and only a few cases have resulted in success for Māori litigants. As 
Matthew Palmer noted in 2011, “there had been only two decisions since 1990 
in which a court has found the Crown has breached the principles of the Treaty 
of Waitangi.”55 This control by the Executive can allow for innovation and 
flexibility in deal-making,56 but the emphasis on the political raises serious 
concerns about the rule of law. The extensive executive power coupled with the 
fact that most of this power is sourced in the royal prerogative,57 not law,58 and 
the absence of an entrenched bill of rights and limited judicial review means 
Indigenous rights are vulnerable in this Indigenous-state partnership. In using a 
restrictive originalist reading of the Treaty that undermines tino rangatiratanga, 
while advocating a contemporary partnership approach, the government is 
                                                 
50 In Te Runanga o Wharekauri Rekohu Ltd v Attorney-General [1993] 2 NZLR 301 (CA) where the legality of the 
deed was challenged, Cooke P found himself unable to see the deed as a simple contract, and described it, very 
aptly, as "a compact of a political kind, its subject-matter so linked with contemplated Parliamentary activity as to be 
inappropriate for legal rights": at 308.  
51 Butler and Palmer, above n 47, at 125 and 130. 
52 At 125–126. 
53 See, McGee, David, Parliamentary Practice in New Zealand, 3rd ed., Dunmore Publishing Limited, Wellington, 
2005. Hon Christopher Finlayson “Submission to Standing Orders Committee on Procedures for historical Treaty of 
Waitangi settlement bills” at [25].   
54 Te Runanga o Wharekauri Rekohu Inc v Attorney-General [1993] 2 NZLR 301 (CA); New Zealand Māori 
Council v Attorney-General [2013] NZSC 6, [2013] 3 NZLR 31, which shows deference to the Executive in 
resolving claims to freshwater. Compare Ririnui v Landcorp Farming Ltd [2016] NZSC 62, 1 NZLR 1056; Haronga 
v Waitangi Tribunal [2011] NZSC 53, [2012] 2 NZLR 53, which directed the Waitangi Tribunal to hear an urgency 
application for redress; Proprietors of Wakatu v Attorney-General [2014] NZCA 628, [2015] 2 NZLR 298; and 
Proprietors of Wakatu Inc v Attorney-General [2012] NZHC 1461, which considered whether to uphold Māori 
claims to Crown breaches of fiduciary duty type obligations with respect to early land transactions. See also Claire 
Charters “Māori rights: Legal or Political?” (2015) 26(4) PLR 231. 
55 Matthew Palmer The Treaty of Waitangi in New Zealand’s Law and Constitution (Victoria University Press, 
Wellington, 2008) at 125.  
56 Kirsty Gover “Settler–State Political Theory, ‘CANZUS’ and the UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous 
Peoples” (2015) 26 EJIL 345. 
57 Another potential source is the “third source” which again has no legal basis: see Bruce Harris “Recent Judicial 
Recognition of the Third Source of Authority for Government Action” (2014) 26(1) NZULR 60. 
58 Butler and Palmer, above n 47, at 95–96, who propose that the prerogative be abolished so that government 
powers have their source in law. 
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reducing the Treaty to whatever the Executive thinks it should be.  
 
163. The courts adopt a similar approach. While the colonial courts infamously 
dismissed the treaty as a nullity,59 the orthodox position is that the Treaty is a 
treaty of cession that must be incorporated in statute to have any legal status.60 
Statutory references to the “principles of the Treaty” have sparked a body of 
contemporary jurisprudence about the meaning of this phrase.  However, like 
government, the courts adopt a conservative originalist reading of the treaty,61 
while advocating that the treaty be seen as expressing ideals of “partnership” and 
“mutual respect.”62 On the other hand, the Waitangi Tribunal analysis has been 
more searching and bolder.  As a commission of inquiry comprised of roughly 
equal numbers of Māori-Pakeha with power to consider the Treaty as a whole, 
“as embodied in its two texts”,63 when determining whether the Crown has acted 
consistent with the “principles of the Treaty,” the Tribunal has greater scope than 
the courts to investigate the Treaty’s meaning. But each inquiry results in a 
distinct report written by different tribunal members and there have been variable 
approaches. Some of the early reports implied that Māori in 1840 did not cede 
sovereignty to the Crown and that tino rangatiratanga meant much more than 
self-management.64 The Motunui–Waitara Tribunal wrote in 1983 that “te tino 
rangatiratanga”, the retention of which was guaranteed to Māori, ‘could be taken 
                                                 
59 Wi Parata v Bishop of Wellington, (1877) 3 NZ Jur (NS) SC 7. 
60 Te Heuheu Tukino v Aotea District Māori Land Board [1941] NZLR 590 (PC). Contrast Palmer, above n 55, at 
164: “On the basis of what we know today, an interpretation of the Treaty of Waitangi that accorded to most 
rangatiratanga an intention to cede sovereignty is, in my view, untenable. The implication of this view is that the 
treaty is not a treaty of cession … [r]ather it is more analogous to [an international] treaty of cession.”  
61 New Zealand Māori Council v Attorney-General [1987] 1 NZLR 641 (CA) at 663-664 [Lands case]. As Cooke P 
noted in the Lands case at 702: “[Māori] ceded rights of government in exchange for guarantees of possession and 
control of their lands and precious possessions for as long as they wanted to retain them.” See also the judgment of 
Somers J at 690, noting cession of sovereignty “is not in doubt”. For a more recent statement, see Paki v Attorney-
General [2014] NZSC 118, [2015] 1 NZLR 67 (CA) at [68]: “The cession of sovereignty to the Queen of England in 
1840 did not affect the property of Māori”.  
62 See Lands case, above n 61. 
63 Treaty of Waitangi Act 1975, s 5(3). 
64 See also Waitangi Tribunal Report of the Waitangi Tribunal on Claims Concerning the Allocation of Radio 
Frequencies (Wai 26, 1990) at 42: “as we see it the ceding of kawanatanga to the Queen did not involve the 
acceptance of an unfettered legislative supremacy over resources.”; Waitangi Tribunal, Report of the Waitangi 
Tribunal on the Orakei Claim (Wai 9, 1987) at 188: Māori have “full authority over their lands, homes and things 
important to them”. Waitangi Tribunal The Manukau Claim (Wai 8, 1985) at 66-67: “In the Māori text of the 
[Treaty] the Māori chiefs ceded to the Queen ‘kawanatanga’. We think this is something less than the sovereignty 
(or absolute authority) ceded in the English text. As used in the Treaty it means the authority to make laws for the 
good order and security of the country but subject to an undertaking to protect particular Mäori interests.”; Waitangi 
Tribunal Te Whanau o Waipareira Report (Wai 414, 1998) at xxv: “Vis-a-vis the Crown, the principle of 
rangatiratanga means that a particular Māori community should control their own tikanga and taonga, including their 
social and political organisation, and, to the extent practical and reasonable, fix their own policy and manage their 
own programmes.”; Waitangi Tribunal Māori Electoral Option Report (Wai 413, 1994) at 3-4: “… it is clear that the 
exercise of tino rangatiratanga, like kawanatanga, cannot be unfettered; the one must be reconciled with the other ... 
In constitutional terms this could be seen as entitling Māori to a measure of autonomy, but not full independence 
outside the nation State they helped to create in signing the Treaty”. 
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to mean “the highest chieftainship” or indeed, “the sovereignty of their lands”.65 
Other reports have regarded a cession of sovereignty as being very clear to both 
parties.66 The recent He Whakaputanga Report took up the issue more directly 
and its conclusion is that Māori did not cede sovereignty and under the Treaty 
power was to be shared:67 
 
we believe … rangatira understood kāwanatanga primarily as the power to control 
settlers and thereby keep the peace and protect Māori interests accordingly; that rangatira 
would retain their independence and authority as rangatira, and would be the Governor’s 
equal; that land transactions would be regulated in some way; that the Crown would 
enforce the Māori understanding of pre-treaty land transactions, and therefore return 
land that settlers had not properly acquired; and that it may also have involved protection 
of New Zealand from foreign powers. We think that few if any rangatira would have 
envisaged the Governor having authority to intervene in internal Māori affairs – though 
many would have realised that where the populations intermingled questions of relative 
authority would need to be negotiated on a case-by-case basis, as was typical for 
rangatira-to-rangatira relationships. 
 
164. This view sits with those of most historians of the Treaty of Waitangi,68 who 
accept that, while the Crown may have been seeking sovereignty over New 
                                                 
65 Waitangi Tribunal Motunui–Waitara Claim (Wai 6, 1983). See also Waitangi Tribunal Taranaki Report - 
Kaupapa Tuatahi (Wai 143, 1996) at 5 and 19: “The international term of ‘aboriginal autonomy’ or ‘aboriginal self-
government’ describes the right of indigenes to constitutional status as first peoples, and their rights to manage their 
own policy, resources, and affairs, within minimum parameters necessary for the proper operation of the State. 
Equivalent Māori words are ‘tino rangatiratanga,’ as used in the Treaty, and ‘mana motuhake,’ as used since the 
1860s”.   
66 See for example Waitangi Tribunal Muriwhenua Fishing Claim Report (Wai 22, 1988) at 187: “In any event on 
reading the Māori text in the light of contemporary statements we are satisfied that sovereignty was ceded. Tino 
rangatiratanga, therefore, refers not to a separate sovereignty but to tribal self-management on lines similar to what 
we understand by local government”.  
67 Waitangi Tribunal He Whakaputanga me te Tiriti: the Declaration and the Treaty Report (Wai 1040, 2014)[He 
Whakaputanga Report] at 524: “Our view is that, on the basis of what they were told, the signatories were led to 
believe that Hobson would be a rangatira for the Pākehā and they would retain authority within their own 
autonomous hapū”. 
68 See Claudia Orange The Treaty of Waitangi (Bridge Williams Books, Wellington, 2010) at 36: “As presented, the 
Treaty seemed to be confirming the chiefs’ authority and directing its effects mainly at Pakeha, aiming specifically 
at better control of British subjects. Such control might be to the advantage of the Māori people, even though it 
would mean accepting an increased British authority and sharing the ruling power of the land”. See also Ned 
Fletcher who disagrees with historical accounts that view the Treaty of Waitangi as a cynical attempt to secure 
sovereignty to enable wholesale colonization of New Zealand. Based on an extensive review of writings of the 
drafters of the English version of the Treaty, he argues that the Treaty was primarily aimed at the protection of 
Māori from settlers. Ned Fletcher A Praiseworthy Device for Amusing and Pacifying Savages? (PhD thesis, 
University of Auckland, 2014). Compare this with the Waitangi Tribunal’s conclusion in He Whakaputanga, above 
n 67, that the “British’s intention … was that Māori would cede sovereignty to the Crown and so become subject to 
British law and government.” See also He Whakaaro Here Whakaumu mō Aotearoa: The Report of Matike Mai 
Aotearoa - The Independent Working Group on Constitutional Transformation (January, 2016) [He Whakaaro Here 
Whakaumu mō Aotearoa]. <www.converge.org.nz/pma/MatikeMaiAotearoaReport.pdf> at 101: “Te Tiriti o 
Waitangi provided for the continuation of the Māori constitutional order. It created a new constitutional 
configuration with the grant of kāwanatanga for the Crown to exercise authority over its people while providing for 
a joint site of power where Māori and the Crown could work together in a Tiriti-based relationship”. Compare PG 
McHugh Aboriginal Societies and the Common Law (Oxford University Press, New York, 2004) at 150, describing 
a shift in practice from an earlier pre-1840 pluralistic model of sovereignty to one at the time of the Treaty in which 
sovereignty was absolute, exclusive and territorial.   
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Zealand, Māori for their part would not have consented to cession of absolute 
sovereignty and expected that there would be power sharing between the British 
and Māori chiefs. The broader idea of shared sovereignty has support 
normatively in political and legal theory69 and recently international law in the 
form of the UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples as discussed in 
more detail below. How then, was sovereignty ceded to the British Crown? Raw 
political power or a “revolution” it seems.70 Māori outnumbered Pakeha forty-
to-one at the time of the signing of the Treaty. While many chiefs were aware of 
the might of the British, there were strong cultural imperatives to preserve their 
mana and for many the Treaty provided a means to augment that mana by 
securing a powerful ally. However, if we take the view that a form of political 
power sharing was envisaged, as Matthew Palmer notes “there was no common 
understanding of the extent to which the British were to govern, and the 
continued authority of rangatira, were to interact. The precise terms on which 
power was to be exercised respectively by the British and Māori signatories 
cannot be said to have been specified or mutually agreed.”71  Furthermore, many 
tribes did not sign the Treaty.   
 
165. So what are the implications of this framework of thinking of Indigenous rights 
in New Zealand? The focus of Indigenous rights reforms in New Zealand has 
been property and the right to culture.72 So why does the Government not accept 
the right to property claim to water by Māori? The problem is that the ownership 
model only applies in certain cases, and in many other cases, the property model 
is rejected by Government. The reason for this seems to be political and fiscal 
expedience.  
 
166. The area in which the Crown is consistent is its rejection of tribal political 
authority over natural resources. In the Freshwater Waitangi Tribunal inquiry the 
                                                 
69 Duncan Ivison, Paul Patton, Will Sanders eds, Political Theory and the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (Cambridge 
University Press, 2000) Roger Maaka and Augie Fleras, The Politics of Indigeneity: Challenging The State in 
Canada and Aotearoa New Zealand (University of Otago Press, 2005); James Tully Strange Multiplicity 
Constitutionalism in an Age of Diversity (Cambridge University Press, 1995). Jeremy Waldron has argued that an 
original wrong may be superseded by subsequent circumstances such as the size of the population, or the availability 
of resources, so that any entitlement based on the wrong may fade in their moral importance: Jeremy Waldron 
“Redressing Historic Injustice” (2002) 52 UTLJ 135. But Waldron’s critique mostly assumes that matters will 
improve when in most cases for Indigenous peoples an original grievance continues overtime and becomes worse. 
Jeff Spinner-Halev refers to this type of injustice as an “enduring injustice” and he argues that they persist because 
they cannot be adequately addressed by a system of distributive justice: J Spinner-Halev “From Historical to 
Enduring Injustice” (2007) 35 PolTheory 574. But they also persist because the injustice is so deeply embedded in 
our society: see Courtney Jung The Moral Force of Indigenous Politics (Cambridge University Press, New York, 
2008). 
70 FM Brookfield “Revolutions, referendums and the treaty (New Zealand)” [1997] NZLJ 328. 
71 Matthew Palmer The Treaty of Waitangi in New Zealand’s Law and Constitution (Victoria University Press, 
Wellington, 2008). 
72 Of course the distinction between the different models (culture, property and tino rangatiratanga) are not so cut 
and dry, in particular virtually all reforms are to some degree sourced in the notion of prior sovereignty that tino 
rangatiratanga rests upon. And in the case of the property model, this is closely related to the right to culture model, 
in that restoring property is a means of promoting an Indigenous peoples culture. However, the argument is that the 
right to culture and property are the prominent models. 
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Crown argued that it would be better for Māori to characterize the claim as one 
based on tino rangatiratanga or kaitiakitanga and not ownership. But according 
to the Freshwater claimants, this was an attempt by government to limit the range 
of rights made available to iwi. For the Crown, tino rangatiratanga in the context 
of the water claim is equated with co-management rights, iwi representation, and 
enhanced iwi participation in resource management, which “deal primarily with 
the restoration and protection of the health and wellbeing of the waterways, not 
the issue of recognising their rights and interests in their water bodies.”73  In other 
words, the government is advancing the right to culture model, while also 
rejecting the proprietary rights model which give iwi relatively extensive rights 
(the exclusive right of hapū and iwi to control access to and use of the water 
while it was in their rohe). In Part III below we consider the extent to which the 
RMA and recent treaty settlements promote political authority. In Part II we 
consider aboriginal rights jurisprudence in the common law countries and the 
statutory schemes in New Zealand for the recognition of proprietary rights in 
natural resources claimed by iwi as well as those claims to proprietary rights 
rejected by government. 
 
II Property   
 
167. Concern about Indigenous peoples’ claims to political authority is one of the 
reasons why aboriginal jurisprudence arose in the common law countries in the 
last four decades. It was a workable jurisprudence that did not question 
sovereignty and in fact was premised on it. It could never achieve what many 
Indigenous advocates sought from it in terms of political authority. But that still 
gives iwi considerable assets of value to establish an economic base. These 
property rights are not just any property but based on the notion of an original 
and enduring right to the natural resources as Indigenous peoples. Examples 
include the settlement of fisheries and aquaculture claims whereby the Crown 
has shoehorned the Māori interest into a statutory scheme. But the question is 
why not water? Why does the Crown draw a distinction between water and 
aquaculture? The aquaculture treaty settlement, especially is analogous to claims 
to freshwater bodies, given that it recognizes a right to exclusively occupy a 
water space.    
 
A Common law aboriginal rights to water 
 
168. Common law aboriginal rights litigation emerged in response to the rise of 
Indigenous movements in the common law states. McHugh argues that the 
judiciary were basically prodded into action due to the ambivalent political 
                                                 
73 Linda Te Aho “The ‘False Generosity’ of Treaty Settlements – Innovation and Contortion” in Andrew Erueti (ed) 
The UN Declaration on Rights of Indigenous Peoples: Implementation in Aotearoa (Victoria University Press, 
Wellington, 2017).   
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action on land claims.74 Scholars, legal academics and Indigenous advocates 
took advantage of the rise of public interest litigation and judicial review to bring 
claims to lands and resources before the courts resulting in a series of 
“breakthrough” decisions including Calder v. Attorney-General of British 
Columbia in Canada,75 and in Australia, the decision of  Mabo v. Queensland 
(No.2), (1992),76 which overturned as discriminatory the common law rule that 
Australia was terra nullius when sovereignty was asserted over the country. 
Many of these early decisions were quite non-commital on the specific naure of 
the right.77 But it was clear that the rights themselves were justiciable after many 
decades of being characterised as only political in nature (hence the epithet, 
breakthrough) and sui generis in that the rights had their origins in a pre-colonial 
aboriginal life and not the property system created by the state. And the courts 
seemed to see their decision as a basis for political negotiations between 
Indigenous peoples and the state. There were Government responses in the form 
of contemporary treaty settlements in Canada for example.78 Yet little progress 
and disappointment about the content of rights meant that aboriginal rights 
continued to be litigated. The result according to McHugh is a “disfigured 
jurisprudence” – the move from the new dawn to the cold light of day – as the 
courts developed complex evidential standards of proof relating to continuity of 
connection and the legal extinguishment of aboriginal rights.79 McHugh 
attributes this result to the focus on property rights by the courts, which was 
simply unable to accommodate the many dimensions of aboriginal rights claims 
making but especially political authority over territory.80 It was a mistaken 
attempt to use private property to address a public end.81 The greatest criticism 
has been of the evidential test for proof of existing aboriginal rights. Aboriginal 
rights law is not restorative or reparative but based on a right that has survived 
                                                 
74 P.G. McHugh, “A Common Law Biography of Section 35” in Patrick Macklem and Douglas Sanderson From 
Recognition to Reconciliation: Essays on the Constitutional Entrenchment of Aboriginal and Treaty Rights 
(University of Toronto Press, 2016) [McHugh, “A Common Law Biography of Section 35]. 
75 Calder v. Attorney-General of British Columbia [1973] S.C.R. 313. 
76 Mabo v. Queensland (No.2), (1992) 175 C.L.R. 1. 
77 McHugh, “A Common Law Biography of Section 35, above n 74. 
78 See Nisga'a Final Agreement Activities 1999 at 
http://www.bclaws.ca/civix/document/id/complete/statreg/99002_01. 
79 See, Paul McHugh, 'New Dawn to Cold Light: Courts and Common Law Aboriginal Rights' [2005] New Zealand  
Law Review 485. For critique of this jurisprudence, see, for example, Noel Pearson, ‘The High Court's 
Abandonment of “The Time-Honoured Methodology of the Common Law” in its Interpretation of Native Title in 
Mirriuwung Gajerrong and Yorta Yorta’ (2003) 7:1 Newcastle Law Review 1; Kirsten Anker, ‘Law in the Present 
Tense: Tradition and Cultural Continuity in Members of the Yorta Yorta Aboriginal Community v Victoria’ (2004) 
28(1) Melbourne University Law Review 1;  Richard Bartlett, ‘An Obsession with Traditional Laws and Customs 
Creates Difficulty Establishing Native Title Claims in the South: Yorta Yorta’ (2003) 31(1) University of Western 
Australia Law Review 35;  Greg McIntyre, ‘Native title rights after Yorta Yorta’ (2003) 9(1) James Cook University 
Law Review 268; Lisa Strelein ‘Members of the Yorta Yorta Aboriginal Community v Victoria—Comment’ (2003) 
2(21) Land, Rights, Laws: Issues of Native Title; Simon Young, ‘The Trouble with “Tradition”: Native Title and the 
Yorta Yorta Decision’ (2001) 30(1) University of Western Australia Law Review 28. 
80 McHugh, “A Common Law Biography of Section 35”, above n 74. 
81  P.G. McHugh, “A Common Law Biography of Section 35.” See also Richard Boast, Treaty rights or Aboriginal 
rights [1990] NZLJ 32 at 36,  noting “Another criticism [of aboriginal rights] is that the rule forces indigenous 
claims and indigenous rights into the rather procrustean bed of an obscure feudal rule of the common law”.   
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and endured. The difficulty of course are the many intervening years in which 
the Crown has displaced Indigenous peoples and allocated rights in land and 
formalised those rights in the form of land grants.    
 
169. There is not much cause to bring an aboriginal rights claim to land in New 
Zealand because most of the land is considered extinguished at law given the 
Crown’s acquisition of land through land confiscation, purchase and through the 
Māori Land Court mechanism of making tribal titles into westernised freehold 
titles. That has resulted in exceptional cases of riverbeds (Paki v Attorney-
General (No.2) [2014])82 and the foreshore and seabed (Ngati Apa).  Ngati Apa 
(2003) arose because most had assumed that any aboriginal rights in that area 
had long been extinguished. Recently in Paki, the Supreme Court recognised the 
potential for aboriginal rights in riverbeds. Freshwater seems to be another 
exceptional and overlooked interest. This is unusual because with water, there 
seems to be much potential for such an aboriginal rights claim due in large part 
to the repeated insistence by the Crown that no one owns water in New Zealand. 
The Crown policy is that this is not possible at common law due to the common 
law doctrine of capture.83 Water is only capable of ownership once captured or 
contained (for example, put in a tank or bottled). For this reason, Government 
says, it is not possible for the Crown to offer claimant groups legal ownership of 
an entire river or lake – including the water – in a Treaty settlement.84  However, 
according to New Zealand common law and statute, common law presumptions 
such as the doctrine of capture cannot displace an Indigenous interest in a natural 
resource. The English common law applied in New Zealand from 1840 only “so 
far as applicable to the circumstances of the ... Colony of New Zealand.”85 In 
Baldick v Jackson (1910) for example the court rejected the argument that there 
was a common law royal prerogative in stranded whales.86 In Ngati Apa Elias 
CJ, rejected the English common law presumption that the Crown is entitled to 
the foreshore and seabed noting “if any Māori custom is shown to give interests 
in foreshore and seabed, there is no room for a contrary presumption derived 
from English common law. The common law of New Zealand is different.”87 
The Supreme Court decision of Paki (No.2), found that the presumption that the 
Crown had obtained title to the bed of the river in accordance with the ad medium 
                                                 
82 Paki v Attorney-General [2014] NZSC 118, [2015] 1 NZLR 67 [Paki No 2]. Lack of experience with aboriginal 
rights law may explain why the claimants did not raise this in Paki assuming instead that any aboriginal right was 
displaced by the common law presumption of ad medium filum aquae.  
83 Office of Treaty Settlements Settlement Redress at 111. 
84 At 111.   
85 As was later confirmed by the English Laws Act 1858 for the avoidance of doubt. This provision was continued, 
in relation to New Zealand, by the English Laws Act 1908 and is confirmed today by the Imperial Laws Application 
Act 1988, s 5. See also, Amodu Tijani v Secretary Southern Rhodesia [1921] 2 AC 199, 403. 
86 Baldick v Jackson (1910) 30 NZLR 343 (HC). At common law whales taken in the territorial waters of the United 
Kingdom or stranded ashore were regarded as royal fish and belonged to the sovereign, but in Baldick v Jackson 
Stout CJ said this rule could have no applicability in New Zealand for two reasons: it had never been asserted in 
New Zealand waters by the Crown, and would in any case be contrary to the Treaty of Waitangi "for they [the 
Māori] were accustomed to engage in whaling." 
87 Ngati Apa v Attorney-General [2003] 3 NZLR 643 (CA). 
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filum aquae or mid-point presumption could not apply unless it was consistent 
with Māori custom.88 The issue the court said had to be determined on a case-
by-case basis depending on the customary law of the tribe in question. By saying 
that no one owns water the Crown is of course also saying it does not own water. 
This can be compared with legislation that expressly states that the Crown has 
“property” in a resource such as the Crown Minerals Activities 1991.89 In the 
case of rivers and lake bodies the Crown could assert extinguishment of any 
aboriginal right by implication – the exclusion of Māori without their consent 
from their development, governance and management by legislation and Crown 
actions including the Water-power Act 1903, the Water and Soil Conservation 
Act 1967 and the RMA. However, there is much authority that to regulate is not 
to extinguish in Australian and Canadian aboriginal rights law. In R v Agawa 
(1988) the Ontario Court of Appeal ruled that a provincial licensing requirement 
did not extinguish an aboriginal right to fish. The right had been regulated and 
not extinguished by the fishing legislation.90 In Sparrow, the Supreme Court of 
Canada said that to extinguish an aboriginal right the intention must be “clear 
and plain.”91 The court found that the subjection of Indians to a licencing system 
under federal law for the exercise of any fishing rights was “simply a matter of 
controlling the fisheries not defining underlying rights.” The Australian High 
Court in Yanner v Eaton (1999) found legislation vesting “property” in “all 
fauna” in the Crown did not extinguish a native title right to catch juvenile 
estuarine crocodiles for food without a permit.92 The use of the word “property” 
in the Act did not give the Crown absolute, beneficial ownership in the fauna.93 
Instead the Act was intended to regulate, not abolish, the practice of hunting 
native fauna.94 However, in the case of water in New Zealand there is as noted 
no vesting of property in the Crown only its regulation by the RMA. In Ngati 
                                                 
88 Paki No. 2 thus recognises the possibility that there may be unextinguished Māori customary title in the beds of 
non-navigable rivers; a possibility that some had assumed was precluded by the Re the Bed of the Wanganui River 
precedent. As a result, it is now possible for iwi to apply to the Māori Land Court for investigation of title to the 
non-navigable segments of the bed of the Waikato River. 
89 For example, the Crown Minerals Act which says petroleum is the “property” of the Crown.  But even if a statute 
does vest property in the Crown that does not mean any aboriginal right is extinguished. The Ngati Apa decisions 
found that section 7 of the Territorial Sea, Contiguous Zone and Exclusive Economic Zone Act 1977 (which deems 
the seabed and subsoil 'to be and always to have been vested in the Crown') was not sufficient to extinguish 
aboriginal rights in the seabed. See also Yanner v Eaton (1999) 201 CLR 351. 
90 R v Agawa (1988) 65 O.R. (2d).505 (C.A.). 
91 R v Sparrow, [1990] 1 S.C.R. 1075. 
92 Yanner v Eaton (1999) 201 CLR 351. 
93 At [115]. The Majority in Yanner did not consider that property had to be construed as meaning something like all 
rights attached to a thing. contrats with the mr decision of McHugh: McHugh J held that the use of the word 
“property” gave the Crown “every right, power, privilege and benefit that does or will exist in respect of fauna ... to 
exclude every other person from enjoying those rights, powers, privileges and benefits” (at [49]). This reasoning led 
to the conclusion that the Crown’s rights were so broad that the appellant’s native title rights must have necessarily 
been extinguished.But see Hayes v Northern Territory (1999) 97 FCR 32, Olney J found particular vestings did not 
operate to extinguish native title, because they did not imply exclusive possession (at 114–16), and in another case 
because land was merely vested in ‘an emanation of the Crown’ (at 130). 
94 In that case, the majority also took account of the fact that the common law had only ever recognised a qualified 
or limited property right in wild animals. At common law, like the doctrine of capture, wild animals are not capable 
of owernship unless captured. 
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Apa the New Zealand Marine Farming Association argued that Māori claims to 
ownership of property in foreshore and seabed are inconsistent with the controls 
of the coastal marine area under the RMA. It was suggested that any Māori 
customary property interests amounting to rights less than ownership can be 
recognised now only under the statutory regime provided by the Act. Elias CJ 
rejected this argument observing that while the management of the coastal 
marine area under the RMA “may substantially restrict the activities able to be 
undertaken” by Māori with customary property in the area, “the statutory system 
of management of natural resources is not inconsistent with existing property 
rights as a matter of custom. The legislation does not effect any extinguishment 
of such property.”95 
 
170. As a result one of the greatest potential challenges to an aboriginal rights claim 
to water in New Zealand – that the right has been supplanted by statute – does 
not seem to be an issue in the context of a Māori claim to water. The question 
then, would be whether there was an interest to begin with and whether that 
interest had been maintained. The common law jurisprudence generally requires 
continuity of use and connection as noted above and this has proved to be a major 
issue for many Indigenous peoples.96 In New Zealand, each resource claimed 
would have to be decided on a case-by-case basis.  
 
171. As developed by Ruru, if a court in Aotearoa New Zealand was asked to 
determine if an claimant still had aboriginal rights or native title in a specific 
stretch of freshwater, it is likely that a series of interrelated issues would be 
canvassed.97  First, is native title applicable to water? Second, can the doctrine 
of native title trump other common law doctrines, specifically the doctrine of 
publici juris of fresh water (the idea that at common law the water cannot be 
owned because it is a common good).  Third, can the claimant prove that, 
according to its tikanga, that the claimant has a recognised customary property 
interest in a precise river.  Fourth, can the Crown identify any statute law that 
has clearly and plainly extinguished that native title property right?  Only if the 
claimant win on the first three points, and the Crown fails on the fourth point, 
will it be possible for a court to recognise native title in freshwater. But in doing 
                                                 
95 At [76] per Elias CJ; At [123] per Gault P: “[the RMA] provisions are not wholly inconsistent with some private 
ownership”; and at [192] per Tipping J: (“[T]he prescribed restrictions on activities within the coastal marine area, 
stringent as they are, do not inevitably lead to the view that the potential for an underlying status of Māori customary 
land has thereby been extinguished.) Compare McRitchie v Taranaki Fish and Game Council [1999] 2 NZLR 139, 
where the majority of the Court of Appeal found that the taking of trout by McRitchie without a license was 
unlawful despite a statutory reference to the protection of a “Mäori fishing right” because the taking of trout has 
always been controlled by law. The majority concluded that the legislative history “demonstrates beyond doubt that 
the appellant and his hapu did not have a Mäori fishing right to take trout in the Mangawhero River.” However, the 
Court of Appeal majority did not fully consider the nature of the right (the appeal was only on the question of law of 
effect of legislation) and especially the law of aboriginal rights, and did not consider jurisprudence in Australia and 
Canada and New Zealand about regulation of aboriginal rights.  
96 See Members of the Yorta Yorta Aboriginal Cmty. v. Victoria (2002) 194 A.L.R. 538. 
97 For example, see Jacinta Ruru “Maori legal rights to water: ownership, management or just consultation?” (2011) 
RM Theory & Practice 119 and Jacinta Ruru “Undefined and Unresolved: Exploring Indigenous rights in Aotearoa 
New Zealand’s freshwater legal regime” (2010) 5 Journal of Water Law 236. 
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this, native title itself encompasses a wide spectrum where exclusive ownership 
falls to the far right.  It is possible that a claimant might get to this point, and the 
court finds that they simply have a bundle of rights to use and access the water 
that are already provided for to all citizens.  This is essentially what the majority 
decision of the High Court of Australia did to an Australian Indigenous group in 
2002.98 However, Ngati Apa does suggest the possibility of exclusive ownership 
by recognising how the doctrine has developed in Canada.  Elias CJ stated:99 
 
The Supreme Court of Canada has had occasion recently to consider the content of customary 
property interests in that country.  It has recognised that, according to the custom on which 
such rights are based, they may extend from usufructuary rights to exclusive ownership with 
incidence equivalent to those recognised by fee simple title. 
 
172. And, President Gault reflected that the RMA provisions “are not wholly 
inconsistent with some private ownership”100 of the coastal marine area.  Keith 
and Anderson JJ, in their joint judgment, suggest an approach that Kirby J, in the 
High Court of Australia, has been advocating for some time: Indigenous 
qualified exclusive ownership.  They stated “[s]ubject to such qualifications 
arising from the circumstance of New Zealand, property in sea areas could be 
held by individuals and would in general be subject to public rights such as rights 
of navigation”.101 It is possible that a court might conclude similarly in the 
context of freshwater, assuming of course that those first four hurdles could be 
successfully crossed.  
 
173. In the case of the use of geothermal resources for example there would be little 
difficulty meeting continuity tests. For example there could be no doubt that 
Ngati Whakaue have used the geothermal water in their rohe consistently since 
1840. In the case of the Waikato river, raupatu undermined the ability of 
Waikato-Tainui iwi to exercise control over their use of the Waikato river. But 
there is no doubt about a continuing connection with the river. The Waitangi 
Tribunal has issued five reports on iwi claims to rivers and they all attest to the 
continued close association between tribes and rivers as taonga.102 Proof of 
ownership, as accepted in the native Land Court and later in the Waitangi 
Tribunal, and as demonstrated by the claimants in the Stage 1 Report, rests on 
the following customary proofs or ‘indicia of ownership’, which have been 
accepted by the Crown:  
 
the water resource has been relied upon as a source of food; the water resource has been 
relied upon as a source of textiles or other materials; the water resource has been relied 
upon for travel or trade;  the water resource has been used in the rituals central to the 
spiritual life of the hapū;  the water resource has a mauri (life force);  the water resource 
is celebrated or referred to in waiata;  the water resource is celebrated or referred to in 
                                                 
98 Commonwealth v Yarmirr [2001] 208 CLR 1 (HCA). 
99 Ngati Apa at 656. 
100 Ngati Apa at 677. 
101 Ngati Apa at 679. 
102 See, for example Waitangi Tribunal The Stage 1 Report on the National Freshwater and Claim (Wai 2358, 
2012).   
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whakataukī; the people have identified taniwha as residing in the water resource; the 
people have exercised kaitiakitanga over the water resource; the people have exercised 
mana or rangatiratanga over the water resource; whakapapa identifies a cosmological 
connection with the water resource; and there is a continuing recognised claim to land 
or territory in which the resource is situated, and title has been maintained to ‘some, if 
not all, of the land on (or below) which the water resource sits’. 
 
174. The Marine and Coastal Area (Takutai Moana) Act 2011 [Takutai Moana Act 
2011] imposes rigid evidential standards focused on ideas of “occupation”, 
“exclusivity”, and “continuity” as has been the case in relation to aboriginal title 
litigation in Canada.103 In brief to obtain customary title, claimants need to show 
they have occupied land without interruption and to the general exclusion of 
others. The requirement to establish aboriginal exclusive occupation has been a 
vexed issue in Canadian litigation. However, the recent Canadian Supreme Court 
decision of Tsilhqot’in Nation v British Columbia (2014) has confirmed that both 
“occupation” and “exclusion” are considered with reference to the aboriginal 
perspective as well as that of the common law.104  
 
175. It should be noted too that the common law is capable of recognizing Indigenous 
proprietary rights. In Mabo Brennan J, noted “a community which asserts and 
asserts effectively that none but its members has any right to occupy or use the 
land has an interest in the land that must be proprietary in nature: there is no 
other proprietor ... The ownership of land within a territory in the exclusive 
occupation of a people must be vested in that people.”105 Accordingly Brennan 
J accepted that the customary land claims of Aboriginals comprise a ‘proprietary 
community title’. In Canada also aboriginal rights include the right to exclusively 
occupy land and ownership of subsurface minerals.106 Canadian aboriginal title 
law also recognizes the potential for joint-aboriginal title ownership in those 
cases where two or more aboriginal communities shared the use of particular 
territories.107  
 
176. In addition, there is a long-standing practice in New Zealand law – recognised 
recently in the Ngati Apa decision – of readily translating a Māori customary 
property into a right of ownership and that is the conversion process recognized 
in Māori land legislation since 1862. The original legislation allowed for the 
conversion of lands “owned by Natives under their customs or usages” into a 
                                                 
103 See Kent McNeil Common Law Aboriginal Title (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1989), for argument about 
aboriginal prior occupation granting a right to exclusive occupation at common law that cannot be displaced by 
adverse possession, Kent McNeil Common Law Aboriginal Title (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1989). 
Similarly, aboriginal title in Canada is based on exclusive occupation at sovereignty. See Tsilhqot’in Nation v 
British Columbia 2014 SCC 44 [Tsilhqot’in Nation], in which aboriginal title to land was recognized. At the same 
time, aboriginal title is not based on aboriginal law and sovereignty but on “prior occupation” of land. Aboriginal 
law is adopted as a tool to ensure that the common law tests of occupation are modified to accommodate different 
perspectives.  
104 Tsilhqot’in Nation v British Columbia 2014 SCC 44. 
105 Mabo v Queensland (No 2) (1992) 175 CLR 1 at 51; 107 ALR 1 at 36. 
106 Delgamuukw v British Columbia [1997] 3 SCR 1010; and Tsilhqot’in Nation. 
107 Delgamuukw v British Columbia [1997] 3 SCR 1010 at 58. 
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Crown granted fee simple title.108 The Māori Land Court retains that power 
though of course not in relation to the coastal marine area due to the Takutai 
Moana Act 2011.  
 
177. Any judicial recognition of aboriginal rights to water in New Zealand would 
likely lead to negotiations between aboriginal rights-holders and government. 
However, there is no guarantee that a judicial decision would result in robust set 
of rights as is evidenced with the experience following Ngati Apa. However, an 
important difference between Ngati Apa and any future judicial declaration of 
rights to water, is that in the latter case there would be actual justiciable rights 
and so it would be much harder for the government to oust the rights without the 
consent of the claimants. In the case of Ngati Apa the central issue was about 
jurisdiction to investigate whether such rights existed and so there was no 
recognition of any legal rights as such and disagreement about the potential 
scope and nature of any rights.109 What is clear is that any judicial finding of 
aboriginal rights would likely add significant impetus for negotiation of reforms. 
The Waitangi Tribunal reports have no doubt provided momentum for the 
proposed RMA reforms for example. However, it is not clear how much leverage 
this will provide Māori seeking proprietary rights in water. For example, the 
Stage 1 Report was not sufficient to leverage a settlement when the Government 
decided to sell 49 per cent of the shares in Mighty River Power (MRP) and other 
SOEs. The Crown has undertaken that it will not rely on the privatisation of the 
hydro-electric generating companies so as to diminish any claimed rights. Yet 
the partial privatization of MRP (now Mercury) has been achieved.110 The 
Supreme Court found that the government could proceed with partial 
privatization because this would not materially impair the Crown’s ability to take 
the reasonable action needed to comply with the principles of the Treaty of 
Waitangi. But we do not think the Supreme Court fully appreciated the potential 
rights available to Māori as yet not de jure but de facto and so substantial, on 
their face, that there is a compelling case for Māori ultimately obtaining de jure 
rights through the common law doctrine of aboriginal rights. And the Supreme 
Court seems to have over-estimated the potential gains to be made through the 
political process of negotiation with the Crown. The Supreme Court was very 
much convinced by the Crown’s argument that this was the appropriate process. 
But, while this is the typical means of addressing Māori claims, the position of 
Māori in such negotiations is relatively very weak unless tribes have some type 
of legal right to confront the Crown with.  
 
178. A significant dimension to any aboriginal rights claim in New Zealand will be 
human rights law. In over-throwing the doctrine of terra nullius Justice Brennan 
in Mabo (No.2), noted the need to ensure that the common law kept abreast with 
                                                 
108 Native Lands Act 1862 (N.Z.); see also Native Lands Act 1865 (N.Z.). 
109 McHugh speculated that the common law would not be able to recognize exclusive interests in the foreshore and 
seabed drawing on Australian jurisprudence especially Yarmirr v Northern Territory, [2001] HCA 56; see also 
Waitangi Tribunal, Report on the Crown's Foreshore and Seabed Policy, (Wai. 1071, 2004). 
110 Mercury remains 51 percent government-owned after partial privatisation in 2013. 
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developments in international law human rights law especially 
nondiscrimination principles. Similarly international human rights bodies have 
relied on the principle of equality to recognize an Indigenous rights to land.111 
The New Zealand Supreme Court has also noted the significance of these 
international developments in cases relating to Māori customary rights.112  The 
recognition of the right to ownership of land follows from the right to equality 
in that Indigenous rights to land – even though sui generis given their basis in 
Indigenous rights land tenure – ought to be accorded the same status and respect 
as non-Indigenous peoples’ property.113  114 
 
 
B Negotiated proprietary rights in natural resources  
 
179. An interesting dimension to claims to natural resources are the many treaty 
settlements made that give effect to Māori proprietary rights. Treaty settlements 
are directed towards providing compensation for dispossession of rights to lands 
and natural resources (most of which are now in private ownership or Crown 
ownership, for example conservation estate). This is in contrast to the modern 
treaty settlements in Canada which are directed at extinguishing existing 
aboriginal property rights in land in exchange for treaties that allow for forms of 
self-government, and legal rights to natural resources. However iwi have been 
successful in negotiating a right of “ownership” over specific natural resources 
as means of re-claiming control over them. This includes deals relating to the 
right to commercial and customary fisheries,115 lakebeds,116 forests,117 Crown 
lands,118 and aquaculture119 and minerals in the coastal marine area.120 The claims 
have been assisted by the development of the common law doctrine of aboriginal 
rights. While these agreements are framed as treaty settlements, all of them are 
based on a similar notion to that underpinning modern treaties in Canada, ie, the 
                                                 
111 The Awas Tingni community’s Indigenous tenure was deserving of the same equal protection as non-Indigenous 
tenures. See I/A HR Court, Awas Tingni Mayagna (Sumo) Indigenous Community v. Nicaragua, Series C (No. 79) 
(2001) (Awas Tingni). 
112 Takamore v Clarke [2012] NZSC 116. 
113 The Awas Tingni community’s Indigenous tenure was deserving of the same equal protection as non-Indigenous 
tenures. See I/A HR Court, Awas Tingni Mayagna (Sumo) Indigenous Community v. Nicaragua, Series C (No. 79) 
(2001) (Awas Tingni). 
114 Note also the right to culture in s 20 of the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990 
115 Treaty of Waitangi (Fisheries Claims) Settlement Act 1992; Fisheries (Kaimoana Customary Fishing) 
Regulations 1998. 
116 Te Arawa Lakes Settlement Act 2006, s 23(1): the fee simple estate in each Te Arawa lakebed is vested in trust in 
the Trustees of the Te Arawa Lakes Trust. 
117 Central North Island Forests Land Collective Settlement Act 2008. The proposed sale of forests lands, resulted in 
objection by Māori who claimed an interest in the forests, and a treaty settlement that led to the Crown keeping 
ownership and creation of the Crown Forestry Rental Trust (CFRT) to manage rental gained from selling of cutting 
rights and leasing of forest lands. 
118 State-Owned Enterprises Act 1986. 
119 Māori Commercial Aquaculture Claims Settlement Act 2004. 
120 See Ngati Apa v Attorney-General [2003] 3 NZLR 643 (CA); and Marine and Coastal Area (Takutai Moana) Act 
2011. 
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notion of tribes possessing existing de facto property rights in natural resources. 
In other words, there are no established legal rights in the resource in question, 
though there is an arguable case for legal rights on the basis that Māori once 
possessed these resources, the resource or rights to the natural resources are now 
in the possession of the Crown, and the Crown’s interest is challenged by the 
prior Indigenous rights.121  Indeed these agreements acknowledge potential 
property rights in the natural resource in question by expressly providing that all 
claims in relation to the natural resource in question, are fully and finally settled, 
satisfied, and discharged.”122 This includes claims “founded on rights arising by 
or in common law (including customary law and aboriginal title), the Treaty of 
Waitangi, statute, or otherwise.” The Treaty on its own of course cannot give 
rise to justiciable property rights, but treaty rights to natural resources can be 
referred to in legislation as was the case in relation to the Māori right to fisheries. 
In addition to such treaty rights, is the common law aboriginal right. These 
“extinguishment clauses” thus anticipate and foreclose any potential rights based 
on the treaty and common law aboriginal rights.123  
 
180. The validity of the de facto property right is typically established through a 
Waitangi Tribunal inquiry into the historical claims of iwi. Claimants seem to 
prefer the Waitangi Tribunal given it is not as adversarial as the general courts 
(as a commission of inquiry), is less costly than an aboriginal rights judicial 
inquiry, and the Waitangi Tribunal is likely to be more open to such a claim than 
the courts, which have been generally conservative in hearing aboriginal rights 
claims. In addition legal aid funding is available to groups in Tribunal but 
not to groups in general Courts. There is also the fact that most aboriginal 
rights cases are a prelude to political negotiations so claimants may hope that a 
successful Waitangi Tribunal inquiry would lead to negotiation of a fair 
settlement. This has proven to be the case in relation to claims to fisheries and 
aquaculture. But of course despite several Waitangi Tribunal findings of iwi 
proprietary rights to rivers, Māori claimants have not achieved proprietary rights 
to water or forms of political authority over freshwater.  
 
 
 
                                                 
121 To this extent at least there are more similarities between the agreements and the modern agreements made in 
Australia and Canada in relation to aboriginal title than many commentators assume.  
122 See for example, Māori Commercial Aquaculture Claims Settlement Act 2004, section 6(2)(i): settlement of 
Māori claims to commercial aquaculture activities are “fully and finally settled, satisfied, and discharged” in relation 
to “rights arising by or in common law (including customary law and aboriginal title), the Treaty of Waitangi, 
statute, or otherwise.” 
123 See Boast who considers the fishing treaty settlements have their origins in the Treaty, noting the 1989 and 1992 
settlements and their implementing enactments explicitly invoke the Treaty of Waitangi. The Treaty of Waitangi 
(Fisheries Claims) Settlement Act 1992 is described in its long title as an Act "to make better provision for the 
recognition of Māori fishing rights secured by the Treaty of Waitangi". See, Recitals, especially cls (a), (c), (d), (f), 
(j) and (k) and s 10 (a) and (b).  The common law doctrine of Native or Aboriginal title is the other obvious 
candidate. 
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(a) The “Sealord deal” 
 
181. The “Sealord deal” can find its original source in legal action based in part on an 
aboriginal right to fisheries. The Courts found that there was a case for such a 
proprietary interest124 – that successive governments were wrong in assuming 
that the right was merely “recreational or ceremonial” – and granted an 
injunction to stop privatisation of fishing rights.125 The declaratory judgment was 
influenced by the wealth of evidence produced by the Waitangi Tribunal in the 
Muriwhenua Fishing Report (1988) and the Ngai Tahu Sea Fisheries Report 
(1992).126 The Government and Māori then negotiated an “interim settlement” 
in the form of quota and money assuming that the substantive issue of rights 
would be determined by the courts. And then latter agreed to finance the 
acquisition of shares in Sealord, which held a significant share of New Zealand’s 
commercial fishing quota.127 The package also included customary fishing 
regulations and further quota in exchange for Māori agreeing to stop litigation 
and give up legal claims. At no point have any of the substantive legal questions 
been definitively answered. As Boast notes, “with the injunctions in place, and 
the substantive proceedings looming, a deal had to be struck, and indeed was. 
The necessity for a deal and the re-emergence of statutory pragmatism was due 
to legal uncertainty.”128  
 
(b) Lake Beds 
 
182. When Māori customary rights were recognised by the Native Land Court, the 
                                                 
124 See New Zealand Māori Council v Attorney-General (8 October 1987) unreported, High Court, Wellington, CP 
553/87); Ngai Tahu Māori Trust Board v Attorney-General, (2 November 1987) unreported, High Court, 
Wellington, CP 559/87, 610/87, 614/87. 
125 Ngai Tahu Māori Trust Board v Attorney-General at 6. According to Boast, “Arguably Greig J's interim 
declarations against the Crown of 30 September and 2 November 1987 were the boldest and most decisive step in 
the entire sequence. All of the following negotiations were conducted under the shadow of these declarations, which 
effectively halted the allocation of quota until a settlement of some kind was worked out.” Note that it is not clear 
whether the fishing right in question was sourced in either the treaty as recognised by statute in s88(2) of the 
Fisheries Act, or a common law aboriginal right to fish, although arguably the right can be recognised either as a 
statutory or common law right as was possible with rights to the foreshore following Ngati Apa. Richard Boast, 
Treaty rights or Aboriginal rights [1990] NZLJ 32 at 36, noting “a compelling argument can be made that s 88(2) 
refers to treaty rights.” 
126 See also the Law Commission Preliminary Report. 1989.       
127 The Treaty of Waitangi (Fisheries Claims) Settlement Act 1992. The Act provided for the Crown to pay $150 
million to fund Māori to purchase Sealord Products Ltd (in a 50-50 joint venture with Brierley Investments) which 
held 26 percent of the total fishing quota. Māori were also to receive 20 percent of all new species of fish brought 
under the QMS. Contrast Mahuika v New Zealand (2000) 7 HRNZ 629, Comm No 547/1993, 
CCPR/C/70/D/547/1993 (2000).  The UN Human Rights Committee ruled that Sealord deal did not violate Article 
27. The committee seemed to be influenced by the fact that the deal addressed both their commercial interests and 
“the cultural and religious significance of fishing for the Māori.” The claim that the deal undermined their right to 
self-determination was not addressed on the disingenuous basis that it is a collective right and the Committee can 
only hear claims from individual petitioners not collectives. Broader tino rangatiratanga type claims were thus not 
before the Committee, only property and culture.   
128 Richard Boast, "Māori Fisheries 1986-1998: A Reflection" (1999) 30(1) Victoria University of Wellington Law 
Review 111 at x 
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Crown negotiated with Arawa tribes in 1922 to have the beds of the Rotorua 
Lakes vested in the Crown in exchange for an annuity.129 A similar agreement 
was reached with Ngati Tuwharetoa in relation to Lake Taupo in 1926. The Te 
Arawa Lakes Settlement Act 2006 recognizes the significant relationship 
between Te Arawa and the fourteen lakes within their rohe. And in addition to a 
Crown apology for past wrongdoings, vests the ownership of the lakebeds in Te 
Arawa,130 and establishes a co-management arrangement between Te Arawa and 
the local council. 
 
(c) Pounamu 
 
183. The Crown undertook in the Arahura purchases of 1860 to protect Ngai Tahu’s 
right to pounamu. The Waitangi Tribunal found that pounamu is a taonga to Ngai 
Tahu and recommended that it be owned and controlled by Ngāi Tahu.131 The 
Crown agreed. The Ngāi Tahu (Pounamu Vesting) Act 1997, (Ngāi Tahu) vested 
all pounamu in the takiwā (area of traditional tribal ownership) to Te Rūnanga o 
Ngāi Tahu.132 By virtue of the Act, pounamu management is exempt from the 
legal framework that controls ownership and mining of other minerals in New 
Zealand.133    
 
(d) Land 
 
184. Most treaty settlements include the return of tribal land that is owned by the 
Crown. The Ngai Tahu agreement for example included high country pastoral 
property in Crown title and forest lands and the right to first refusal over some 
urban Crown lands including airports. Ngai Tahu also obtained title to precious 
sites and title to certain reserves. Treaty settlements may also include private 
land formerly owned by the Crown. The Treaty of Waitangi Act 1988 gave the 
Waitangi Tribunal powers in respect of Crown land transferred to SOEs. All such 
land when privatised would be subject to a memorial on the cert of title so that 
if the Waitangi Tribunal found that the land had been acquired in breach of the 
treaty it could order that the land be returned to the claimants (not merely 
                                                 
129 In Tamihana Korokai v Solicitor-General (1912) 32 NZLR 321 held that the applicants could not be prevented 
from applying to the Native Land Court for investigation of their title to the bed of Lake Rotorua unless it was 
shown that native title had been extinguished by Proclamation, cession of the owners, or Crown grant (at 345 per 
Stout CJ, at 348 per Williams J, at 351 per Edwards J, at 356 per Chapman J). 
130 Te Arawa Lakes Settlement Act 2006, s 23(1): the fee simple estate in each Te Arawa lakebed is vested in trust 
in the Trustees of the Te Arawa Lakes Trust.   
131 Waitangi Tribunal, 1991, p. 131.  
132 Section 3 of the Ngāi Tahu (Pounamu Vesting) Act 1997 provides that “All pounamu occurring in its natural 
condition in – (a) The Takiwā of Ngāi Tahu Whānui; and (b) Those parts of the territorial sea of New Zealand [...] 
that are adjacent to the Takiwā of Ngāi Tahu Whānui and the seabed and subsoil beneath those parts of the territorial 
sea – that, immediately before the commencement of this Act, is the property of the Crown, ceases, on the 
commencement of this Act, to be the property of the Crown and vests in and becomes the property of Ngāi Tahu 
Whānui.”   
133 Section 5 of the Ngāi Tahu (Pounamu Vesting) Act 1997 prohibits the Minister of Energy from granting any 
further permit or mining privilege in respect of any pounamu to which s. 3 applies.  However, section 4 protects 
existing mining privileges and the rights and obligations of holder of existing privileges.  
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recommend). Although this power has been used sparingly, -- too rarely for some 
(See Haronga) – it has been used by the Waitangi Tribunal.134 135 To assist with 
return of land the government adopted a mechanism for land-banking land for 
future treaty settlements. In addition, the Central North Island Forests Land 
Collective Settlement Act 2008 gives effect to the so-called Treelords deal which 
involves $195.7m of Crown forest land covering 176,000 hectares, plus about 
$223m in rentals that have accumulated on the land since 1989 and an annual 
income stream of $13m.136 
 
(e) Māori Commercial Aquaculture  
 
185. The Māori Commercial Aquaculture Claims Settlement Act provides for the full 
and final settlement of contemporary Māori claims to commercial aquaculture 
space in the coastal marine area. The Settlement Act gives iwi rights to 20% of 
the new aquaculture space created from 1 January 2005. The treaty settlement 
has its genesis in the notion of Māori interests in the coastal marine areas as 
recognised by the Waitangi Tribunal in the Ahu Moana: The Aquaculture and 
Marine Farming Report (2002, Wai 953)137 and the Sealord deal and the Ngati 
Apa decision.  
 
(f) minerals (excepting Crown-owned in foreshore and seabed). 
 
186. The Marine and Coastal Area (Takutai Moana) Act 2011 grants the holders 
of a customary marine title to ownership of minerals in the reserve with the 
exception of crown-owned minerals such as petroleum and gold.  
 
C Government rejection of ownership interests in natural resources  
 
187. However, government has resisted many Māori legal claims to “ownership” of 
resources – especially those of “national interest” that are of high value and the 
grant of which could potentially interfere with public rights of access, 
navigation, fishing and recreational use. The Sealord deal was politically 
palatable because it would not directly impact on non-Māori rights and was not 
a significant drain on the public purse. In other words, Crown policy is not based 
on the question of whether there is an original and enduring tribal interest in the 
natural resource but political considerations resulting in inconsistency in state 
recognition of natural resources.    
 
 
                                                 
134 For example, the memorialised property in private commercial use in the Turangi Settlement with Ngati 
Turangitikua. 
135 Most recently the Supreme Court has found that the power should have been used in relation to Mangatū forest 
see, Haronga v Waitangi Tribunal and Ors SC 54/2010 [19 May 2011], The Attorney-General v Alan Paerekura 
Torohina Haronga [2016] NZCA 626 [19 December 2016] 
136 See also, the Crown Forests Agreement entered into on 20 July 1989 between representatives of Māori and the 
Crown and the Crown Forest Assets Act 1989. 
137 Waitangi Tribunal, Ahu Moana: The Aquaculture and Marine Farming Report (2002, Wai 953). 
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(a) conservation estate 
 
188. The general Crown principle is that whenua within the New Zealand’s 
conservation estate is not able to be returned to iwi.  Conservation groups have 
resisted the return of conservation lands to iwi in treaty settlements given 
concerns over protection of endangered species and access to walkways. A 
significant exception is the Te Urewera Act 2014 that has removed the national 
park status from Te Urewera.138 
 
(b) petroleum and other precious minerals.  
 
189. Successive governments have refused to engage with Māori on petroleum 
ownership and other precious minerals which as noted are declared under the 
Crown Minerals Act 1991 to be Crown owned but in the case of petroleum was 
nationalised under the Petroleum Act 1937. The matter came to a head following 
a Waitangi Tribunal claim by Taranaki hapu to petroleum. Taranaki is the only 
region in the country where petroleum is extracted on a regular basis.  It is also 
a region where many iwi lost land due to settler-government confiscation 
legislation following the land wars. The Waitangi Tribunal agreed with the 
argument advanced by the hapu that the Crown had violated the principles of the 
Treaty by taking the land (and thus the minerals) and through the nationalisation 
of the lands without compensation in those cases where areas of land had been 
retained by Māori.139 While the Māori interest may have been lost, the Waitangi 
Tribunal ruled that the hapu had a “Treaty interest”140 in petroleum which 
entitled Māori to a remedy for its wrongful loss.141 The Government refused to 
accept the Waitangi Tribunal recommendations stating that the nationalisation 
of petroleum was, and continues to be, in the public interest. In a subsequent 
Petroleum Management Report, the Waitangi Tribunal inquired into Māori 
participation in the regulation of petroleum and called for reforms that would 
facilitate the more effective engagement with regulators including more robust 
forms of iwi management plans,142 and the creation of a fund based on royalties 
to enhance their capacity to participate in RMA and CMA processes.  The 
Waitangi Tribunal also advocated that there should be increased application of 
                                                 
138 Jacinta Ruru “Tuhoe – Crown settlement – Te Urewera Act 2014” (2014 October) Maori Law Review. 
139 Waitangi Tribunal The Petroleum Report (Wai 796, 2003). 
140 Waitangi Tribunal The Petroleum Report (Wai 796, 2003). 
141
 Waitangi Tribunal The Petroleum Report (Wai 796, 2003). See also, Craig Coxhead, ‘Māori Title to Petroleum: 
the Waitangi Tribunal Petroleum Report’ (2004) 7 Yearbook of New Zealand Jurisprudence, 66, at 71-72. 
142 See Waitangi Tribunal Ko Aotearoa Tenei: A Report Into Claims Concerning New Zealand Law and Policy 
Affecting Māori Culture and Identity (Wai 262, 2011) at 280-283 (Critiquing the RMA and noting the “lynchpin” of 
a Treaty-compliant RMA system would be enhanced iwi management plans, called iwi resource management plans, 
at 281). The Government has introduced a proposal to amend the RMA to promote greater efficiency. Included in 
the suite of changes is the notion of ‘iwi participation arrangements’ (IPA), with the idea being that iwi be more 
proactively involved at the front end of the planning and policy-making stage instead of reacting to plans and 
consent applications. 
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user pays principles by the private sector with companies funding for example 
cultural impact assessments.143  
 
(c) foreshore and seabed  
 
190. The Ngati Apa (2003) decision of the Court of Appeal affirmed the orthodox 
postion under the doctrine of aboriginal rights that the Crown acquired imperuim 
on assertion of sovereignty but this was subject to the pre-existing Indigenous 
property. Applying this principle to the coastal marine space (the land between 
high-tide and the end of the territorial sea), the Court of Appeal found that it was 
not clear that legislation had extinguished any customary title thus clearing the 
way for Māori to seek customary rights under both the Māori Land Court’s and 
the High Court’s jurisdiction. The Māori Land Court jurisdiction was the most 
controversial because it seemed to allow for the granting of freehold titles. 
Politicians exploited the uncertainty created by the decision raising the spectre 
of tribes excluding non-Māori from the coast.144 Instead, of allowing Māori to 
seek recognition of aboriginal rights in the courts as has been the case in 
Australia and Canada, the Government enacted legislation – Marine and Coastal 
Area (Takutai Moana) Act 2011 – that declares that the area cannot be owned by 
anyone.145 At the same time, the Act guarantees the continuation of free legal 
public access in, on or over the common marine and coastal area. As noted in the 
Government’s guide, “anyone can continue to walk, swim, sail, kayak, fish or 
have a picnic in the common marine and coastal area.” The Act also preserves 
and protects existing recreational fishing rights, navigation rights and all other 
existing uses. 
 
191. The Act allows Māori to apply to the High Court for recognition of: (i) “protected 
customary rights” (if exercised by Māori since 1840 and continue to do so in 
accordance with tikanga); and (ii) “customary marine title” (CMT) (if Māori held 
the area in accordance with tikanga and exclusively occupied from 1840 without 
substantial interruption)146 in the coastal marine space subject to the claimants 
meeting the evidential requirements. The former results in limited rights to 
engage in customary activities such as launching waka, and gathering hangi 
stones while the latter results in a “title” established over the area claimed and a 
set of procedural rights (eg permission rights under the RMA) and specified 
substantive rights (eg, to subsurface minerals excepting precious minerals). This 
title does not confer the right to ownership as was hoped for by iwi following 
Ngati Apa, and indeed it is not premised on the idea of property but instead is 
said to recognise “the intrinsic, inherited rights of iwi, hapū, and whānau, derived 
in accordance with tikanga and based on their connection with the foreshore and 
                                                 
143 Waitangi Tribunal, Report on the Management of Petroleum (2011, WAI 796) at 182.   
144 Don Brash “Nationhood” An address by Leader of the National Partyto the Orewa Rotary Club on 27 January 
2004. 
145 Section 11. 
146 Section 58. 
65 
 
seabed and on the principle of manaakitanga.”147 The Act is thus underpinned by 
the right to culture concepts contained in the RMA. The permission rights 
include the right to say no to certain activities in the CMT (including withholding 
permission for a new activity that is carried out under a resource consent148 or 
specified conservation activities such as declaring/extending marine reserves).149 
Although in the latter case there is an exception for any project the Crown 
considers “nationally significant.”  The Act is clear that the CMT does not allow 
the land to be sold or for the public to be excluded. Free public access, fishing 
and other recreational activities are allowed to continue in customary title areas. 
Although it is possible to obtain recognition of a wāhi tapu in the CMT, which 
allows prohibitions or restrictions on access.150  
 
192. The primary object of the Act is to make clear that no-one, including Māori may 
possess ownership rights in the coastal marine space and while the customary 
marine title does result in some potentially significant rights (short of ownership 
of the land), including the permission rights, to obtain these rights, tribes must 
prove that the area claimed has been continuously occupied and used, without 
substantial  interruption, from 1840 to the date of legislation’s enactment, which 
for many tribes will be a difficult test to meet, especially those tribes that have 
land confiscated from them.151 
   
(d) water 
 
193. Māori have made claims to “ownership” of freshwater bodies (lakes and rivers) 
but these have been rejected by the Government on the basis that water is not 
capable of ownership under the common law.152 According to government, 
“New Zealand has a multi-dimensional society with cultural, recreational and 
commercial claims on the water resource, and the task of government ultimately 
is to balance and reconcile those in some way that recognises the long-term needs 
of new Zealanders.” The Crown also argues – drawing on Waitangi Tribunal’s 
report on the ‘Indigenous flora and fauna and Māori cultural and intellectual 
                                                 
147 Preamble. 
148 Sections 66 to 70; 
149 Sections 71 to 75; 
150 The wāhi tapu may be recognised if there is evidence to establish the connection of the group with the wāhi tapu 
and access prohibitions or restrictions can be put in place if the evidence establishes this is needed to protect the 
wāhi tapu. 
151 Mallon J in the recent and first High Court decision of Re Tipene [2016] NZHC 3199 under the Takutai Moana 
Act 2011, had no doubt that the applicant for a CMT had established exclusive and continuous occupation of the 
coastal area claim off the Titi islands. There was ample evidence of extensive use given the use of the islands for 
gathering mutton birds and exclusively so in large part due to the remoteness of the area, which meant Mallon J did 
not need to inquire deeply into the meaning of these concepts, although he clearly drew on the Tsilhqot’in Nation v 
British Columbia [2014] 2 SCR 256 decision of the Canadian Supreme Court in noting that the Act needed to be 
“applied with an appreciation for the context in which the particular claim arises” and “[r]emoteness, the 
environment and changes in technology are all relevant when considering notions of occupation, use and 
continuity.” This was important in the context of the case given there were seasons when the titi islands were not 
occupied and used yet this did not raise any issue of lack of continuous connection. At [149]. 
152 See Waitangi Tribunal The Stage 1 Report on the National Freshwater and Claim, above n 1.  
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property claim’ (Wai 262) – that english-style ownership is not in fact the best 
english cultural equivalent for Māori rights and that instead a “kaitiaki model” 
is more appropriate, whether full kaitiaki control, partnership (co-governance or 
co-management), or a lesser interest (kaitiaki influence through consultation). 
But as noted above, the claimants argue in response that this model is likely to 
be reduced to kaitiaki influence through consultation (with rangatiratanga and 
mana then forgotten in favour of a narrow interpretation of kaitiakitanga). 
 
D Conclusion  
 
194. In summary there are a range of agreements made that relate to an enduring 
interest in natural resources in New Zealand. To this extent then, there are 
parallels with native title and aboriginal rights declarations of proprietary rights. 
But in many cases the Crown will not recognize proprietary rights in natural 
resources. What can be gleaned from this approach to natural resources?  
 
195. First, it is clear that Government prefers to negotiate agreements to address 
Māori claims to natural resources. For water, the Government asserts that the 
process of rights definition is best left to collaboration between iwi and the 
Crown, which, it says, is already occurring with the Iwi Leaders Group in the 
Fresh Start for Fresh Water program. It is a ‘complex exploration still in 
dialogue’.
 
 The challenge with this approach for Māori as noted is that the 
process is controlled by the executive branch of government with little means of 
legal review. This can still result in rights of substance but it seems that Māori 
must seek leverage in negotiations by obtaining some prima facie legal right to 
the natural resource.  
 
196. Secondly, the proprietary rights recognised do not impact significantly on non-
Indigenous peoples’ rights or the Crown – the rights granted to Māori do not 
overtly deprive others of rights.  In contrast lakes and rivers and the coastal 
marine area, and the conservation estate are politically challenging because of 
issues of public access, navigation and public fishing rights. New Zealanders are 
anxious about the prominent role of treaty settlements and their potential to 
entrench ethnic divisions, undermine civil unity and create special rights.153  
 
197. Thirdly, the proprietary rights are based on the idea of prior Indigenous 
ownership or traditional use and some type of enduring interest. The Sealord deal 
and the aquaculture agreement was supported by ample evidence of an extensive 
Māori fishery in New Zealand at 1840 gathered by the Waitangi Tribunal in two 
major claims involving fisheries; pounamu was based on its well-recorded 
significance to Ngai Tahu; the return of Crown land is clearly based on tribal 
occupation of the land – if not physical then a close connection and the 
                                                 
153 Kenneth Minogue, Treaty of Waitangi Morality and Reality (New Zealand Business Roundtable, Wellington, 
N.Z, 1998); and David Round, Truth or Treaty? Commonsense Questions about the Treaty of Waitangi (Canterbury 
University Press, 1998). Don Brash “Nationhood” An address by Leader of the National Party to the Orewa Rotary 
Club on 27 January 2004. 
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significance of land to culture and identity; aquaculture is based on evidence of 
a close relationship between hapu and the coast and freshwater. Fisheries and 
land are expressly referred to in article 2 of the Treaty of Waitangi. Many see 
the rational behind such claims compared say to claims to petroleum and other 
minerals and the radio spectrum where there is little evidence of historical and 
contemporary use. With water of course, as we have seen there is a rich 
repository of evidence of use and connection with water resources. However, 
this requirement of continuity of traditional use – sharply applied in the case of 
Australian native title law154 – has to be viewed with caution given: (i) the effects 
of European settlement; and (ii) its close connection with the right to culture – 
do Māori for example have to show traditional use of petroleum, or instead show 
that the land containing the natural resource was subject to their tino 
rangatiratanga?155  
 
198. Fourthly, proprietary rights recognition to date are based on natural resources 
that may be of high value but will not break the fiscal envelop bank. The high 
economic value of proprietary rights in water, petroleum etc raises the question 
of the relativity of treaty settlements.   
 
199. To bring it all together, there seems no basis in principle for denying an 
Indigenous right to water in New Zealand (given substantial evidence of its 
continuous use by Māori), other than the political risks of recognition and the 
value of the natural resources to the state. Government as was the case with Ngati 
Apa and the foreshore and seabed are concerned about public opposition to 
Indigenous rights recognition.  
 
200. One means for the government to avoid the ownership question over natural 
resources of national interest is to establish co-management agreements with iwi. 
Government has negotiated co-management deals in Treaty settlements with iwi 
that demonstrate a connection with a river. These agreements do not address the 
Indigenous peoples’ right to property – in fact they expressly defer consideration 
of proprietary interests.156 The co-management agreements are largely directed 
at promoting the right to culture. The Government concedes that it may recognise 
the right of “full kaitiaki control”. However, the claimants in the Stage 1 Report 
countered this was not likely – in most the Crown would likely give effect to the 
types of rights contained in the current co-management agreements. 
 
III Political authority and natural resources 
 
201. So far we have discussed the notion of proprietary rights in natural resources 
in New Zealand. As Part A makes clear the Māori right to natural resources 
                                                 
154 See Members of the Yorta Yorta Aboriginal Cmty. v. Victoria (2002) 194 A.L.R. 538. 
155 See for example, Suriname v Saramaka Peoples accepting that the tribal community in question had a right of 
property to forests but not gold in their tradiitonal lands because there was no evidence of its traditional use.  
156 See also the Tuhoe deal where the Crown rejected ownership of conservation land and offered instead to vest the 
park with legal personality to be co-chaired by Māori and the Crown: Te Urewera Act 2014. 
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cannot be reduced to ownership only and does not fall on all fours with the 
common law conception of property. As noted tino rangatiratanga subsumes the 
ideas underlying proprietary rights in that the Māori concept envelopes both a 
political conception of authority as well as rights attached to resources, including 
rights to exclusive possession and use. In short, tino rangatiratanga encompass 
both political authority and proprietary rights.  In turning to the recognition of 
natural resources in the last four decades of Indigenous rights recognition, it is 
evident that the Crown has accepted that Māori can be accorded rights of 
ownership in natural resources and that this is based on the notion of an enduring 
interest to the resource in question. This practice is supported by the common 
law doctrine of aboriginal  rights. In other cases, however, politics prevents the 
recognition of rights of ownership – for example in the case of petroleum and 
foreshore and seabed. This seems to be the rationale behind the refusal of the 
Crown to recognize Māori proprietary rights in water. However, as noted the 
matter does not end with property, because for Māori another significant 
dimension is political authority (usually expressed as tino rangatiratanga) and 
the Crown here is consistent in refusing to recognize such rights. Instead the 
regulatory code relating to natural resources and the treaty settlements reached 
to date give effect to the right to culture model by seeking to enhance 
stewardship, effective participation in decision making and a cultural and 
spiritual connection to a natural resources. These rights are of course significant 
to iwi. However, as iwi have consistently asserted, their rights and interests in 
their rohe cannot be reduced to the right to culture. Efforts to address the many 
criticisms directed at the RMA, in the form of the legistative reforms introduced 
in 2015,157 appear again to pursue this objective of promoting the tribal right to 
culture. Recognition of the right to property is significant. But ownership rights 
only take iwi so far if they lack governmental authority over the natural 
resource.158  
 
 
 
A The RMA and Māori interests – right to culture model 
 
202. Compared to many other countries, New Zealand has a robust regulatory process 
for environmental regulation of natural resources – including water bodies – and 
this includes important protections for Māori interests. The principal legislation 
for regulating the use of New Zealand's physical environment is the RMA159 
which refers to a set of Māori interests. These Māori interests reflect the right to 
culture model in that they are not aimed at granting political authority to Māori 
but rather focus on stewardship, the “relationship” of Māori with their 
environment, and effective participation in decision-making that may impact on 
them.160 There is no reference in the RMA to tino rangatiratanga over natural 
                                                 
157 Resource Management Legislation Bill 2015. 
158 Stephanie Milroy, The Māori Fishing Settlement And The Loss Of Rangatiratanga, (2000) 8 Waikato L. Rev. 63. 
159 There is also legislation governing the exclusive economic zone (EEZ).   
160 Resource Management Act 1991, s 6, 7 and 8. 
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resources in their rohe or mana whenua and mana moana. Instead, all decision 
makers under the RMA must “take into account the principles of the Treaty of 
Waitangi,”161 and have “particular regard” to “kaitiakitanga” [guardianship by 
the tangata whenua],162 and “recognise and provide for … the relationship of 
Māori and their culture and traditions with their ancestral lands, water, sites, 
waahi tapu [sacred sites], and other taonga [treasures].”163 As a result of these 
provisions, when a local council draws up development plans or grants resource 
consents to carry out some activity, it must first consider the implications of the 
plan and consent on the tangata whenua’s customary law as it relates to 
kaitiakitanga for example. However, these interests do not appear to be 
advancing the interests of Māori. As the Waitangi Tribunal has said many times, 
iwi and hapu feel sidelined by the RMA consent process.164 Part of the challenge 
lies with the weak statutory directions to “take into account” the principles of the 
Treaty and the fact that the Māori interests are one of several other competing 
interests including the overall commitment to sustainable development.  
Additionally, section 36A of the RMA explicitly states that neither an applicant 
nor a local authority have a duty to consult any person (including Māori).  
 
203. The RMA was amended in 2005 to strengthen the role for Māori by creating an 
obligation to consult with tangata whenua in the preparation of a proposed policy 
statement or plan if they may be affected by the policy or plan. A further 
amendment provided for public authorities and iwi to enter into “joint 
management agreements” under which decisions taken have the legal effect of a 
decision of the local authority.165 But these have only been used on a few 
occasions. In addition, local authorities now must have regard to iwi 
management plans in the preparation of their own plans and policy statements. 
Regional policy statements must set out the resource management issues of 
significance to the region’s iwi authorities. There is also provision under the Act 
for local authorities to transfer functions to iwi authorities after following a 
requirement of special consultation under the Local Government Act 2002.   
                                                 
161 Resource Management Act 1991, s 8.  
162 Section 7. 
163 Section 6. 
164
 See Waitangi Tribunal Ko Aotearoa Tenei: A Report Into Claims Concerning New Zealand Law and Policy 
Affecting Māori Culture and Identity (Wai 262, 2011) [Ko Aotearoa Tenei Report]. See also, Ruru, Jacinta 
Indigenous restitution in settling water claims: the developing cultural and commercial redress opportunities in 
Aotearoa, New Zealand Pacific Rim Law & Policy Journal, March, 2013, Vol.22(2), p.311(42) (noting in 2013 that 
“Since the enactment of the RMA in 1991, there have been about twenty instances where Māori, as objectors, have 
appealed council decisions that approved resource consents to take water, discharge wastewater into water, or dam 
water.”). 
165 See section 2 and 36B of the Resource Management Act 1991. See for example the agreement between Taupo 
District Council and Ngati Tuwharetoa; at http://www.taupodc.govt.nz/our-council/policies-plans-and-bylaws/joint-
management-agreements/Documents/Joint-Management-Agreement.pdf. Some iwi have entered into joint 
management agreements.  Ngāti Porou recently entered into such an agreement with the Gisborne District Council in 
relation to the Waiapu River.  The purpose of the JMA is “to provide a mechanism for Ngā Hapū o Ngāti Porou to 
share in RMA decision-making … within the Waiapu Catchment”. The “broader aspiration of Ngāti Porou hapū is 
to move to a transfer of powers under the Resource Management Act 1991 (RMA), within five years.” See 
www.gdc.govt.nz/assets/Uploads/15-346-X1-Appendix-reduced.pdf.  
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204. Despite the introduction of enhanced consultation requirements and provision 
for the consideration of iwi management plans, the current RMA regime has not 
empowered iwi.  A major issue has been the weak impact of iwi management 
plans. Regional or district plans are not required to be consistent with iwi 
management plans. There is no requirement to consider iwi management plans 
when determining whether or not to grant resource consents. The RMA is also 
silent as to the purpose and content of iwi management plans. Consequently, iwi 
management plans tend to be uneven in style and content. Their quality depends 
on the extent to which iwi have the resources “to get legal and technical advice, 
consult on and develop the plan, and engage in RMA processes.”166 The 
Waitangi Tribunal has called upon the Ministry for the Environment to “step up 
with funding and expertise, to ensure that [Māori] are not prevented from 
exercising their proper role by a lack of resources or technical skills.”167 Māori 
communities struggle to keep up with the paperwork associated with resource 
consent applications and planning.168   
 
205. As a result of these shortcomings, in December 2015, the Government 
introduced a proposal to amend the RMA and included in the suite of changes is 
the notion of ‘iwi participation arrangements’ (IPAs).169 The IPAs are intended 
to strengthen the current iwi management plans.  The Bill aims to provide more 
meaningful and effective iwi participation in resource management processes by 
placing a statutory obligation on local authorities “to invite iwi to form an iwi 
participation arrangement.”170 The proposal provides a statutory process for 
negotiation between iwi and local authority as well as a mechanism for review 
and monitoring of that relationship. It is hoped that by introducing a compulsory 
requirement to invite iwi to establish IPAs, the Bill will improve consistency in 
iwi engagement in plans development.171 Since the Resource Management 
Legislation Bill was intoduced to Parliament, an alternative to IPAs has been 
proposed in relation to the management of freshwater resources.172 The Ministry 
for the Environment Next steps for fresh water: Consultation document 
(February 2016) has proposed a new mechanism, known as Mana Whakahono a 
Rohe (MWaR), which shares many similarities with IPAs.173 However, unlike 
                                                 
166 Ko Aotearoa Tēnei, above n 162 at 254. 
167 Ko Aotearoa Tēnei, above n 162 at 283. 
168 See, Waitangi Tribunal The Report on the Management of the Petroleum Resource (Wai 796, 2011) at 94 (noting 
“how time consuming - and protracted -  the processes can be. Indeed, they show that for some claimant groups, and 
for those members who shoulder the responsibility, the task of staying abreast of petroleum activities so that taonga 
can be protected is relentless. … All the claimants we heard from were volunteers for their hapu. The sheer size of 
the files that they had assembled about particular projects to which they had objected provided some indication of 
the extent of the work required of them, which was done in their own time”). 
169 Resource Management Legislation Bill 2015. 
170 At clause 58L. 
171 Ministry for the Environment, Department Disclosure Statement at 4: at 
http://disclosure.legislation.govt.nz/assets/disclosures/bill-government-2015-101.pdf 
172 See Ministry for the Environment Next steps for fresh water: Consultation document (February 2016) at 29. 
http://www.mfe.govt.nz/sites/default/files/media/Fresh%20water/next-steps-for-freshwater.pdf 
173 At 30. 
71 
 
the IPA process, the MWaR process is iwi-initiated. Also, the scope of MWaR 
goes further than participation in plan-making processes to include “consenting, 
appointment of committees, monitoring and enforcement, bylaws and 
regulations and other council statutory responsibilities.”174 It is therefore 
possible under the MWaR programme for iwi to negotiate agreements that are 
akin to those negotiated by iwi in treaty settlements such as the co-management 
agreements contained in the Waikato-Tainui and Whanganui River treaty 
settlements. 
 
B Co-governance agreements over water in lieu of ownership 
interests – right to culture model  
 
206. Despite the government’s rejection of Māori ownership of freshwater bodies, it 
has negotiated alternatives to ownership in the form of co-governance 
agreements. Most of the agreements have been negotiated as tribal-specific 
treaty settlements but also tribal-specific joint committee agreements under the 
RMA. In relation to the largest river in the North Island, the Waikato river, for 
example, Waikato-Tainui tribes negotiated an agreement given effect in the 
Waikato-Tainui Raupatu Claims (Waikato River) Settlement Act 2010. This 
establishes the Waikato River Authority (the Authority), which is made up of 
roughly equal numbers of tribal and government representatives.175 The 
Authority is responsible for establishing the “vision and strategy to achieve the 
restoration and protection of the health and wellbeing of the Waikato River for 
future generations.”176 Following the confiscation of Waikato Tainui tribal lands 
in the late 1800s, the Crown assumed control of the river and the river suffered 
from pollution from farm run-off, coal mining and sewage.177 This “clean up” is 
to be assisted by a series of agreements with the local council that seek to better 
integrate Waikato Tainui tribes into the RMA planning processes, including the 
preparation of an ‘integrated river management plan’ and an ‘environmental 
plan’ that local councils must consider when preparing planning documents.  
 
207. More recently the government has reached a novel co-management agreement 
with affected tribes which vests the Whanganui River, Te Awa Tupua, with legal 
personality and establishes a trust, Te Pou Tupua, constituted equally of tribal 
and government members to co-manage the river.178 Recognition of the 
independent autonomy of the river roughly accords with the customary view that 
                                                 
174 At 29. 
175 Waikato-Tainui Raupatu Claims (Waikato River) Settlement Act 2010, section 22, and Schedule 6 Waikato 
River Authority. 
176 Waikato-Tainui Raupatu Claims (Waikato River) Settlement Act 2010, 22 Establishment and purpose of 
Authority 
177 Linda Te Aho, “Indigenous Challenges to Enhance Freshwater Governance and Management in Aotearoa NZ – 
the Waikato River Settlement” (2010) 20 The Journal of Water Law 285.  
178 Te Awa Tupua (Whanganui River Claims Settlement) Bill (section 14 Te Awa Tupua declared to be legal 
person). The Bill gives effect to the Whanganui River Deed of Settlement signed on 5 August 2014, which settles 
the historical claims of Whanganui Iwi as they relate to the Whanganui River. 
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rivers possess their own mauri (life force). Like the Waikato agreement, the 
focus is on the future health and well-being of the river and its people. And 
measures are provided to facilitate tribal engagement in the RMA planning and 
consent making processes associated with the river.179 But by vesting the river 
with legal personality, the Government has effectively side-stepped the issue of 
ownership.180 The tribes thus cannot gain any benefit from use of the resource.  
 
208. And while Whanganui River and Waikato River tribes have a greater say in 
RMA decisions, they cannot, for example, stop the issuing of natural resources 
consents over the river to extract, or divert water or build dams on them.181 This  
outcome is a far cry from the recommendation made by the Waitangi Tribunal 
that the  river in its entirely be vested in the tribes which would mean  that any 
resource consent application would require the tribe’s approval.  
 
209. These agreements promote tribal enaggement in RMA regulatory processes. Yet 
they remain directed at the right to culture in so far as they are limited to effective 
participation and the overall objective of restoring and protecting the health and 
wellbeing of the [river] for future generations.182 Tribes are not granted the right 
to give their free, prior and informed consent in relation to the use of the river 
for hydro-electric projects for example.183 The Whanganui River and Waikato 
River tribes cannot, for example, stop the issuing of natural resources consents 
over the river to extract, or divert water or build dams on them. Nor do they gain 
any benefit from use of the resource. And the issue of water ownership over the 
river remains unresolved.  
 
210. The Tribunal has been heavily critical of the use of treaty settlements to stop 
gaps in the RMA. As the Waitangi Tribunal observed:184 “It is disappointing that 
the RMA has almost completely failed to deliver partnership outcomes in the 
ordinary course of business when the mechanisms to do so have long existed. It 
is equally disappointing that Māori are being made to expend the potential of 
their Treaty settlement packages or customary rights claims to achieve outcomes 
the Resource Management law Reform project (now two decades ago) promised 
would be delivered anyway.” 
 
                                                 
179 Sections 8 and 63. 
180 See also the Tuhoe deal where the crown rejected ownership of conservation land and offered instead to vest the 
park with legal personality to be co-chaired by Māori and the Crown: Urewera Act 2014. See also the Takutai 
Moana Act 2011, which simply declares that no one owns the foreshore and seabed.   
181 However, the consent of Te Pou Tupua may be required in relation to the use of the bed of the Whanganui River; 
see, section 41. 
182 Linda Te Aho, The ‘False Generosity’ of Treaty Settlements – Innovation and Contortion in Erueti (eg) “The 
UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous peoples: Implementation in Aotearoa” (Victoria University Press, 
2017). Te Aho also notes that the issue of ownership is expressly deferred by the treaty settlement, see Waikato-
Tainui Raupatu Claims (Waikato River) Settlement Act 2010, sections 64 and 90.   
183 The requirement in the Declaration that states obtained the FPIC of Indigenous peoples before engaging in any 
activity that could significantly affect them is pertinent here. 
184 Ko Aotearoa Tēnei, above n 162 at 279. 
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C Other co-governance agreements over natural resources   
 
211. There are of course other co-management agreements including the customary 
fisheries regulations which significantly allow for iwi to establish bylaws in 
relation to the taking of kaimoana.  
 
(a) customary fisheries regulations 
 
212. Tangata Whenua may establish Mataitai reserves -- being areas where Tangata 
Whenua manage all non-commercial fishing by making bylaws -- following 
consultation with the local community – ie people who own land in the proximity 
of the proposed mataitai reserve.185 Reserves can only be applied for over 
traditional fishing grounds and must be areas of special significance to the 
Tangata Whenua. Tangata Whenua may establish bylaws for the reserves which 
may restrict or prohibit the taking of a particular species within a mataitai 
reserve.  However, the process of establishing reserves and the bylaws 
themselves are heavily scrutinised by the Minister of Fisheries.     
 
D Conclusion 
 
213. The emphasis in the RMA is on a right to culture model and not political 
authority or proprietary rights to natural resources. The co-management 
agreements with Waikato-Tainui and Whanganui further that same object in that 
there is no right to prevent a resource consent being issued over the Waikato and 
Whanganui rivers. Hence the reason for claims to proprietary rights in water 
bodies by tribes. The efforts to introduce IPAs and MWar go some way towards 
promoting iwi effective participation in RMA processes but again like the co-
management agreements in the treaty settlements, the emphasis is on 
consultation, and effective participation in decision-making under the RMA. 
 
IV Human Rights, Indigenous Rights and Water, 
 
214. This section discusses human rights and water, drawing on the Declaration on 
the Rights of Indigenous Peoples and UN Guiding Principles on Business and 
Human rights but also the jurisprudence of the Inter-American Human rights 
Court and UN human rights treaty bodies. The focus in these international 
standards is on property to natural resources but also Indigenous peoples’ 
political authority over natural resources. 
                                                 
185 There are two sets of regulations in place, one for the North Island and one for the South Island, although they 
are similar in most respects. The regulations in the North Island are called the Kaimoana Customary Fishing 
Regulations 199861 and cover non-commercial customary fishing, which means fishing to provide food for hui 
(meetings) and tangi (funerals), and which does not involve the exchange of money or other form of payment. See 
also, the Taiapure provisions are contained within sections 174-185 of the Fisheries Act 1996 
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A What is the Declaration? 
 
215. The United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (the 
Declaration)186 has been heralded as a “landmark” achievement for Indigenous 
peoples.187 With the Declaration’s adoption by the UN General Assembly in 
2007 by 143 states, international Indigenous rights has become a significant field 
in international law. Although other international treaties, standards and policies 
on Indigenous rights exist, notably International Labour Organization 
Convention No 169,188 no other international instrument provides such robust 
protections for groups within states. This includes Article 3 of the Declaration 
which provides: “Indigenous peoples have the right to self-determination. By 
virtue of that right they freely determine their political status and freely pursue 
their economic, social and cultural development.”189  This restates the language 
in Article 1 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) 
and International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights (ICESCR), 
but with reference to Indigenous peoples. Despite the continuing controversy 
over the meaning of self-determination and whether it can apply to “peoples” 
outside of the colonial context, Indigenous peoples succeeded in having it 
included in the Declaration, albeit conditioned by states’ rights to territorial 
integrity.190 Not only that, the Declaration also includes the right to self-
government;191 historical redress;192 the right to free, prior and informed consent 
(FPIC);193 and the right to the recognition, observance and enforcement of 
treaties.194 We describe these rights as the self-determination framework. In 
addition to these breakthrough rights, there are many others that apply classic 
human rights to the circumstances of Indigenous peoples including the right to 
religion,195 property,196 and the right to practise and revitalize their cultural 
traditions and customs.197 For example the human right to property – which is 
normally directed at the right of individual ownership – is adapted to provide: 
                                                 
186 United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, above n 42. 
187 Claire Charters “The road to the adoption of the Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples” (2007) 4 N Z 
Yearb Int Law 121; Claire Charters and Rodolfo Stavenhagen Making the Declaration work (IWGIA, 2009). 
188 Convention (No. 169) Concerning Indigenous and Tribal Peoples in Independent Countries, 27 June 1989, 28 
ILM 1382 (entered into force 5 September 1991). See also, Convention (No. 107) concerning the Protection and 
Integration of Indigenous and Other Tribal and Semi-Tribal Populations in Independent Countries, 26 June 1957, 
328 UNTS 247 (entered into force 2 June 1959) [ILO Convention No. 107]. 
189 The Declaration, above n 42, art 3. 
190 Art 46(3). 
191 Art 4. 
192 At art 5.  
193 At art 10, 19 and 32. 
194 At art 31. 
195 At art 12. 
196 At art 26. 
197 At art 11. 
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Indigenous Peoples have the right to the lands, territories and resources which 
they have traditionally owned, occupied or otherwise used or acquired.198   
 
216. But what relevance does the Declaration have to a country like Aotearoa New 
Zealand – a long-established, liberal democracy with many checks and balances 
on governmental power and a relatively robust set of rights aimed at promoting 
and respecting the rights of Māori? In particular New Zealand has instigated 
institutions in the form of the Waitangi Tribunal199 and Office of Treaty 
Settlements200 to investigate and negotiate the settlement of historical 
injustices.201 New Zealand has a Bill of Rights Act,202 constitutional rights and 
conventions that act as safeguards for rights enjoyed by Māori,203 including 
statutory protections of Māori interests in legislation affecting them,204 and 
common law rights.205 One challenge of course is that even states with 
comprehensive rights protections can fail to fully implement them or argue that 
the rights have been fulfilled when the case is not clear. States may prefer 
majority interests or elites over marginalised groups.206 As evidenced by the 
Government’s response to Ngati Apa for example. Moreover, there may be 
significant gaps in domestic Indigenous rights architecture. The Declaration 
offers supranational standards to guide states and Indigenous peoples in their 
quest to establish fair terms of co-existence. And these standards can also be 
used by international bodies to evaluate and monitor New Zealand compliance 
with international law Indigenous rights.  
 
B The Declaration and the Self-determination framework  
 
217. The Declaration addresses claims to property as noted below. But also 
significantly, the Declaration addresses the public law or political dimension of 
Indigenous Peoples’ interests in natural resources including water. The 
Declaration for example endorses the right to self-determination, self-
Government and FPIC. These rights are dismissed by the Government as non-
binding “aspirations”. As a matter of international law UN General Assembly 
declarations are not binding. However, the UN Special Rapporteur on the rights 
                                                 
198 Art 26. 
199 See Treaty of Waitangi Act 1975. 
200 Office of Treaty Settlements Ka Tika A Muri, Ka Tika a Mua: Healing the Past and Building a Future (2nd ed, 
Office of Treaty Settlements, Wellington, 2015). 
201 Nicola R Wheen and others Treaty of Waitangi settlements (Bridget Williams Books with the New Zealand Law 
Foundation, Wellington, NZ, Wellington, New Zealand, 2012). 
202 New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990.  
203 Constitution Act 1986. 
204 See for example Resource Management Act 1991, sections 6,7 and 9. 
205 See Attorney-General v Ngati Apa [2003] 3 NZLR 643 (Court of Appeal); Takamore v Clarke [2012] NZSC 116, 
[2013] 2 NZLR 733. 
206 A useful example, and one that encouraged many Indigenous advocates in Aotearoa New Zealand to pay greater 
attention to international human rights, was the government response to Attorney-General v Ngati Apa decision 
(above n 24) that indicated that Māori might possess exclusive property in New Zealand’s coastal waters. See Claire 
Charters and Andrew Erueti Māori Property Rights and the Foreshore and Seabed (Victoria University Press, 
2007). 
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of Indigenous peoples and pre-eminent scholar on the rights of Indigenous 
peoples under international  law, James Anaya, states, “to say simply that the 
Declaration is non-binding is an incomplete and potentially misleading 
characterization of its  normative  weight.”207  As noted by the UN Office of 
Legal Affairs, “in United Nations practice, a “declaration” is a solemn 
instrument resorted to only in very rare cases relating to matters of major and 
lasting importance where maximum compliance is expected.”208 Many of the 
rights expressed in the Declaration – including the right to self-determination -- 
reflect rights and freedoms included in widely ratified human rights treaties such 
as, for example, rights to non-discrimination, culture, property and the right to 
self-determination as set out in the International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights (ICCPR) and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights. New Zealand has ratified both conventions. Indeed several 
rights in the Declaration are considered to have the status of customary 
international law, according to some commentators.209  As argued by Claire 
Charters, expert on international law of Indigenous rights, the Declaration has 
acquired significant legitimacy as a result of the process by which it was drafted 
and then adopted.210 Charters points to the fact that the process followed in its 
development and adoption was fair and robust. For example, the substance of 
the Declaration was debated for over two decades and included states, 
Indigenous peoples, international institutions, non-governmental organisations 
and academics amongst others. She also argues that the substance of the 
Declaration is equally legitimate, responding, in part, to historical discrimination 
against Indigenous peoples under colonial regimes and international law. 
Macklem for example when reviewing the development of international 
Indigenous rights argues that they serve the purpose of remedying international 
law’s denial of their right as peoples to sovereignty. “Indigenous peoples in 
international law”, Macklem argues thus are:211  
 
… communities that manifest historical continuity with societies that occupied and 
governed territories prior to European contact and colonization. They are located in 
States whose claims of sovereign power possess legal validity because of 
international law’s refusal to recognize these peoples and their ancestors as 
sovereign actors. What constitutes indigenous peoples as international legal actors, 
in other words, is the structure and operation of international law itself.  
 
218. Self-determination is the linchpin but other related rights in the self-
determination framework including the righty to free, prior and informed 
consent. The right to FPIC is cited several times in the Declaration. Article 19 
                                                 
207 Report of the UN Special Rapporteur on the rights of Indigenous peoples, James Anaya, to the UN General 
Assembly (2013) A/68/317. 
208 Economic and Social Council Report of the Commission on Human Rights (18th Sess, March-April 1962) UN 
Doc E/3616/Rev 1, para 105. 
209 Siegfried Weissner, “Indigenous  Sovereignty:  A  Reassessment  in  the  Light  of  the  UN Declaration on the 
Rights of Indigenous peoples”  (2008)   41   Vanderbilt   Journal   of   Transnational Law 1141. 
210 Claire Charters “The Legitimacy   of   Indigenous   Peoples’   Norms   under   International   Law”, PhD thesis, 
January 2011.   
211 Patrick Macklem The Sovereignty of Human Rights (Oxford University Press, New York, 2015) at 135. 
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specifically addresses the requirement to obtain Indigenous peoples’ FPIC 
before adopting any measure etc:212 
 
Article 19 
States shall consult and cooperate in good faith with the indigenous peoples 
concerned through their own representative institutions in order to obtain their free, 
prior and informed consent before adopting and implementing legislative or 
administrative measures that may affect them 
 
219. States were generally opposed to the inclusion of FPIC in the Declaration, 
arguing that it provided Indigenous peoples with a right of veto.213 However, a 
body of policy, scholarship and jurisprudence has provided greater clarity about 
the content of the right to FPIC. In particular, the Inter-American Court of 
Human Rights has given perhaps the most comprehensive authoritative guidance 
on the content of FPIC.  In the Case of the Saramaka People v. Suriname 
(2007),214 the Court held that Indigenous peoples have the right to say “no” to 
activities that have potential to significantly impact them and their territories.215 
The right to FPIC has been affirmed in several UN human rights treaty body 
decisions, including the UN Human Rights Committee,216 the UN Committee on 
the Elimination of Racial Discrimination,217 and the African Commission on 
Human and Peoples’ Rights.218  
 
220. The former UN Special Rapporteur on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, James 
Anaya, has stressed the need to focus not only on consent, but on establishing a 
process that will result in Indigenous peoples’ full engagement with a proposed 
development. The key is ensuring that Indigenous peoples are involved early in 
the process including in the preparation of regulatory frameworks on relevant 
areas such as the environment, and natural resource allocation and strategic 
planning for resource extraction.219  
 
221. The right to FPIC certainly influenced the Waitangi Tribunal in its Whaia te 
Mana Motuhake Report. But the Waitangi Tribunal has also being developing 
                                                 
212
 The United Nations General Assembly. Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous People, 2007, Article 32.  
213
 Explanation of Vote by HE Rosemary Banks, New Zealand Permanent Representative to the United Nations, 13 
September 2007; http://www.mfat.govt.nz/Media-and-publications/Media/MFAT-speeches/2007/0-13-September-
2007.php (the Declaration implies that Indigenous peoples have a right of veto over a democratic legislature and 
national resource management, in particular Articles 19 and 32(2)). 
214
 Saramaka People v. Suriname, Judgment of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights, 28 November 2007. Ser 
c No. 172, at para. 129-134.  
215 The Court ruled that, regarding large-scale development or investment projects that would have a major impact 
within Saramaka territory, the State has a duty, not only to consult with the Saramakas, but also to obtain their free, 
prior, and informed consent, according to their customs and traditions. Saramaka People v. Suriname, above n 22. 
216 See Angela Poma Poma v. Peru, CCPR/C/95/D/1457/2006, 24 April 2009. 
217 General Recommendation No. 23: Indigenous Peoples: 18/08/97.  
218
 Centre for Minority Rights Development (Kenya) and Minority Rights Group International on behalf of 
Endorois Welfare Council v Kenya, 276/03, Judgment of November 2009, see 
http://www.achpr.org/files/sessions/46th/comunications/276.03/achpr46_276_03_eng.pdf. 
219 James Anaya, Extractive industries and Indigenous peoples, Report of the Special Rapporteur on the rights of 
Indigenous peoples,Report to the Human Rights Council A/HRC/24/41, 2013, para 49-51. 
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its own conception based on treaty principles of partnership. The Wai 262 
Waitangi Tribunal noted for example, a spectrum of possibilities in relation to 
Crown engagement with Māori from consultation to “full-kaitiaki control” 
which would vary depending on the degree of impact of a proposal on Māori. 
This notion thus closely mirrors the ideas of FPIC being developed by 
international human rights bodies.    
 
C The indigenous right to property 
 
222. The Declaration advances rights to property (land and natural resources) and 
culture.  
 
Article 26 
1. Indigenous peoples have the right to the lands, territories and resources which they have 
traditionally owned, occupied or otherwise used or acquired. 
2. Indigenous peoples have the right to own, use, develop and control the lands, territories 
and resources that they possess by reason of traditional ownership or other traditional 
occupation or use, as well as those which they have otherwise acquired. 
3. States shall give legal recognition and protection to these lands, territories and resources. 
Such recognition shall be conducted with due respect to the customs, traditions and land 
tenure systems of the Indigenous peoples concerned. 
 
Article 27 
States shall establish and implement, in conjunction with Indigenous peoples concerned, a 
fair, independent, impartial, open and transparent process, giving due recognition to 
Indigenous peoples’ laws, traditions, customs and land tenure systems, to recognize and 
adjudicate the rights of Indigenous peoples pertaining to their lands, territories and 
resources, including those which were traditionally owned or otherwise occupied or used. 
Indigenous peoples shall have the right to participate in this process. 
 
223. The Declaration is not the first international instrument to recognize Indigenous 
peoples property. The ILO established the ILO Convention 107 and then later 
revised it in the 1980s and both treaties require states to recognize indigenous 
peoples’ rights of “ownership and possession” to the lands they “traditionally 
occupy.”220 Significantly, international instruments are directed at according 
rights of “ownership” to Indigenous peoples in relation to those lands occupied 
and used under traditional tenure.221 But with ownership comes the all-important 
right to control access to traditional lands and natural resources. The objective is 
to provide Indigenous property with the fullest form of protection available.  The 
recognition of the right to ownership of land follows from the right to equality 
in that Indigenous rights to land – even though sui generis given their basis in 
Indigenous rights land tenure – ought to be accorded the same status and respect 
                                                 
220 Convention (No 107) Concerning the Protection and Integration of Indigenous and Other Tribal and Semi-Tribal 
Populations in Independent Countries, 26 June 1957, 328 UNTS 247 (entered into force 2 June 1959) [Convention 
(No 107)]; Convention (No. 169) Concerning Indigenous and Tribal Peoples in Independent Countries, 27 June 
1989, 28 ILM 1382 (entered into force 5 September 1991). 
221 Art 26(2) Indigenous peoples have the right to own, use, develop and control the lands, territories and resources 
that they possess by reason of traditional ownership [emphasis added]. 
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as non-Indigenous peoples property.222 There is also recognition that retention 
of property is an important means of maintaining and strengthening Indigenous 
peoples political institutions and identities.223 The right to ownership of natural 
resources enables Māori to build a base to develop their political authority and 
culture. The right to property thus, as with all the rights in the Declaration, is 
connected to and should be read in conjunction with the key right to self-
determination. The point in the case of aboriginal rights to water in Aotearoa 
New Zealand is that Māori as prior occupants possessed right to tino 
rangatiratanga over their natural resources and because property is recognised 
and respected in New Zealand law, to deny that to Māori would be discriminate 
against them.  
 
224. Protection of Indigenous peoples’ land rights has frequently been emphasized by 
UN human rights treaty bodies.224 The UN Human Rights Committee comments 
on states’ reports and in its decisions in relation to petitions made under the 
ICCPR and has repeatedly endorsed Indigenous peoples right to property.225 The 
                                                 
222 The Awas Tingni community’s Indigenous tenure was deserving of the same equal protection as non-Indigenous 
tenures. See I/A HR Court, Awas Tingni Mayagna (Sumo) Indigenous Community v. Nicaragua, Series C (No. 79) 
(2001) (Awas Tingni). 
223 Convinced that control by Indigenous peoples over developments affecting them and their lands, territories and 
resources will enable them to maintain and strengthen their institutions, cultures and traditions, and to promote their 
development in accordance with their aspirations and needs, 
224 See, also, Case of the Indigenous Community Sawhoyamaxa v Paraguay (Merits, Reparations and Costs) Inter-
American Court of Human Rights Series C No 146 (29 March 2006); and Case of the Indigenous Community Yakye 
Axa v Paraguay (Merits, Reparations and Costs) Inter-American Court of Human Rights Series C No 125 (17 June 
2005). See, UN Human Rights Committee ‘CCPR General Comment 23 Article 27 (Rights of Minorities)’ (8 April 
1994) UN Doc CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.5 para 7. 
225 For example, the HRC has recognised Indigenous peoples’ non-traditional economic cultural rights, see 
Lansmann et al v Finland No 1 Communication No 511/1992 (Views adopted 26 October 1994) UN Doc 
CCPR/C/52/D/511/1992, UN General Assembly ‘Report of the Human Rights Committee Vol II’, 50th Session 
Supp No 40 UN Doc A/50/40 at pp 66-76; and Apirana Mahuika et al v New Zealand Communication No 547/1993 
(Views adopted 27 October 2000), UNGA ‘Report of the Human Rights Committee Vol II’ 56th Session Supp No 
40 UN Doc A/56/40.   In the Lubicon Lake communication, Chief Ominayak, on behalf of his Band, alleged that the 
Canadian government allowed the Alberta provincial government to expropriate its territory for the benefit of 
private corporate interests. Report of the Human Rights Committee Lubicon Lake Band v Canada, Communication 
No 167/1984 (26 March 1990) UN Doc Supp No 40 A/45/40, at 1 para 2.3. UN Human Rights Committee 
(UNHRC), Lubicon Lake Band v Canada Communication No 167/1984 (26 March 1990), UN Doc Supp No 40 
(A/45/40); UNHRC Länsman et al v Finland Communication No 511/1992 (1992) UN Doc 
CCPR/C/52/D/511/1992 para 9.2–9.3 (land-related reindeer herding protected by art 27 ICCPR); UNHRC 
‘Concluding Observations on Mexico's Fourth Periodic Report’ (27 July 1999) UN Doc CCPR/C/79/Add.109 para 
19; UNHRC ‘Concluding Observations on Chile's Fourth Periodic Report’ (30 March 1999) UN Doc 
CCPR/C/79/Add.1094, para 22; UNHRC ‘Concluding Observations of the Human Rights Committee: Republic of 
Guatemala’ (27 August 2001) UN Doc CCPR/CO/72/GTM; UN Committee on the Elimination of Racial 
Discrimination (CERD), ‘General Recommendation XXIII: Indigenous Peoples’ (18 August 1997) UN Doc 
A/52/18, annex V; CERD ‘Decision 1(53): Australia’ (11 August 1998) UN Doc A/53/18; CERD ‘Concluding 
Observations on United States of America’ (14 August 2001) UN Doc A/56/18 paras 380–407; CERD ‘Concluding 
Observations: Argentina’ UN Doc CERD/C/65/CO/1 (August 2004), para 16; CERD ‘Conclusions and 
Recommendations of the Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination: Suriname’ UN Doc 
CERD/C/64/CO/9 (2004); CERD ‘Conclusions and Recommendations of the Committee on the Elimination of 
Racial Discrimination: Suriname’ ibid; CERD ‘Decision 1(66): New Zealand Foreshore and Seabed Act 2004’ (11 
March 2005) CERD/C/66/NZL/Dec.1; UN Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (CESCR) 
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Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination’s (CERD Committee) 
interpretation of freedom from racial discrimination as expressed in its General 
Recommendation 23, calls upon States parties:226 
 
to recognize and protect the rights of Indigenous peoples to own, develop, control and use 
their communal lands, territories and resources and, where they have been deprived of their 
lands and territories traditionally owned or otherwise inhabited or used without their free 
and informed consent, to take steps to return those lands and territories. Only when this is 
for factual reasons not possible, the right to restitution should be substituted by the right to 
just, fair and prompt compensation. Such compensation should as far as possible take the 
form of lands and territories. 
 
225. New Zealand has been criticized by the CERD Committee for its treatment of 
Indigenous rights under its early warning procedure.227 The Committee was 
concerned with the Foreshore and Seabed Act 2004, which removed the ability 
of Māori to claim proprietary rights in the foreshore and seabed and instead 
allowed Māori to claim non-exclusive customary rights in the area. According 
to the Committee the proposed legislation contained “discriminatory 
elements.”228  
 
226. But Declaration also recognizes that Indigenous peoples may be displaced from 
their lands and natural resources. And in such cases a rectification process is 
called for which includes a right to restitution. Article 27 refers to a mechanism 
for lands that were formerly possessed and occupied by them.229  But article 28 
specifically notes the right to redress.  
 
Article 28 
1. Indigenous peoples have the right to redress, by means that can include restitution or, 
when this is not possible, just, fair and equitable compensation, for the lands, territories 
and resources which they have traditionally owned or otherwise occupied or used, and 
which have been confiscated, taken, occupied, used or damaged without their free, prior 
and informed consent. 
2. Unless otherwise freely agreed upon by the peoples concerned, compensation shall 
take the form of lands, territories and resources equal in quality, size and legal status or 
of monetary compensation or other appropriate redress. 
 
227. The right of Indigenous peoples to their lands, territories and resources that they 
have been dispossessed of is endorsed by a number of decisions including Yakye 
                                                 
‘Concluding Observations: Bolivia’ (21 May 2001) UN Doc E/C.12/1/Add.60, CESCR ‘Concluding Observations: 
Ecuador’ (7 June 2004) UN Doc E/C.12/1/Add.100; UN Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination Against 
Women ‘Concluding Observations: Australia’ UN Doc A/52/38/Rev.1 Part II (12 August 1997) at para 119. 
226 General Recommendation 23. 
227 Claire Charters and Andrew Erueti (eds), Māori Property Rights and the Foreshore and Seabed: The Last 
Frontier (Wellington: VUP, 2007). 
228 CERD/C/DEC/NZL/1 (March 2005). 
229 The preamble of the Declaration also notes “that Indigenous peoples have suffered from historic injustices as a 
result of, inter alia, their colonization and dispossession of their lands, territories and resources, thus preventing 
them from exercising, in particular, their right to development in accordance with their own needs and interests.” 
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Axe v Paraguay and Sawhoyamaxa v Paraguay,230 which upheld the Indigenous 
peoples’ rights to lands, territories and resources titled to third parties under 
Paraguayan law without their knowledge let alone consent.  
 
228. As noted above, the aboriginal rights to natural resources is premised on the idea 
of there being extant rights that can be given effect in law. Thus if rights have 
expired (so they are not exercised in fact due to the pressures of colonisation) or 
been legally extinguished the common law cannot recognize the rights. In 
contrast, International Indigenous rights law recognizes extant rights (for 
example Article 26 of the Declaration) but goes further in recognizing the right 
to restitution in those cases where the rights may have expired or been 
extinguished at law (Article 27). That means there is less pressure on Indigenous 
peoples to show continuity of connection and use although there would still be a 
requirement to show that the aboriginal rights holder is extant.  
 
D Conclusion 
  
229. Government persists in advancing a right to culture model in relation to Māori 
rights to water, rejecting both political authority or tino rangatiratanga in the 
resource and proprietary rights. As we saw in the first section, aboriginal rights 
law and legal practice support Māori proprietary rights to natural resources and 
the treaty recognised the continuing right to political authority over natural 
resources. International Indigenous rights law recognises both the right of 
Indigenous peoples to own their traditional lands and natural resources as well 
as exercise self-determination over those natural resources. In fact the rights set 
out in the Declaration are influenced by the types of normative arguments and 
legal practice that emanate from New Zealand  and the other Anglo-common law 
nations.231   
 
V Business and human rights and Māori proprietary rights to water. 
 
230. The intersection of water as a private property right and yet a fundamental human 
right emphasizes the importance of the UN Guiding Principles on Business and 
Human Rights232 (‘UN Guiding Principles’), in particular the requirement to 
satisfy due diligence. In light of the corporatisation of water rights and the 
existing and unrecognised Indigenous rights to water the first part of this section 
will review the UN Guiding Principles before examining differences that may 
exist between such an approach and that of due diligence. The final parts will 
                                                 
230 Case of the Indigenous Community Sawhoyamaxa v Paraguay (Merits, Reparations and Costs) Inter-American 
Court of Human Rights Series C No 146 (29 March 2006); and Case of the Indigenous Community Yakye Axa v 
Paraguay (Merits, Reparations and Costs) Inter-American Court of Human Rights Series C No 125 (17 June 2005). 
231 See Kingsbury “Competing Conceptual Approaches”; Andrew Erueti “Comparing domestic principles of 
demarcation with emerging principles of International Law” Arizona Journal of International and Comparative 
Law, 23(3), 543. 
232 16 June 2011, Human Rights Council, Geneva 
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discuss the requirement to undertake due diligence as it relates to Indigenous 
rights to water before some concluding thoughts.  
 
 
Part One 
 
UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights 
 
231. In June 2011, the UN Human Rights Council unanimously endorsed the UN 
Guiding Principles as the first global standard for preventing and addressing the 
adverse human rights impacts of business activities, such as the effect of the 
commodification of water for agricultural purposes or for the operation of 
hydroelectric facilities on a human right to water.233 This endorsement 
effectively established this Guide as “the authoritative global standard for 
addressing business related human rights challenges”.234 The UN Guiding 
Principles set out a three-pronged “Protect, Respect and Remedy” framework235 
and applies in all operational contexts including those that have a bearing on 
Indigenous peoples.236  
 
232. The first pillar confirms the State duty to protect against human rights abuses by 
third parties, especially business enterprises.237 Therefore, States are not by 
itself, responsible for the human rights abuses of third parties.238 However, States 
may breach their human rights obligations where such abuses can be attributed 
to them, or when they fail to take appropriate steps to prevent and redress 
corporate-related harm. Although businesses are not expected to be surrogate 
states, when states have a weak rule of law and provide inadequate services for 
Indigenous peoples, often businesses are perceived in this light.239 Thereby 
highlighting the need for states and businesses to work together to protect human 
and Indigenous rights, including an Indigenous right to water. 
 
233. The second and most important pillar is the corporate responsibility to respect 
human rights.240 It requires business to ensure that they do not adversely impact 
                                                 
233 For a discussion of the relationship between the UN Guiding Principles and the UN Global Compact see 
explanatory note at <http://www.unglobalcompact.org>. 
234 Anaya “Comment on the Human Rights Council’s Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights as related 
to Indigenous Peoples and the Right to Participate in Decision Making with a Focus on Extractive Industries 
(A/HRC/EMRIP/2012/CRP1)” para 21. 
235 A/HRC/17/31 para 6. 
236 Anaya A/HRC/EMRIP/2012/2, above n 231, para 23. Although it is noted that Indigenous peoples are not 
referred to in the text of the UNGPs only in a footnote – this could be viewed as a flaw in the UNGPs. 
237 For a full discussion of how this first pillar relates to Indigenous peoples see Anaya A/HRC/EMRIP/2012/2 
above n 231, para 26. 
238 General Assembly Report A/68/279 “Human rights and transnational corporations and other business 
enterprises” August 6 2013 at p 7.  
239 United Nations Global Compact, United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples: Business 
Reference Guide (United Nations Global Compact Office, New York, 2013), p 6. 
240 For a full discussion of how this second pillar relates to Indigenous peoples see Anaya A/HRC/EMRIP/2012/2, 
above n 231, para 27. 
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on the rights of others and address such impacts when they do occur.241 The 
corporate responsibility to respect human rights is based on the notion that, even 
though business are not subjects of international human rights law, they 
nonetheless have a tremendous impact on the human rights and well-being of 
people around the globe.242  
 
234. The Guiding Principles further recognizes “the role of business enterprises as 
specialized organs of society performing specialized functions” and businesses 
are required to respect human rights throughout their operations. That is, 
businesses should avoid infringing on the human rights of others, including 
Indigenous Peoples, and should address adverse human rights impacts with 
which they are involved.243  In particular, businesses must:244 
 
(a) avoid causing or contributing to adverse human rights impacts through their own 
activities, and address such impacts when they occur; and 
 
(b) seek to prevent or mitigate adverse human rights impacts that are directly linked 
to their operations, products or services by their business relationships, even if 
they have not contributed to those impacts. 
 
235. Finally, the third pillar encompasses both the State duty to provide an effective 
remedy and the corporate responsibility to address and remedy human rights 
impacts that they contribute to.245 
 
236. Importantly, the UN Guiding Principles do not create any new binding rules of 
international law or impose additional obligations on business. Instead they build 
on existing rules of human rights law and clarify the respective roles of states 
and businesses.  
 
237. When the Guiding Principles first appeared before the UN Human Rights 
Council in March 2011, there was no singular reference to the rights of 
                                                 
241 Principle 11 of the UN Guiding Principles. For further discussion see The Corporate Responsibility to Respect 
Human Rights: An Interpretive Guide, UN Office of the High Commission for Human Rights 
<http://www.business-humanrights.org> 
242 See discussion in Gavin Hilson ‘Corporate Social Responsibility in the extractive industries: Experiences from 
developing countries’ Resources Policy, Volume 37, Issue 2, June 2012, Pages 131–137. 
243 Principle 11 of the Guiding Principles. For a discussion of this, see The Corporate Responsibility to Respect 
Human Rights: An Interpretive Guide, UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights 
(http://www.business-humanrights.org/media/documents/corporate-responsibility-to-respect-interpretive-guide-nov-
2011.pdf) 
244 Principle 13 of the Guiding Principles, 
http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Publications/GuidingPrinciplesBusinessHR_EN.pdf. Nonetheless see discussion 
by Emma Gilberthorpe and Glenn Banks ‘Development on whose terms? CSR discourse and social realities in 
Papua New Guinea's extractive industries sector’ Resources Policy Volume 37, Issue 2, June 2012, pp 185 – 193 
where they note one of the weaknesses include ‘ill-conceived and inappropriate development programmes that 
generate inequality, fragmentation, and social and economic insecurity’ 
245 For a full discussion of how this third pillar relates to Indigenous peoples see Anaya A/HRC/EMRIP/2012/2, 
above n 231, para 28.  
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Indigenous Peoples. In June 2011, however, the Council directed the Working 
Group on Business and Human Rights to give special attention to persons living 
in vulnerable situations, including Indigenous Peoples.246  
 
UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights and Due 
Diligence 
 
238. The UN Guiding Principles is relatively new and to some degree untested but 
empowers Indigenous peoples and creates more of an obligation on businesses 
than due diligence which is a more measured approach. Unlike many 
international human rights instruments, the UN Guiding Principles is unique in 
that it recognises Indigenous rights whereas general international human 
instruments do not.247  
 
239. As a general starting point, it has been observed that the UN Guiding Principles 
are opaque in precisely what they require of states and businesses.248 It could be 
that they empower Indigenous peoples to request a higher standard when 
engaging with businesses, providing a capacity to empower Indigenous peoples. 
Equally, however, it could be that they only require a bare minimum of 
consultation, as some businesses have implemented. It is possible to argue that 
the UN Guiding Principles can provide a better outcome for Indigenous peoples 
when read together with the UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous 
Peoples. This approach would provide a creative opportunity to ensure that 
fundamental Indigenous rights are recognised, such as consultation in 
accordance to Indigenous culture and norms, by Māori for Māori, empowering 
Māori, as the rights holder, from the beginninng of the process to the end. Māori 
should be equal decision makers as active consultation cannot exist without 
Indigenous peoples. In effect this could be viewed as akin to a veto right.249  
 
240. Nonetheless, regardless of its precise contours, the concept of due diligence as it 
relates to businesses seeking to engage with Māori as rights holders is considered 
to be an orthodox starting point for Indigenous peoples to explore, and is 
therefore the focus of this section. This obligation of due diligence is ongoing 
and more than just regard to the existing legal framework. Once established 
systems must also be in place to mitigate any human rights violations should 
they occur. This would include issues such as pollution of water ways, damaging 
the ecosystems and associated environmental loss. 
 
                                                 
246 The UN Permanent Forum on Indigenous Issues is actively collaborating with this working group. 
247 Instruments such as the ICESCR and ICCPR contain general human rights and, on their own, do not meet the 
cultural and political concerns of indigenous people. However, considered in light of favourable general comments 
and creative legal interpretations of treaty monitoring-body decisions can, advance indirectly indigenous rights. 
248 Human Rights Clinic (Columbia Law School) and International Human Rights Clinic (Harvard Law School) 
‘Righting wrongs? Papua New Guinea, Key Concerns and Lessons Learnt’ (November 2015), 
249 Human Rights Clinic (Columbia Law School) and International Human Rights Clinic (Harvard Law School) 
‘Righting wrongs? Papua New Guinea, Key Concerns and Lessons Learnt’ (November 2015). 
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Part Two 
 
241. It is impossible for any businesses to anticipate how its future operations may 
impact on the specific rights of all Indigenous groups, subsequently, the issue of 
due diligence is important. 
 
Due Diligence 
 
242. As the corporate responsibility to respect human rights exists independently of 
the states willingness to fulfil its human rights obligations, business enterprises 
should not assume that compliance with State law equals compliance with 
international standards on Indigenous rights.250 Rather, businesses should 
conduct due diligence251 to ensure that their actions do not trample on the 
international Indigenous rights of Indigenous Peoples, including a right to water.  
 
243. Due Diligence is a term used for a number of concepts including the requirement 
to an act with a certain standard of care. So, with respect to the intersection 
between corporate responsibility and Indigenous rights, including an Indigenous 
right to water, due diligence should place an onus on businesses to act with a 
certain standard of care when engaging with, or seeking to operate on, 
Indigenous lands and territories. 
 
244. The initial step is to identify relevant domestic laws and policies relating to 
Indigenous rights. In particular, businesses should determine whether the 
government recognises collective ownership rights, and the extent to which the 
Indigenous peoples have received a formal title.252 This is a typical area of risk 
for businesses as some countries do not recognise collective rights of Indigenous 
peoples, or only provide title for an area smaller than the groups have 
traditionally used or occupied.253 This also means that the domestic law might 
not require the State to consult with Indigenous peoples prior to granting 
concessions or water permits on or near their lands. 
 
245. Due diligence can assist businesses to recognise and address any gaps between 
New Zealand’s domestic law and international law. Where these gaps are readily 
apparent, businesses should consult experts with specialised knowledge in 
international human rights law, especially those relating to Indigenous peoples’ 
rights. This will allow businesses to not only identify areas where the New 
                                                 
250 Anaya, above n 231, [53]. 
251 See also United Nations Global Compact, United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples: 
Business Reference Guide (United Nations Global Compact Office, New York, 2013) pp 15 20. 
252 Many States will claim natural resources, such as water, are ‘State owned’ dispossessing Indigenous peoples of 
their lands, territories and resources. See Anaya A/HRC/EMRIP 2012/2, above n 226, paras 32 – 35. This highlights 
the importance of due diligence. 
253 United Nations Global Compact, United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples: Business 
Reference Guide (United Nations Global Compact Office, New York, 2013) at 16. 
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Zealand’s domestic law falls short, but also to better understand the nature and 
scope of  Indigenous rights.  
 
246. Businesses should also exercise due diligence to determine the potential impacts 
their projects may have on Indigenous rights. The idea is to understand the 
specific impacts on specific groups, within the context of the business’ 
operations.254 In this connection, businesses should be aware that not all 
Indigenous groups are the same and that each has its own unique relationship 
with traditional lands, territories and resources. It is, of course, quite possible 
that a particular activity may not have an adverse impact on the rights of one 
Indigenous group, but may severely impact the rights of another group. 
Businesses need to be aware, and perform their due diligence in a manner that is 
respectful to the Indigenous groups concerned.  
 
247. With this in mind, businesses should consider developing a joint impact 
statement with the Indigenous group. A joint impact statement will allow the 
business to identify potential risks as the Indigenous group will often have 
specialised knowledge on their lands, natural resources and culture. It can also 
assist to foster a relationship between the business and the Indigenous 
community, which in turn, strengthens the business’s social license to operate 
within their territories.  
 
248. Once the due diligence process is complete, businesses should integrate the 
findings from their impact assessments and take appropriate actions. These 
findings should be made available to the affected Indigenous peoples in a manner 
and form that they can easily understand. It should also allow for input and 
suggestions from the affected Indigenous groups in accordance with their own 
customs, systems and decision-making processes. Effective integration also 
requires that the responsibility for addressing adverse human rights impacts be 
assigned to the appropriate level and function within the business. 
 
249. Indigenous peoples should be able to participate in this process and ensure that 
the business is taking appropriate steps to address those impacts.  
 
250. In assessing human rights impacts, businesses will need to look for both actual 
and potential adverse impacts, especially those that have been identified by the 
Indigenous community itself. Potential impacts should be prevented or at least 
mitigated across all parts of the business by drawing on the knowledge and 
recommendations of the Indigenous peoples concerned. Actual impacts, on the 
other hand, should be addressed immediately and be subject to remediation. 
Moreover, the business should also track and monitor the impact of its activities 
                                                 
254 See Report by OECD ‘Stakeholder engagement due diligence in extractive industries’ 
which states that ‘the rationale for due diligence is when the ‘proper mode of engagement is not identified an applied 
stakeholders perspectives may not be adequately integrated into project decisions and an enterprise may face 
liabilities (e.g. if it does not comply with relevant legal obligations regarding engagement such as an obligation to 
obtain consent)’. Available https://mneguidelines.oecd.org/stakeholder-engagement-extractive-industries.htm. 
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on the Indigenous community. This can be achieved through regular 
consultations and inviting feedback from the Indigenous peoples. 
 
  
251. In sum, due diligence requires businesses 
 
a. To not contribute to the State’s failure to meet international obligations in 
relation to Indigenous rights  
b. To not replace the role of the State in fulfilment of those obligations, but promote 
the full assumption by States of such responsibility 
c. To identify Indigenous ownership or possession of land and natural resources 
d. To identify in advance the existence of Indigenous peoples that may be affected 
by their activities 
e. To consult with Indigenous peoples prior to the adoption of measures that may 
affect them 
 
252. If businesses continued with projects knowing that the State has failed to carry 
out for example, consultation or identification of Indigenous ownership – 
businesses would fall short of their due diligence. In this regard, due diligence 
requires businesses to identify and address potential risks that their activities may 
have on the rights of Indigenous peoples. Indigenous peoples have a right to be 
consulted on those risks and to influence how those risks will be addressed.   
 
Part Three 
 
Remedies  
 
253. The UN Declaration articulates that Indigenous Peoples builds on and manifests 
the long-standing common body of opinion of principles that recognise the rights 
of indigenous peoples such as a right to water. The UN Declaration, clearly 
articulates these rights.  
 
 
Article 32: 
2. States shall consult and cooperate in good faith with the indigenous peoples concerned 
through their own representative institutions in order to obtain their free and informed consent 
prior to the approval of any project affecting their lands or territories and other resources, 
particularly in connection with the development, utilization or exploitation of mineral, water 
or other resources. 
 
Article 25: 
Indigenous peoples have the right to maintain and strengthen 
their distinctive spiritual relationship with their traditionally owned or 
otherwise occupied and used lands, territories, waters and coastal seas 
and other resources and to uphold their responsibilities to future 
generations in this regard [emphasis added].  
 
Article 26 
1. Indigenous peoples have the right to the lands, territories and resources which they 
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have traditionally owned, occupied or otherwise used or acquired. 
2. Indigenous peoples have the right to own, use, develop and control the lands, 
territories and resources that they possess by reason of traditional ownership or other 
traditional occupation or use, as well as those which they have otherwise acquired. 
3. States shall give legal recognition and protection to these lands, territories and 
resources. Such recognition shall be conducted with due respect to the customs, 
traditions and land tenure systems of the Indigenous peoples concerned. 
 
Article 27 
States shall establish and implement, in conjunction with Indigenous peoples concerned, 
a fair, independent, impartial, open and transparent process, giving due recognition to 
Indigenous peoples’ laws, traditions, customs and land tenure systems, to recognize and 
adjudicate the rights of Indigenous peoples pertaining to their lands, territories and 
resources, including those which were traditionally owned or otherwise occupied or 
used. Indigenous peoples shall have the right to participate in this process. 
 
 
254. When these articles are read together with the key article of the Declaration 
asserting self- determination for Indigenous peoples255; 
 
“Indigenous peoples have the right of self-determination. By virtue of that right they freely 
determine their political status and freely pursue their economic, social and cultural 
development.” 
 
255. These clauses provide that Māori as Indigenous people “have the right to 
maintain and strengthen their distinctive relationship with their traditionally 
owned water and the New Zealand Government is required to consult and 
cooperate with Māori to obtain their free prior and informed consent prior to the 
approval of any development, utilization or exploitation of water." 
 
256. Despite this the New Zealand Government and businesses often fail to recognise 
these rights. Businesses often act on the fact that Indigenous rights have not been 
adequately recognised by the New Zealand Government and not recognised in 
international instruments and therefore do not consider these rights when 
carrying out their business activities, often pointing to economic benefits of the 
project and emphasise the national benefits as a justification. However, 
economic benefit is often not a priority for Indigenous peoples and many are 
sceptical of any benefit.256 
 
257. New Zealand has a duty to protect the rights of Indigenous people against 
adverse Corporate behaviour and the Business has a responsibility to act 
consistently with the UN Declaration. Just because the UN Declaration may not 
be incorporated into domestic legislation does not mean these rights do not exist 
and indeed does not mean that these rights should not be respected by the 
Business. 
 
                                                 
255 Article 3. 
256 Anaya A66/288 (20111) para 107. 
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258. Businesses cannot state “we are complying with domestic law” as a way to 
abscond from adhering to the rights contained in the UN Declaration, these 
Indigenous rights exist independently. Even if the State fails to recognise these 
rights in the UN Declaration, the business has a responsibility to respect 
Indigenous rights. 
 
259. In particular, the Indigenous right of self-determination should be respected and 
the “protect, respect and remedy” framework articulated in the Guiding 
Principles on Business and Human Rights should be applied the same way as 
human rights are applied. So, when property rights law has been established, the 
same standard attaches. Arguably for Indigenous people a higher standard 
applies due to the cultural component when compared to a non-Indigenous 
peoples property right. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
